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INTRODUCTION

The judicial enforceability of economic, social, and cultural rights has received increasing attention worldwide over
the last decade. Both scholars and practitioners have challenged longstanding conceptions about the nature of such
rights and their suitability for case-by-case adjudication, shifting the debate increasingly away from ideology and decontextualized stereotypes of rights toward the technical and jurisdictional issues that accompany case-based litigation in the
human rights field: system-specific justiciability doctrine, admissibility requirements, appropriate balancing tests, remedial
deference, and supervision of compliance with final orders or
settlements. As a result, a small but growing number of contentious cases has been brought before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at the national and supranational level, seeking to
vindicate and remedy through the law discrete injuries caused
by arbitrary state conduct that concretely and unreasonably infringe individuals' enjoyment of their rights to adequate
health, education, housing, social security, cultural integrity,
and just labor conditions.'
Some of these cases, particularly at the national level,
have met with resounding success and have been instrumental
in rationalizing arbitrary state policy and in setting binding
framework principles to be built upon in future litigation and
social mobilization strategies. Others have been less successful, often as a result of litigant errors in matters of jurisdictional competence. Many falter, as is common in supranational litigation, at the implementation stage. What the evolving jurisprudential record makes plain, however, is that the
relative success or non-success of social rights litigation de1. For the most up-to-date single-volume source of this jurisprudence,
see SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE:

EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE AND

INTERNATIONAL LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., forthcoming) [hereinafter SocLAL RIGi-TSJURJSPRUDENCE]. This author has two chapters in that book, ana-

lyzing the social rights jurisprudence of, respectively, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.
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pends not on the normative characterization of a given claim
as a violation of a "civil and political" or "economic, social, and
cultural" right-a distinction of increasingly questionable
value in legal settings-but rather on the relative sophistication of the legal and extralegal strategies undertaken by litigants and their on-the-ground partners. This is true, albeit in
different ways, in relation to both the technical legal arguments urged before the competent jurisdictional body and the
implementation and follow-up strategies undertaken by advocates on the ground.
In their recent article, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas,
James L. Cavallaro and Emily J. Schaffer advance a recommended strategy for social rights litigation in the inter-American human rights system that sidelines these positive developments in human rights litigation theory and practice, urging a
return instead to unhelpful rights-based stereotypes of the
past.2 Employing such distinctions as a proxy for claim-based

justiciability doctrine, they advance a less-as-more thesis that
contends that less direct litigation of social rights will lead to
more on-the-ground implementation. In this view, "direct approaches" to social rights litigation-whereby advocates rely
on legal norms that autonomously guarantee the rights to
health, housing, education, social security, or adequate labor
conditions when those rights are breached to the detriment of
individuals by arbitrary or unreasonable state conduct-are
"suspect." Rather, advocates must take a more "thoughtful and
responsible" approach to achieving "social justice" in the
3
Americas.
2. James L. Cavallaro & EmilyJ. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS
L.J. 217 (2005). A similar approach is taken with respect to the United Nations human rights system in Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social and CulturalRights: Should There Be an International
Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, Health?,
98 Am. J. INT'L L. 462, 464, 467 (2004), which likewise draws on stereotyped
dichotomies between rights to question the propriety of creating an international complaints mechanism for social rights adjudication under an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The conclusions in the present Article, while responding directly to the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis, are equally relevant to the arguments
advanced by Dennis and Stewart.
3. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 263, 267, 281.
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This "wiser" and "more restrained" path rests not, however, on ensuring that individual claims are jurisdictionally
well-crafted, properly limited to their justiciable elements, or
reflect a certain margin of appreciation 4 for the state at issue.
Rather, playing on classic stereotypes of the judicial enforceability of different classes of abstract rights, Cavallaro and
Schaffer recommend that litigants simply recast social rights
claims, including in their broadest, most structural or diffuse
5
dimensions, as violations of classic civil and political rights.
Thus, arbitrary government abuses in the areas of health,
housing, education, social security, freedom to unionize, or
just labor conditions should not be adjudicated as actual violations of those rights-despite their autonomous guarantee in
the region's binding human rights instruments and regardless
of how broadly or narrowly they might be framed-but rather
primarily as breaches of the rights to life, liberty, integrity,
property, and non-discrimination. 6 They re-term their proposed strategy an "elements approach," arguing that social
4. "Margin of appreciation," a term used predominantly in the European human rights system, refers to the latitude of deference or error a supranational organ will allow to national legislative, executive, administrative,
and judicial bodies in striking a balance between a right guaranteed by a
human rights treaty and a permitted derogation, restriction, or limitation
thereon, before it is prepared to declare such derogation, restriction, or limitation a violation of one of the treaty's substantive guarantees. See, e.g.,
HOWARD CHARLES YouRow, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE
DYNAMics OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996) [hereinafter THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION].
5. See, e.g., Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 274-75 ("This Article
contends that a strategy that focuses on expansive interpretation of civil and
political rights provides greater impetus for the advance of economic, social,
and cultural rights within the national legal systems of the Americas by providing guidance for expansive interpretations of civil and political rights,
uniformly guaranteed by the constitutions of American States."; "[O]ur focus is on the protection of elements [of civil and political rights] with economic, social, and cultural implications, rather than on formal acceptance of
the rights themselves."), 275-80 (commending hypothetical "test cases" that
address broad, structural, or diffuse dimensions of social rights claims under
frame of civil-political norms).
6. See id. at 274 ("In other words, it may be more efficient for the system
to recognize the right to medicine or treatment in a particular matter as an
element of the right to life or the ight to physical integrity than to force the
system to recognize, through the individual petitions process, economic, social, and cultural rights not deemed ripe for international litigation by
states.").
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rights abuses, if adjudicated at all, should be addressed in their
"civil and political elements." 7 These, they contend, are the
only fully 'justiciable" elements. 8 According to the authors,
such a norm-based focus-despite its simple name-changing
nature in the vast majority of cases-evidences "caution and
restraint."9 It will, in their view, correspondingly increase the
"legitimacy" of the litigation, support the "credibility" of the
adjudicatory bodies, and hence lead to more effective "real
world change" by states otherwise resistant to economic, social,
and cultural rights. 10
This Article questions the legal and factual bases upon
which the authors' thesis is constructed, highlighting the inconsistencies, both practical and conceptual, that result from
its application and advocating a more technical and jurisdictional approach to social rights litigation. It argues that realworld application of the authors' less-as-more thesis, will lead
7. The use of norms enshrining classic civil and political rights to protect their constitutive dimensions of a more economic, social or cultural nature has been termed an "integration approach," based on the idea that
rights cannot artificially be separated into categories or compartments. That
is, the right to life is as much an economic and social as a political right, just
as the right to education is as much a civil as a social and cultural right. See
TARA MELISH, PROTECTING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE

HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: A MANUAL ON PRESENTING CLAIMS
(2002) [hereinafter PROTECTING]. Distinctions between social, economic,
civil, political, and cultural rights generally obscure more than they illuminate; rarely are they useful on a practical level. Conceptually, then, the terminology "elements approach" may be problematic in its unhelpful tendency to reinforce the idea of rights as differentiable along subjective lines
of categorization. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
8. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 263 (contrasting approach
"seeking to incorporate economic, social, and cultural elements within the
scope of justiciable civil and political rights" with "a direct approach, in
which advocates allege violations of provisions of human rights instruments
that specifically refer to economic, social, and cultural rights"). For Cavallaro and Schaffer, economic, social and cultural rights lack corresponding
justiciable obligations, and thus are judicially unenforceable. See id. at 222,
252, 267-68.
9. Id. at 281.
10. Id. (suggesting that recommended approach "will enhance [litigants'] chances of success in their legal battles and also increase the likelihood of effecting real-world change, while maintaining the credibility of supranational oversight mechanisms themselves."; "Litigation as part of such
broader campaigns may advance economic, social, and cultural rights even
without litigating them directly. Within these constraints, international litigation
may be effective.") (emphasis added).
INTER-AMERICAN
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to neither less frequent litigation nor more implementation at
the local level. Neither will it lead to higher levels of legitimacy or credibility in supranational litigation.
To the contrary, having misidentified the source of the
problem, it will have precisely the inverse effect: more "distributive justice" claims framed as absolute/immediate entitlements that are undiscerning of core justiciability requirements, political realities, practical implementation time-tables,
queue-jumping concerns, and social movement synergies.
These are precisely the types of cases that are least likely to be
admissible under contentious process or to have long-term
real-world impacts. The result, at the practical level, will be to
undermine not only the economic, social, and cultural rights
for which the authors seek expanded real-world protectionthe substantive and procedural contours of which will now be
placed off-limits from direct judicial interrogation in concrete
individual contexts-but also, through inattentiveness to system-specific justiciability doctrine, the civil and political rights
on which they seek to rely and stake the regional system's legitimacy.1' Indeed, the predictably perverse results that follow
from the authors' thesis should serve as a clarion call to both
advocates and governments to avoid distinctions between any
12
category or class of rights.
This inverted outcome results inevitably from two critical
flaws in the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis, one conceptual, one
technical-jurisdictional. The first is the unexamined distinction between civil and political rights as "immediately enforceable" and economic, social and cultural rights as "lacking enforceable duties," a distinction that lies at the heart of the thesis and, at a broader level, represents one of the most
enduring misperceptions in human rights advocacy and litigation today. 13 It is this conceptual error that leads the authors
11. See discussion infra Part VI.

12. For further discussion on the unintended consequences of distinguishing in litigation contexts between categories of rights and applying different state obligations to each, see Tara J. Melish, Beyond "Separate But
Equal": DesegregatingHuman Rights Duties and Taking Social Rights Adjudication

Seriously (unpublished manuscript, on file with The New York University
Journal of International Law & Politics).
13. This misperception has, in many ways, defined the core arguments of
detractors and supporters of social rights litigation alike. While detractors
use the distinction to favor civil-political-rights litigation and to distinguish
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to posit that the formal renaming of a social rights claim as a
civil-political rights case is sufficient to convert an otherwise
"non-justiciable" claim into a 'justiciable" one. This view underappreciates the complex dimensionality of the legal obligations attaching to human rights guarantees and, fundamentally, the relevance of claim-based justiciability doctrine to the
proper framing of an adjudicable case. The second flaw derives from the failure to adequately distinguish four staples of
the supranational litigator's daily fare: subject matterjurisdiction,
justiciablebreaches, remedy crafting, and enforcement/implementation
strategies. The Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis entangles critical ele14
ments of each, conflating distinct jurisdictional requisites
15
and stages of litigation, often by superimposing upon them
pre-conceived or unexamined notions of the nature of distinct
rights and their corresponding obligations.
This Article seeks to respond to the Cavallaro-Schaffer
less-as-more thesis by disentangling its constituent elements
and reframing it from a technical-jurisdictional perspective.
In so doing, it sets out a distinct vision of the adjudicable ambit of social rights claims, one delimited not by outmoded dichotomies between classes of rights, but rather by the jurisdictional limits of supranational bodies in the exercise of adjudicatory, as distinct from promotional, functions. Those limits
social rights as programmatic, supporters have tended to accept the distinction just as uncritically, focusing on the creation of a priori doctrines and
typologies to carve out and define the "immediately enforceable" components of social rights. The two most popular at the moment involve, first,
the abstract definition of a right's "minimum core content," the guarantee
of which is said to be "immediately enforceable," as contrasted with the
right's "progressive" periphery and, second, a division among either the tripartite duties of respect, protect, and fulfill (the former two denominated
"immediate," the latter "progressive") or the concepts of an immediate "prohibition on regressivity" verses a non-immediate "duty of progressive realization." It is contended that these standard social rights doctrines fail to hold
much explanatory power or practical resonance in litigation contexts. They
often lead to absurd results upon application in concrete contexts. The resulting disconnect between currently ascendant social rights theory and litigation practice will be addressed more fully elsewhere, particularly as it is
illuminated by the quadrant-based framework set out in Part III of this Article. See id.
14. In particular, they conflate subject-matter jurisdiction and the framing of a justiciable controversy. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 264.
15. They particularly conflate case-framing, remedy-crafting, and enforcement initiatives. Id. at 268.
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correspond to all rights-based claims, regardless of the subjective characterization of the legal norm under which they are
framed. In this regard, it is insisted that more focused, responsibly-crafted, higher-quality litigation leads to better results,
both jurisprudentially and on the ground. This end, however,
requires careful attention to jurisdictional and justiciability
concerns at the stage of framing the substantive and remedial
scope of a case and not, as the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis implies, to the outer cloaking of a claim as a "civil and political
right." Good lawyering, based on well-crafted claims that adhere to the fundamental elements of a justiciable case, not
transparent decoys designed to hoodwink governments into
thinking they are dealing with "immediately enforceable" civil
and political rights, is needed to expand legitimate judicial
protection of economic, social, and cultural rights.
After outlining the contours of the Cavallaro-Schaffer lessas-more thesis in Part II of this Article, Part III.A addresses its
principal underlying error: the premise that jurisdictional
provisions directly protecting economic, social, and cultural
rights in the inter-American system contain no "enforceable
rights" and "no definite grounds for state responsibility" cognizable in the individual petitions process.' 6 This assessment is
based on a faulty reading of the system's jurisdictional instruments, neglect of contrary decisions by the system's supervisory organs, an unwarranted conflation of the frequency and
justiciability of certain types of litigation, and an uncritical reliance on one piece of isolated obiter dictum in a recent decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("Court").
The corresponding error is addressed in two parts, each
directed at demonstrating why autonomous social rights
claims are no less enforceable in the regional system than
those framed under classic civil and political rights. The first
clarifies the inter-American organs' uncontested ratione materiaejurisdiction over social rights norms in the individual complaints procedure. The second contrasts this norm-specific jurisdiction from the equally-important claim-specific constraint
of justiciability. It describes the parameters of a justiciable
controversy in the regional system and highlights the critical
jurisdictional role those parameters serve in distinguishing between claims appropriate for case-based adjudicationand those
16. Id. at 267-68.
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more suited to political mechanisms of control. That dividing
line falls not, as the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis implies, between
abstract categories of rights but rather between claims that fulfill and those that fail to fulfill the elements of a justiciable
controversy. The point to be underscored is the fundamental
difference between the subjective characterization of a given
claim-i.e., whether it is normatively described as civil, cultural, economic, political, or social-and the constituent elements of that claim, whatever its subjective characterization,that
enable rules of decision to be applied to it in an adjudicatory
context. Only the latter is relevant in contentious processes
once appropriate subject matter jurisdiction is assured.
A new quadrant-based framework for distinguishing the
justiciable dimensions of state obligations from those more appropriate to supranational monitoring and promotional mechanisms is thus set out in Part III.A.2. The framework responds
to the principal problem underlying the Cavallaro-Schaffer
thesis: the view that different obligations apply to rights formally categorized as "civil and political" and those as "economic, social, and cultural." By insisting that the same spectrum of legal obligations apply to all human rights, but that
only certain dimensions of those obligations are cognizable
under adjudicatory process, the framework sets out a general
theory for supranational human rights litigation in individual
complaints procedures, irrespective of the formal right used in
litigation. The critical insight is that the dimension of obligations that any treaty-based supervisory body may properly apply to a given human rights issue or dispute depends not on
the subjective right at issue but rather on the nature of the
competence used by the supervisory instance in exercising jurisdiction over that issue or dispute. This distinction is too
often ignored by international human rights advocates, who
often seek to transfer unreflectively rights-based concepts and
duties developed or enunciated by supranational supervisory
bodies under their promotional or advisory mandates into
non-congruent adjudicatory contexts, where issues of justiciability take center stage.1 7 Because of historically-restricted
17. This is particularly true of the result-based duty of "progressive realization" and its corresponding "prohibition on regressivity," developed by the
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights through its periodic reporting procedures and general comments. Advocates have widely
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limits on the competence of these supervisory bodies, particularly the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, over-reliance in litigation contexts on their non-casebased 'jurisprudences" to characterize the adjudicable dimensions of state obligations tends to lead to misleading, and often
perverse, results in practice.
The "legitimacy" of social rights litigation is then addressed in Parts III.B and IV. Cavallaro and Schaffer's generalized assessment that social rights litigation is considered illegitimate by American states is questioned from an empirical
perspective. Part IV then turns to legitimacy in supranational
litigation more generally, highlighting the key features that
most commonly lead to legitimacy critiques and situating
Cavallaro and Schaffer's recommended test cases within them.
By ignoring these concerns, particularly those related to core
justiciability requirements, such as individualized injury-in-fact
and defendant-specific causal conduct, Cavallaro and Schaffer
recommend a strategic course that, if embraced, will in fact
exacerbate legitimacy concerns in supranational litigation.
Part V expands on this analysis by focusing in on the nature of adjudicable, as distinct from monitorable, breaches of international legal obligations. Cavallaro and Schaffer neglect
this distinction and, in so doing, fall into the trap of commending "hypothetical cases" that are not in fact cognizable in
the individual petitions process. They are more appropriate to
the promotional mandate of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights ("Commission") and other supranational
supervisory bodies, in conjunction with social movement advocacy, protest strategies, and monitoring and lobbying initiatives at the domestic level. That is, by simplistically substituting a facade of civil and political rights for a well-crafted argument attendant to justiciability and implementation concerns,
they replicate the same nettlesome issues they sought to avoid
in defining their less-as-more approach. In sum, they assume
that merely changing the name of the right will somehow
make the legitimacy concerns go away. This approach misattempted to convert these concepts into directly justiciable ones, with often
perverse results for the social rights at issue. See, e.g.,
TaraJ. Melish, A Pyrrhic
Victory for Peru's Pensioners:Pensions, Property, and the Perversion of Progressivity,I
CEJILJOURNAL: DEBATES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

51 (2005) [hereinafter A Pyrrhic Victory].
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perceives the legitimacy and justiciability problems facing
human rights litigants, problems that are not limited to any
particular category of rights but rather attend to how such
rights are translated into individual claims.
Part VI then turns to the practical implications of the
Cavallaro-Schaffer less-as-more thesis. Using actual cases resolved in the inter-American system it explains why an exclusive focus on classic civil and political rights or an "elements
approach" is unwarranted not only in jurisdictional terms but
also, most importantly, on a practical level. In this regard, it
also addresses the problem of "queue-jumping" raised by
Cavallaro and Schaffer and other skeptics of direct case-by-case
adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights.18 The
conclusion is drawn that while queue-jumping-the strategic
use of rights-based litigation to jump to the head of a line in
accessing scarce entitlements-is a serious concern in rightsbased adjudication, it in no way supports the notion that advocates should either limit their litigation initiatives to civil and
political rights norms or prefer alternative, non-adjudicatory
mechanisms for protecting economic, social, and cultural
rights, as Cavallaro and Schaffer suggest.' 9 Rather, the problem of queue-jumping-which affects all categories of rights
equally-is appropriately addressed through two interrelated
mechanisms: proper construction of the scope of individual
rights vis-d-vis the rights of others and proper design of remedial orders. The inter-American human rights system is well
equipped to deal with these issues within the adjudicatory process.
Finally, Part VII recasts the less-as-more thesis, providing a
new definition of what "less" should entail and specifically ex18. See also Dennis & Stewart, supra note 2, 464-66. The authors, U.S.
State Department attorneys, fall into the same conceptual traps as do Cavallaro and Schaffer, both in attempting to draw distinctions between "civil and
political" and "economic, social, and cultural" rights and in appreciating the
practical legal significance of justiciability doctrine in international complaints procedures.
19. While Cavallaro and Schaffer disavow that they "subscribe fully" to
arguments that reject all rights-based litigation given queue-jumping concerns, they conclude that litigation may be effective as part of a broader
political strategy to the extent that it does not invoke economic, social, and
cultural rights directly. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 281
("Within these constraints, international litigation may be effective.").
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cluding cases framed in terms similar to the Cavallaro-Schaffer
hypotheticals. It sets out a general framework for approaching
social rights litigation, one which takes into account the distinct jurisdictional requirements and procedural stages of adjudication. Whether utilizing an "indirect," "integration," "direct," or "complex violations" approach, 20 advocates should
not choose the strategic focus of their cases based on any superficial or predetermined characterization of the claim at issue but rather on the nature of the specific issue or value they
seek to vindicate. To do otherwise is to undermine the very
raison d'etre of establishing internationally-recognized human
rights; we lose essential aspects of what it is to be human and
to live with human dignity.
II.

THE CAVALLARO-SCHAFFER THESIS, IN RELIEF

I begin by outlining the contours of the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis, pulling out the central features that define the argument. Cavallaro and Schaffer in effect offer two disconnected
theses, the first set out in Parts I and II of their article, the
second in Parts III and IV. The first, uncontroversial and
largely unassailable, relates to the implementation stage of
human rights litigation and is illustrated by classic civil-political rights cases. The second, falsely premised and unsustainable, refers to the pleading stage and draws conclusions about
economic, social, and cultural rights. While presented as if
they formed an unbroken crescendo of argument, there is in
fact no logical link between the two: They address different
stages of litigation and involve distinct sets of strategic decisions by lawyers and advocacy groups. In fact, not only do the
evidence and conclusions offered in the first half of the article
fail to support the ultimate conclusion that the legitimacy and
real-world impact of social rights adjudication requires reliance on civil-and-political-rights norms, they directly undermine it. The two halves of the thesis-the "more" and the
"less"-simply fail to correspond in any meaningful way.

20. These four approaches to social rights litigation in the inter-Ameican system are described at length in PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 193-357.
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Thesis I: Low Rates of Real-World Implementation
of SupranationalOrders

Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis I, referring to the "more" in
their less-as-more thesis, addresses the ultimate goal of all
human rights litigation: actual on-the-ground implementation
of supranational remedial orders.2 1 Such remedial orders aim
not only at returning the victim-plaintiff to the status quo ante
(through measures of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation) but also at preventing recurrence of the same or similar violations in the future (through measures of satisfaction
and guarantees of non-repetition aimed at long-term, structural policy change).22 As practiced human rights litigants are
intimately aware, the implementation stage of litigation-including implementation of negotiated friendly settlementsoften presents the most difficult, time-consuming, and resource-intensive hurdle to successful real-world change. This
is particularly true at the supranational level, where, given the
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, 23 national
authorities have already demonstrated a disinclination to enforce human rights guarantees through domestic procedures,
often vigorously defending those decisions in supranational
proceedings.
In Parts I and II of their article, therefore, Cavallaro and
Schaffer embark on the useful and important task of identifying some of the factors that contribute to higher or lower rates
21. "Supranational remedial orders" or "decisions" is used broadly here,
and throughout this Article, as inclusive of final judgments and orders of the
Court, recommendations of the Commission, and friendly settlements entered into by both the Commission and Court.
22. The Court recognizes these five distinct elements of reparation
under international law: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. See, e.g., Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, 85 (Nov. 27, 1998).
23. In light of the principle of subsidiarity, a foundational admissibility
rule in all supranational adjudicatory procedures is the prior exhaustion of
domestic remedies. Only when all available remedies have been exhausted
and a final decision has been issued from the highest level of appeal (unless
a recognized exception applies), may a petition be submitted to the adjudicatory processes of the inter-American human rights system. See American
Convention on Human Rights, art. 46(a), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, at 1 (Nov. 22, 1969) [hereinafter American Convention]; see also Rules of
Procedure, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., art. 31(1) (Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter
IACHR Rules of Procedure].
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of domestic compliance with supranational orders. To do so,
they present five case-studies from the inter-American system
in which three member states of the Organization of American
States (OAS)-Brazil, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago-failed
to comply, either partially or wholly, with orders of the Commission or the Court in cases involving classic civil and political rights. Oddly, given the focus of their article, not a single
case was presented-for illustrative or comparative purposesin which directly-framed rights of an economic, social, or cultural nature were at issue. Rather, each case involved classic
civil-political rights violations: torture, execution, arbitrary detention, physical abuse, and lack of due process. Notably,
these cases arose in such nationally-sensitive areas as terrorism
24
prosecutions, capital punishment, and penal conditions.
From these five case-studies-supplemented by an annual
survey on state compliance with the Commission's petitionbased recommendations-the authors arrive at two factually
uncontroversial and normatively neutral theses. First, supranational remedial orders in human rights litigation tend toward
low rates of compliance by defendant states. 25 Second, the
rate and quality of actual compliance increases when formal
litigation is accompanied by active social movements, a diverse
set of strategies, a sympathetic victim, and regular media attention. Based on these unassailable observations, they conclude
with the equally unassailable recommendation that suprana24. The case studies involved the Urso Branco Case and 42nd Police District
Case from Brazil (prison violence), the Loayza Tamayo Case and Castillo Petruzzi Case from Peru (terrorism prosecutions), and the Hilaire Case from
Trinidad and Tobago (death penalty). See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note
2, at 240-50.
25. See id. at 248-50. Such rates in the inter-American system are generally not quite as "bleak" as Cavallaro and Schaffer suggest, especially with
respect to the Latin American states on which the authors focus their article.
This would have been clearer had the statistics been further broken down
between states that purport to comply with Commission recommendations
and those that make few such pretensions. It also would have been clearer if
the range of measures reflected in "partial" implementation were further
clarified. States tend to have relatively high compliance rates with respect to
compensatory orders of a monetary nature. They also frequently engage in
legislative or policy modifications, although, unsurprisingly, in most cases
this takes time. They are far less good at undertaking serious investigations
and sanctioning those responsible, a failure that would consistently render
them "partially" compliant even where all or most other required measures
were undertaken.
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tional litigants should choose their cases carefully, work closely
with local level organizations capable of generating popular
support, and use a broad diversity of advocacy tools and media
26
strategies to supplement their technical legal arguments.
Few could disagree with this neutrally-framed thesis.
Plainly, however, it fails to speak to the central issue addressed
in their article: whether the rate and quality of state compliance with supranational orders rises or falls with the framing
of a social-rights case in terms of classic civil and political
rights or classic economic, social, and cultural rights. It suggests only that states' compliance rates are "bleak" with respect
to the former category and that this is particularly true when
national security or sovereignty issues are at play. Since these
latter concerns do not pertain more readily to economic, social, and cultural rights than to their civil and political counterparts, the relevance of the first half of the article to their
stated topic is far from clear.
Nonetheless, if better substantiated and delinked from economic, social, and cultural rights-about which it makes no
factual or argumentative mention-Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis I
could have constituted the basis of an important and timely
article in itself. Indeed, except for several unwarranted assumptions that could be drawn from it-e.g., that supranational litigation should not be pursued on behalf of "unsympa27
thetic victims" who lack media draw and popular support this thesis could have provided a useful springboard for a necessary conversation on how to improve low levels of domestic
compliance with supranational court orders. An analysis of
donor funding priorities, activity restrictions, and timetable
contingencies in human rights litigation, and their relationship to both actual compliance levels and the quality, frequency, and scope of litigation-related advocacy efforts would
have been particularly useful. Such an analytical focus would
have gone far to address the actual reasons why litigation is
sometimes insufficiendy linked to broader advocacy efforts,
26. Id. at 251.
27. See id. Indeed, "unsympathetic victims" are often precisely those for
whom resort to supranational human rights litigation is most necessary,
given their lack of ability to mobilize political and legal support at the national level. Prisoners on death row, accused foreign terrorists, non-citizens,
detainees, and racial, ethnic, and religious minorities have historically
formed the core of human rights litigation.
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rather than attributing it to advocates' unawareness of the uselefulness of such strategies or supposed zeal for constructing
28
impact.
real-world
no
have
that
gal arguments
An equally useful and necessary conversation following
naturally from the authors' case-study analysis would involve
the reasons why states resist certain supranational orders while
complying fully with others. From this vantage point, the authors could have concluded that low levels of domestic compliance with supranational judicial orders correspond directly to
the degree with which the defendant state, and majority populations, feel those judgments have encroached on their national sovereignty, constitutionally-entrenched divisions of
power, national defense, or ability to pursue their democratically-defined national interests. Such a conclusion-which relates to how litigants and adjudicators construe the nature and
scope of state obligations under human rights treaties, craft
responsive remedial orders, and understand the bounds of
their supervisory role-could easily have been drawn from the
case examples cited. These tended to deal with sensitive national security or national interest issues, with which states
might feel that, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity,
they should have been granted a larger margin of appreciation. 29 The logical denouement to such a line of argument
28. See id. at 274, 219 (chastising litigants to "be more interested in advancing guarantees for victims than in advancing rights on paper" and to
seek "sustainable, structural, transformative changes of Latin American society-and not merely sterile, judicial recognition of economic, social, and
cultural right."). In making their argument, Cavallaro and Schaffer appear
to ignore in many ways the reality in which human rights organizations operate, the on-the-ground resources on which they rely, and the actual breadth
of strategies utilized in the vast majority of litigation efforts. By contrast,
their critique could have proved quite illuminating and useful had they provided actual concrete examples of how advocates, faced with a particular
dilemma of implementation, failed to make appropriate use of available resources or ignored opportunities for engagement with a diversity of actors to
aid implementation efforts on the ground.
29. See discussion at supra note 4. This certainly reflected Peru's understanding. On July 1, 1999, the Peruvian state submitted a note to the Secretary General of the OAS in which it announced that it would not comply
with the terrorism-related judgments of the Court in the case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. nor with the judgment on reparations in the Loayza Tamayo
case, arguing reasons of law and political considerations. Peru believed that,
with the broad support of the population, it had adopted a counter-terrorism strategy that correctly balanced the rights of accused terrorists with the
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would, however, have led Cavallaro and Schaffer to focus, in
the second half of their article, on constructing a "new analytical framework" 30 that directly addressed these overarching sovereignty and subsidiarity concerns, issues their own case studies identified as giving rise to low levels of domestic compliance with supranational orders.3 1 These legitimacy concerns,
it is contended, are the chief issue that needs to be addressed
in supranational litigation, particularly at the stage of crafting
judicial remedies that support democratic accountability, facilitate participatory governance, and keep the door sufficiently
open to social movement mobilization and long-term political
solutions. Such concerns, however, are unrelated to whether a
claim is framed in terms of its civil-political or economic-socialcultural dimensions. They apply equally to all supranational
human rights orders.
rights of the Peruvian population and had thereby, through its considered
policy choice, dealt with the internal terrorism threat in a way that avoided
recurrence to the systematic human rights abuses that had occurred in Peru
in the past. See Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev.
11-13 (2000).
30. Cavallaro and Schaffer insist upon the need for "a new analytical
framework" for social rights litigation. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at
254. They base this insistence, however, on recognition that the classic negative/positive distinction between civil-political and economic-social-cultural
rights does not hold water. From this, they appear to conclude that although social rights remain "progressive" in nature, and hence are not judicially enforceable in their own right, their "positive" dimensions can nonetheless be protected through traditional civil-political rights, such as the
right to life and non-discrimination, which, in Cavallaro and Schaffer's view,
are "immediately enforceable" in their full dimensionality. This strategy of
swapping rights to take advantage of their supposedly "progressive" verses
"immediate" qualities nonetheless ignores the sovereignty, separation-ofpowers, and subsidiarity issues that lie at the heart of traditional critiques of
social rights as infringing on the democratic and legislative prerogatives of
states-issues that formed the core of the civil-political-rights case-studies
Cavallaro and Schaffer analyzed in the first half of their article. Their thesis
thus fails as a way to think generally about social rights litigation.
31. This was most clearly demonstrated in the authors' discussion of Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (2002),
involving the state's refusal to comply with a Court order to suspend several
executions of convicted criminals. According to Cavallaro and Schaffer, "the
State's repudiation of the authority of the Inter-American system may be
seen not only as an expression of state sovereignty but also as a vindication of
popular sentiment and rejection of a system imposed by colonial rule."
Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 250.
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Instead of following either of these natural lines of argument, Cavallaro and Schaffer shift gears entirely, ignoring the
direct implications of Thesis I and, with it, the most important
challenges facing actors in human rights litigation: the nature
and scope of state obligations under human rights instruments, the proper balance to be struck in adjudicating claims
implicating competing rights and duties, the margin of appreciation to be afforded to states in honoring these commitments, and the proper scope of remedial orders. Rather, they
focus, in Parts III and IV, on the conceptually most inconsequent issue in human rights litigation, particularly at the implementation stage: the normative characterization of a given
human rights claim as "economic," "social," "cultural," "political," or "civil. '' 32 This forms the basis of their Thesis II.

B.

Thesis II: Limiting Legal Pleadings to "Civil
and PoliticalRights" Norms

Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis II-referring to the "less" of
their less-as-more thesis-has two components. The first is
that litigants should pursue quantitatively fewer claims involving economic, social, and cultural rights at the supranational
level given that these rights involve issues of "social justice"
that are better left to non-litigation political strategies and domestic social-movement advocacy.3 3 Second, and most central
to their thesis, any exceptional litigation involving such rights
that is pursued 34 should be carefully circumscribed at the
32. While these considerations are effectively irrelevant at the implementation stage, they can matter at the case-framing stage in the limited sense
that the inter-American organs have recently demonstrated a proclivityone which should be challenged, not accommodated-toward applying different obligations to rights depending on whether they are included in
Chapter II or III of the American Convention on Human Rights. For an
analysis of the underlying error, and how it must be corrected, see A Pyrrhic
Victory, supra note 17.

33. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 221 ("[W]e recommend that
international human rights lawyers accept the limits inherent in litigation in
the inter-American system and seek alternative means of maximizing their
impact in advancing the agenda of social justice.").
34. While allowing for some exceptions, such as under the Protocol of
San Salvador, Cavallaro and Schaffer nonetheless never explain how such
exceptional cases should be chosen. They refer only to the need to actively
consult with local social movements. Yet, it is local social movements, disillusioned and frustrated with domestic processes, that are generally the parties
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pleading stage to classic civil and political rights. 3 5 In the view
of Cavallaro and Schaffer these rights are capable of immediate judicial enforcement and American states universally view
their litigation as legitimate. This stands in contradistinction
to economic, social, and cultural rights, which lack either of
these essential qualities: They are neither immediately enforceable nor is their adjudication viewed as legitimate by
American governments. Consequently, litigation strategies
based on direct pleading of social rights are "suspect" and
should be avoided in favor of expansive interpretations of classic civil and political rights.
According to Cavallaro and Schaffer, failure to follow this
approach may provoke "extreme reactions" from the member
states of the OAS, leading to backlash and non-implementation of supranationaljudgments. 36 A focus on traditional civil
and political rights, they argue, will avoid this backlash and
lead to greater domestic implementation because civil-political
rights adjudication, in contrast to that of economic, social, and
cultural rights, is universally deemed "legitimate" by American
governments.
In effect, moving from an uncontroversial focus on the
usefulness of "mobilizing shame," both domestically and internationally, as an extra-legal strategy to ensure domestic compliance with international human rights norms-a strategy
that applies to all categories of rights, regardless of the technical legal arguments handled in litigation briefs-they recast
their argument into one related to the technical selection between equally valid jurisdictional bases for litigating certain
"types" of cases. Based on this, they chastise litigants in the
system for their currently "unwise" approach in seeking to directly adjudicate, in concrete contexts, the rights to health, education, housing, and social security, offering a "new analytical
pushing most vigorously for supranational litigation. In this sense, the authors' proper insistence on the need for local level consultation with such
movements needs to be reconciled with the likely results it entails: more,
not less, litigation. Id. at 220-21.
35. See id. at 274-75.

36. Id. at 270, 236 ("As we argue, practitioners must recognize the potential for counterproductive results, either due to overreaching, leading to decisions unlikely to be enforced, or to excessive emphasis on rights-based approaches to the detriment of other, potentially more effective means of seeking change.").
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strategy" that simply restates, in exclusive terms and under their
own terminology, the dominant strategy used non-exclusively in
virtually all current supranational litigation. They then recommend a set of hypothetical "test cases" that replicate, in stark
and dramatic form, the very problems that threaten to create a
"crisis of legitimacy" in the system.
The deductions drawn by the authors are eminently curious. Indeed, Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis I directly subverts Thesis II. While the latter warns that practical on-the-ground implementation depends on casting claims as civil and political
rights, the former affirms that American states habitually fail
to implement, or even accept the legitimacy of, supranational
judgments involving classic civil and political rights. It identifies as "bleak" 37 OAS member states' compliance record with
such supranational orders and recognizes the political backlash thereto can be so severe as to provoke the most extreme
of reactions from states: The threat to withdraw their consent
to the supranational organ's contentious jurisdiction.3 8 This
backlash and resistance reflects states' view that certain supranational decisions involving traditionally-understood civil and
political rights are in fact illegitimate and hence unworthy of
respect at the domestic level.
Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis I thus decisively demonstrates
that something other than the outer cloak of a legal claim as an
"immediately enforceable" civil and political right gives rise to
39
higher or lower levels of on-the-ground implementation.
37. Id. at 233.
38. Both Trinidad and Tobago and Peru have threatened to withdraw
their consent to the Court's jurisdiction following Court holdings against
them-one in relation to capital punishment, the other in relation to treatment of terrorism suspects. Trinidad and Tobago followed through in 1998.
In a similar vein, Venezuela has recently submitted an advisory opinion request to the Court following several decisions against it by the Commission,
particularly in the area of freedom of expression of journalists and activists
critical of the Chavez administration. The request asks the Court to pronounce on the remedies available to states to challenge Commission decisions "that contravene the law." For the Court's response, see Control de
Legalidad en el Ejercicio de las Atribuciones de la Comisi6n Interamericana
de Derechos Humanos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), Advisory Opinion OC19/05 (Nov. 28, 2005).
39. While Cavallaro and Schaffer could have argued that an outer cloak
of "civil and political rights" may better mobilize domestic social movements,
which would then function to counteract and moderate state resistance to
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Yet, Thesis II argues precisely that redefining the outer shell of
a "social justice" claim as a civil-political right will avoid
"provok[ing] extreme reactions" '40 from states and lead to
higher rates of real-world implementation, given the uncontested "legitimacy" of the latter in the eyes of American states.
Plainly, Cavallaro and Schaffer have misidentified what it is
about particular supranational orders that raises legitimacy
concerns and provokes extreme reactions from states.
They have also misidentified what it is about a claim that
raises problems of justiciability. Indeed, if a particular claim
involving the right to health, to education, or to housing is
framed in a way that renders it truly unamenable to judicial
resolution, despite the formal existence of contentious subject
matter jurisdiction over those norms, then adjudicating the
same claim under a different set of equally-appropriate jurisdictional norms cannot transform the claim into ajusticiable controversy. 4 ' Such an approach divests justiciability doctrine of
its substantive content. It elevates the veneer of rights, and any
historical baggage conceptually attached thereto, over both
commonly-accepted limits on judicial competence and the dignity interests that give meaningful content to rights as legal
norms.
It is, in fact, only by attaching the notion of 'justiciability"
to abstract rights-rather than to the discrete claims framed
under them-that the "elements approach" can be advanced
as a strategic response to something other than a problem of
limited subject matter jurisdiction, which Cavallaro and Schaffer do not assert.4 2 It is to be noted in this regard that the
supranational orders that raise sovereignty issues, they did not do so. More
importantly, it is unlikely that they could have, given the lack of any evidence
that economic, social, and cultural rights have any less popular appeal, mo-

bilizing capacity, or media draw in Latin America than civil and political
rights. In fact, it may be that such rights have greater popular appeal, mobilizing capacity, and media draw, since respect thereof is often viewed as hav-

ing broader implications over the general public.
40. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 270.
41. Indeed, justiciability refers to the appropriateness for judicial review
of a given claim or controversy, not that of an abstract right without reference to a discrete factual dispute between adverse parties. See infra Part III
A.2.
42. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 224-27, 267 (recognizing
that economic, social, and cultural rights are formally guaranteed under the
American Declaration, the American Convention, and the Protocol of San
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authors effectively bundle under their broad "elements" terminology at least three distinct approaches to rights-based litigation. These three approaches, sharing only the common feature of reliance on classic civil-political rights norms, might
usefully be called elements approaches "I," "II," and "III."
Only the first is reconcilable with the idea that autonomous
social rights, despite proper subject matter jurisdiction, cannot
be judicially enforced in the inter-American system.
That approach, the narrowest, eschews classic social rights
abuse entirely for purposes of litigation. It encourages advocates to cull from a complex situation of abuse only those factual elements of a classically-narrow civil-political nature: a
death, an execution, an arbitrary arrest, torture, or physical
violence. 4 3 The adjudicator's lens is thus focused narrowly
around those circumscribed abuses, excluding from the litigation equation the concurrent and often inseparable factual
abuses of a more socio-economic or cultural nature: the
forced eviction, the unjustified school or job dismissal, the
union retaliation, the arbitrary or unreasonable deprivation of
health care. 44 Those classic social rights abuses, treated
merely as the "underlying factors giving rise to violations of
civil or political rights," 45 are reserved for non-litigation, politi-

cal strategies on the assumption that they are not, in themselves, justiciable.
By contrast, elements approach II (referred to elsewhere
as an integration approach 4 6) departs from precisely the opposite supposition: It embraces as unreservedly adjudicable the
classic social rights abuse that, under elements approach I,
would have been relegated to the political process as beyond
the legitimate competence of courts. It merely calls those
Salvador, the inter-American organs' contentious subject matter jurisdiction
over them being expressly limited under the latter instrument only, and
then only partially).
43. Id. at 221, 278-80 (highlighting the strategy of "defending the civil
and political rights of leaders of social movements," such as peasant and
labor leaders, as well as focusing on physical deaths as a case-framing strategy).
44. See discussion infra Part VI.A (providing examples and discussion of
Corumbiarav. Brazil and Yean and Bosico Girls Case v. Dominican Republic).

45. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 272.
46. See PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 233-332 (discussing strategic use of
norms under chapter heading "Civil and Political Rights" of the American
Convention (arts. 3-25) to protect against classic social rights abuses).
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abuses violations of norms classically identified as "civil and political." 47 Thus, a forced eviction is framed in terms of the
right to property or due process, rather than the right to housing. An unreasonable denial of medical care is litigated under
the right to life or integrity, rather than the right to health.
An arbitrary school dismissal is framed as a violation of the
right to political participation or non-discrimination, rather
than directly as a violation of the right to education. 48 Such
discretional choice between equally-appropriate norms is,
however, plainly unrelated to justiciability. Indeed, if justiciability doctrine rested on such easily-finessed factors there
would be no need for it; it would be subsumed by ratione materiae limitations on an adjudicatory body's competence. That is,
while exclusive reliance on the "integration" or "elements II"
approach necessarily follows as a practical and strategic solution to ratione materiae limitations on a tribunal's adjudicatory
competence-explaining its prominence in the case-based jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the
European Court of Human Rights, which have far more limited subject matter competence over autonomous social rights
than do the inter-American organs-it cannot be reconciled
with a thesis that autonomous social rights are themselves not
amenable, or are less amenable than other rights, to judicial
review.
The same is true of what might be called elements approach III (referred to elsewhere as an "indirect approach" 49 ).

That approach likewise embraces classic social rights abuse as
47. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 272 ("Thus, for example, an
expansive interpretation of the right to physical integrity, a civil right, could
include the right to medical treatment, an economic, social, and cultural
right. An expansive view of the tight to political participation might include
the right to be literate, and thus the right to be educated.").
48. See id. at 272 (substituting right to integrity for right to health, and
right to participation for right to education), 274 ("[I]t may be more efficient for the system to recognize the right to medicine or treatment in a
particular matter as an element of the right to life or the right to physical
integrity than to force the system to recognize, through the individual petitions process, economic, social, and cultural rights not deemed ripe for international litigation by states."), 278 (substituting right to life/integrity for
right to food), 279 (substituting right to life for right to health).
49. See PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 193-230 (discussing strategic use of
the rights to non-discrimination, judicial protection, and due process under
the American Convention to protect economic, social and cultural rights).
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fully adjudicable but resorts to process guarantees, i.e., non-discrimination, judicial protection, and due process, to frame the
violation. 50 The strategic importance of these norms lies in
the fact that they apply not only to the rights recognized autonomously in the regional human rights instruments in which
they are enshrined (whether of a classic civil-political or social
rights character), but also to the full panoply of rights recognized in domestic constitutional, legislative, and regulatory
law. In practice, the approach is vital for social rights adjudication, particularly for ensuring that legal effect is given to domestic social rights protections that may be more robust than
the minimum criteria recognized in international law. It can
not, however, be squared with the view advanced by Cavallaro
and Schaffer that different standards of adjudication apply to
civil-political rights and to autonomous social rights. Indeed,
under the American Convention a violation of any one of the
aforementioned process norms with respect to another autonomous right over which contentious jurisdiction is exercised
can, and often does, give rise to a concurrent violation of that
autonomous right. 5 1 This is particularly true with respect to
non-discrimination, which under the American Convention
constitutes at once a freestanding right and a general obligation
applicable to all autonomous Convention-based rights, including those of an economic, social, and cultural rights nature. 52
The non-discrimination duty in article 1.1, therefore, provides an unequivocally concrete basis for imputing state re50. While Cavallaro and Schaffer discuss non-discrimination separately
from the "elements approach," they fold due process and judicial protection
norms into it. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 255-61.
51. Thus, for example, a failure to provide an adequate or effective remedy for claimed violations of the right to property tends to be treated as a
violation of both article 25 (judicial protection) and article 21 (right to
property) of the American Convention. See, e.g., Case of the Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001); "Five Pensioners" Case v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 98 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Five Pensioners Case]
52. American Convention, supra note 23, arts. 1.1 & 24. The Court has
explained that article 1.1 prohibits discriminatory treatment "with regard to
the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed under the Convention," whereas
article 24 extends that broad protection to the domestic law of the states
parties. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) No. 4,
53-54 (Jan. 19, 1984).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 39:171

sponsibility in individual complaint procedures for direct violations of the autonomous social rights guaranteed in Convention article 26. It is curious, in this regard, that Cavallaro and
Schaffer highlight this Convention-based duty as a strategic
method to advance social rights protections under the Convention without adjudicating social rights directly. 53 To the
contrary, reliance on this standard treaty-based dimension of
state human rights obligations constitutes one of the clearest
examples of the proper use of the "direct approach" in supranational litigation. The same is true of the treaty-based duties to
ensure that appropriate due process safeguards and effective
remedies are available whenever a Convention-protected right,
including those in article 26, is threatened with limitation or
restriction. That is, these process-oriented guarantees are not
only free-standing rights, but also core constitutive elements of
the article 1 and 2 mandated "necessary" or "appropriate"
measures states are required to adopt to give legal effect to
protected rights, including those of an economic, social, and
cultural character.
Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis II thus departs from several unsustainable assumptions. The first, as mentioned, is that the
majority of economic, social, and cultural rights in the interAmerican system are unenforceable and lack concrete justiciable obligations. 54 According to the authors, this contrasts with
civil and political rights, which have concrete, immediately justiciable obligations that are regularly enforced by judicial in-

53. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 254-55 (highlighting and discussing duty of non-discrimination in Convention article. 1.1), 271 ("The
advantage of using the non-discrimination principle is that petitioners, the
Commission, and the Court may rely on a fundamentally civil right to expand protection of economic, social, and cultural rights."). Cavallaro and
Schaffer likewise eT by seeking to draw too close a comparison between the
jurisprudential work of the inter-American human rights organs and the European Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Committee. These latter
bodies lack subject matter jurisdiction over most of the autonomous social
rights over which the inter-American organs enjoy direct competence. Con-

sequently, a litigation strategy predicated on the notion of applying process
norms to "economic, social and cultural rights even when these are not the subject of their own protection," id. at 258 (emphasis added), simply does not have
the same salience in the inter-American system, where such rights are "the
subject of their own protection."
54. Id. at 267, 268.
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stances. 55 Ironically, in making this norm-based distinction,
Cavallaro and Schaffer concede that advocates have persuasively demonstrated the flawed nature of classic rights-based
dichotomies regarding negative/positive obligations, affirming
that all rights have obligations that run the spectrum from
negative liberty to positive entitlement. Based on this, they insist that a "new analytical framework" is required. 5 6 Yet, they
then revert back to a reflexive insistence that economic, social,
and cultural rights are "unenforceable" and entail no "con5 7
crete duties" or "specific grounds for state responsibility."
That is, the authors' inability to move beyond classic stereotypes to appreciate the distinct dimensionality of human rights
obligations, particularly as they relate to conduct- and resultbased duties, keeps them tethered to a dichotomized vision of
rights as "immediate" or "non-immediate." This, in turn, prevents them from applying their negative/positive revelation in
any way other than to insist that civil and political rights, no
matter how broadly drawn or how their corresponding obligations are defined, are immediately enforceable by courts.
As discussed further in Part III, this view underappreciates
the varied dimensionality of the obligations states assume
under human rights treaties and how they may be assessed in
litigation versus promotional contexts. Specifically, the error
derives from the authors' association of the litigation-appropriate dimensions of human rights obligations with claims framed
in terms of classic civil-political rights and the litigation-inap55. Id. at 252 ("This approach makes a distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand (which are understood to impose specific,justiciable obligations on states, and which are regularly enforced by mechanisms for human rights protection) and economic, social, and cultural rights
on the other (whose concomitant obligations are less clear, and whose enforcement has been more complicated)."). While Cavallaro and Schaffer
frame this distinction as the view "of American states," they base their entire
litigation strategy on it, accepting it as the underlying predicate to their thesis. Inexplicably, they except only two norms from their broad generalization about social rights: the rights to education and unionization as framed
under the Protocol of San Salvador. They make no exception for the same
norms as framed under the American Convention, despite the fact that effectively identical obligations clauses attach to each.
56. Id. at 252-54.
57. Id. at 225 (complicated enforcement of social rights) ("fails to establish any specific rights or concrete duties"), 267 ("provide no definite
grounds for state responsibility"), 268 ("article 26 enumerates no specific
rights enforceable on an individual basis.").
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propriate dimensions with direct-approach claims. It is this externally-imposed error, not the nature of the rights themselves, that compels their call for litigant reliance on classic
civil-political rights norms. Once this error is corrected, the
basis for their thesis, and any a priori norm-based preference,
effectively falls away.
The second asserted ground for Thesis II is the supposed
lack of "legitimacy" of social rights litigation in the eyes of
Latin American states. That is, although Latin American states
"formally accept the theoretical bases for such rights" 5 8-and
almost universally include them in their domestic legislation
and political constitutions 5 9-they do not view litigation of
them as "legitimate" and, thus, attempts to cast them as legally
enforceable rights will be viewed as overreach, leading to resistance, negative backlash, and non-implementation by OAS
member states. 60 The authors, however, fail to provide any evidence of this asserted lack of legitimacy-a status belied by actual experience in the American region, in which economic,
social, and cultural rights are regularly adjudicated by domestic tribunals and actively embraced by Latin American governments.

61

Finally, the erroneous premises of Cavallaro-Schaffer Thesis II leads the authors to an ironic set of recommended "test
cases," laid out in detail in Part IV of their article, that they
believe manifest the greatest potential for actual implementation by states. 62 That is, while intoning litigants to be "more
cautious," "restrained," and "thoughtful" in their litigation
strategies, they call for cases that, on justiciability grounds,
would not likely survive basic admissibility rulings in the interAmerican system. 63 Moreover, while calling for a "restrained,
58. Id. at 251-52.
59. Cavallaro and Schaffer prefer to highlight only that civil and political
rights are "uniformly guaranteed by the constitutions of the Americas." Id.
at 275.
60. See id. at 270 ("To the extent that advocates seek to achieve realistically enforceable Court sentences on economic, social, and cultural rights,
they should be attentive to governmental resistance to the enforcement of
such rights.").
61. See discussion infra Part III.B.
62. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 222 ("the kinds of test cases we
believe manifest the greatest potential to establish precedents likely to be
implemented by states in the Americas").
63. See discussion infra Part IV.
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incremental" approach, 6 4 they urge litigants to pursue cases
that promise to produce jurisprudence with "sweeping" and
"potentially revolutionary policy implications" for OAS member states. 6 5 The fact that such orders will be derived from
"immediately enforceable" civil and political rights obligations,
rather than those corresponding to economic, social, and cultural rights, will apparently remove the legitimacy objections
that OAS member states would otherwise have to such expansively-crafted remedial orders. Indeed, according to Cavallaro
and Schaffer this "thoughtful," "responsible," and "pragmatic"
approach will avoid the "overreach" that would "provoke extreme reactions from the member states of the OAS" 6 6 if these
same cases-or likely far more limited ones-were litigated
under a "direct approach." American states will respond positively to such cases because, simply, they view civil-political
rights litigation as "legitimate." Clearly, something is askew in
the proposed "less" strategy. Some good rethinking is necessary.
C. Reconciling the Two Halves: The "More" and "Less"
In defining the desired "more" of their less-as-more thesis,
Cavallaro and Schaffer rightly aim to improve the same thing
all human rights activists do: on-the-ground implementation
of human rights guarantees. In explaining low rates of actual
compliance, they do a good job of identifying one set of factors
that are often critical for improving compliance rates: collaboration of supporting social movements, constant media atten64. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 219 ("We posit that those who
seek sustainable, structural, transformative changes of Latin American society-and not merely sterile, judicial recognition of economic, social, and
cultural rights-are best served by adopting a restrained, incremental, 'less
as more' approach to expanding these rights in the Inter-American system.").
65. Id. at 274 ("[P]etitioners should not look to the system as an arbiter
of disputes but rather as a mechanism for producing jurisprudence with potentially sweeping policy implications."), 277 ("enable the system to reach
conclusions with potentially revolutionary policy implications"). Such
supranationally-ordered changes include the "immediate" formal equalization of expenditures to all school districts, provision of vaccines, medications
and an "adequate share of nutritional needs on a regular basis" to "all in
need," and construction of new structurally-sound housing for large, undifferentiated segments of the urban poor. Id. at 276-80.
66. Id. at 270.
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tion, sympathetic victims, and avoidance of politically "hot" issues of the moment. Yet, these factors are important in relation to all supranational judgments ordering remedies for
victims of human rights violations in a state's jurisdiction, regardless of normative content. No argument is made that the
directly-invoked economic, social, and cultural rights claims
they seek to marginalize will be more likely to lack supporting
social movements, media draw, sympathetic victims, or to be
more "untouchable" at any given moment. 67 Indeed, current
reality is quite likely the opposite. Large gaps in the authors'
thesis thus need bridging. A critical analysis would distinguish
the "compliance" and "implementation" arguments these authors make from their unrelated thesis admonishing advocates
to, as the "wisest" strategy, limit their cases to the civil-political
rights elements of the abuses they seek to vindicate.
Cavallaro and Schaffer do a far poorer job in identifying
the "less" of their thesis. Their "less" refers to two distinct
dimensions. The first is a recommendation that advocates
pursue quantitatively less overall litigation in the field of economic, social, and cultural rights, preferring non-litigation political strategies and social mobilization to achieve similar
ends. This recommendation is curious for two reasons. Most
directly, supranational litigation in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights is so infrequent that calls for less of itrather than a different kind of it-seem broadly off the mark.
Second, the conclusions drawn by Cavallaro and Schaffer in
Part II of their article reflect only that litigation should not be
pursued to the exclusion of other strategies, i.e., that it should
be one element of a broader strategy for targeted change, one
which includes active accompaniment of social movements
and multi-pronged advocacy initiatives. 68 The authors' Thesis
I conclusions, in this sense, directly contradict their Thesis II
conclusion that political strategies should largely replace "di67. Cavallaro and Schaffer at no time assert, nor could they, that the factors they have identified as leading to non-compliance-lack of larger supporting social movements, insufficient media attention, unsympathetic victims, politically "hot" issues of the moment (e.g., terrorism)-correlate in
any meaningful way to whether a claim is framed as a violation of "economic,
social and cultural" or "civil and political" rights. See generally id.
68. See id. at 239 (recommending that "practitioners envision supranational litigation as merely one element among many of an integrated advocacy strategy").
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rect-approach" litigation-a core, but unwarranted, piece of
the Cavallaro-Schaffer "less" thesis. 69 Historically, successful
reform efforts in such areas as labor rights, education, health
care, and housing have always relied on a combination of legal
and political strategies to achieve their ends, as have political
and civil rights movements. 70 Arguments for an exclusive reliance on one or the other challenge history as well as strategic
common sense.
Moreover, if Cavallaro and Schaffer truly support less litigation in the inter-American system for the reasons they provide-i.e., limited access to the system, the need for specialized knowledge, limited capacity of oversight bodies, costs involved in litigation, likely failure of states to comply, repeat
players, and queue-jumping concerns 71-they offer no reason
why their preference for political strategies should be limited
to economic, social, and cultural rights rather than encompassing all human fights claims, including the civil and political rights they champion. 72 This suggests their aversion to so69. Their thesis also neglects the fact that a great deal of state action is
stimulated by the filing of legal complaints and the credible threat of supranational litigation. In the direct-approach access-to-antiretroviral-medications case, Odir Miranda v. El Salvador, cited by Cavallaro and Schaffer on
other grounds, see id. at 265-67, for example, the state Supreme Court resolved the domestic amparo action filed with it (favorably for the petitioners)
only after the Commission issued an admissibility decision asserting jurisdiction over the right-to-health claim under article 26 of the American Convention. SeeJorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. Salvadoran Social Security Institute, April 4, 2001 (Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador), http://www.
uc3m.es/-uc3m/inst/MGP/JCI/04-noticias-es-sida.htm.
70. See, e.g.,

MARTHA

F. DAVIS,

BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE

1960-1973 (1993) (detailing convergence of social and
legal movements in the United States in the area of poverty law). Many
modern examples could, of course, be given in all countries of the Americas,
where the increased prominence of social movements in the labor, consumer, indigenous, environmental, health, and social justice fields have coincided with increased litigation in the area of economic, social and cultural
rights.
71. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 238, 281.
72. See also Dennis & Stewart, supra note 2, 464 (basing bleak view of
prospects offered by international adjudication of economic, social, and cultural rights on their view of a series of factors which are equally applicable to
international adjudication of civil and political rights: limited capacity of
oversight body, costs involved in litigation, likely failure of states to comply
with decisions in individual cases). Cavallaro and Schaffer, like Dennis and
Stewart, would do better to take aim at these specific inadequacies-for exRIGHTS MOVEMENT

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 39:171

cial rights litigation is based not on the neutral reasons they
offer, but rather on their particular understanding of the nature of social rights and of the legal obligations states assume
with respect thereto.
The second dimension to their "less" thesis refers not to
the number of claims litigated but to the number of norms
used to frame those claims. That is, Cavallaro and Schaffer
argue that, in the limited instances in which litigation to redress social rights abuse is pursued, the object of the claim
should either be narrowly restricted to the civil-political elements of the abuse or otherwise framed under civil-political
rights norms. This recommendation is peculiar for a number
of reasons. First, no legitimate grounds are provided for why
this should be true. As referenced above and described in detail in Part III, economic, social, and cultural rights, as autonomous norms, are as fully enforceable in the inter-American system-from both a jurisdictional and justiciability perspective-as are classic civil and political rights. Cavallaro and
Schaffer's repeated reference to the infrequency of the direct
in the Americas in no way speaks to the validity of
approach
it.73 Neither does their repeated reference to the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, bodies which-in
sharp contrast to the inter-American organs-must rely (almost exclusively) 74 on classic civil-political rights norms based
ample, by advocating for higher levels of financing for international adjudicatory mechanisms and for the establishment of a Victims Assistance Fund to
facilitate access to international procedures-rather than call for litigants to
avoid international adjudication exclusively in the area of economic, social
and cultural rights.
73. See, e.g., Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225 ("The Inter-American system's failure to provide protection for economic, social and cultural
rights is contrasted by its active defense of civil and political rights.").
74. The European Court of Human Rights does have jurisdiction over
the right to education, just as the Human Rights Committee has jurisdiction
over the right to culture. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, 213
U.N.T.S. 262; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
27, G.A. Res. 2200A, 1 21, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Both bodies, moreover, have jurisdiction over the rights to special protection of the child and the family, which
include a wide variety of rights of an educational, health, social, and economic nature. The right to association expressly includes "the right to form
and join trade unions," ICCPR, supra, art. 22, and both instruments protect
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on the substantive limitations in the jurisdictional instruments
they are competent to apply. By contrast, the inter-American
jurisdictional instruments provide ample tools for the full protection, using a "direct approach," of economic, social, and
cultural rights.
Second, it is unclear why litigation of social rights under
one set of norms should be any more "legitimate" than litigation of the same claims under a different set of norms. If OAS
member states will truly have "extreme reactions" to supranational judicial orders requiring them to protect the individual
rights to health, housing, social security, education, and labor
freedoms, it is not clear why their reaction should be any less
"extreme" if they are required to provide the same protections
for health, education, housing, social security, or labor under
otherwise identical supranational orders that simply call those
rights "life," "integrity," "property," or "association." Under at
least one of the dominant forms of their "elements approach,"
Cavallaro and Schaffer do not propose that the subject of
claims should be limited-just that it should be renamed. Unless we are to presume that states are politically naive, this suggests that Cavallaro and Schaffer have substantially missed the
mark in identifying what causes states to have extreme reactions to certain supranational human rights orders.
The ultimate irony of the Cavallaro-Schaffer less-as-more
thesis is that the authors' definition of "less" does not in fact
yield less of anything-either from a quantitative or qualitative
standpoint. This is made clear by the recommended "test
cases" set out in Part IV of their article, a set of cases that this
social rights litigator would be reluctant to touch on justiciability and subsidiarity grounds. Indeed, the proposed hypotheticals replicate the same thorny issues that have historiagainst "forced or compulsory labor." Id. art. 8; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. Similarly, both bodies
have jurisdiction over the right to "respect for the home," which guarantees
against arbitrary interference with the enjoyment of one's home or housing.
The broad overlap in rights recognized in the ICCPR and ICESCR puts into
relief the lack of sense in distinguishing formally between rights, especially
on the basis of "justiciability." Compare ICCPR, supra, with International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNA77ONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 39:171

cally led to legal ambivalence about economic, social, and cultural rights as judicially-enforceable rights. The smokescreen
of "civil and political rights" does not inoculate the recommended test claims from the justiciability ailments they suffer.
A proper less-as-more strategy would attend to these disorders,
and address the concerns that states in fact manifest when they
fail to implement supranational orders. A rewriting of the lessas-more thesis is urgently in order.
III.

THE "DIRECT APPROACH" TO LITIGATING ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:

A SUSPECT OPTION?
Cavallaro and Schaffer assert that the "direct approach" to
supranational litigation of economic, social, and cultural
rights is "suspect" and should generally be avoided in the
Americas. 7 5 This approach refers to the strategy of framing
concrete instances of human rights abuse as violations of the
norms that autonomously guarantee classic social rights in
three region-specific human rights instruments: the American
Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention"), 76
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the
Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("San Salvador
Protocol") 77 and the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man ("American Declaration" 78 ). Specifically, the
approach refers to direct recourse in contentious disputes to
three sets of social rights: the rights enshrined in article 26 of
the American Convention, the multivariable umbrella provision under the chapter heading "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights"; "the totality of rights" enshrined in the San Salvador Protocol, a treaty dedicated to social rights guarantees;
and roughly half the rights in the American Declaration, an
instrument within which civil, cultural, economic, political,
75. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 267-70 (contrasting "suspect

option" with a "wiser path").
76. American Convention, supra note 23.

77. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, "Protocol of San Salvador," Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 [hereinafter San Salvador Protocol]

78. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948,
reprinted in ORG.

OF Am. STATES, BAsIc DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 9 (2003)

[hereinafter American Declaration].
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and social rights are intermingled without distinction.79 Respectively, these provisions protect, in overlapping and autonomous terms, the rights to health, to education, to housing, to
culture, to social security, to unionization, and to just labor
conditions.
Cavallaro and Schaffer urge litigants to bypass these express norms, limiting their pleadings to the "civil and political
elements" of social rights violations.8 0 In this sense, litigants
should invoke only those norms in the American Convention
found under the formal chapter title "Civil and Political
Rights" (articles 3-25) and those norms in the Declaration that
might classically be considered "civil and political." They provide two grounds for this discriminating approach to the region's core human rights instruments: First, autonomous social rights are notjudicially enforceable and, second, their litigation is viewed as illegitimate by Latin American states.
Neither of these assertions withstands scrutiny.
Indeed, as the following two Sections demonstrate, the direct litigation in the inter-American system of economic, social, and cultural rights presents no greater justiciability or legitimacy problems than does direct litigation of classic civil
and political rights. This is because neither 'justiciability" nor
"legitimacy," as legal concepts, correlate meaningfully with the
type or class of right at issue. Rather, they are concerned with
the nature and scope of the claim or controversy made with respect to a given right-whatever its subjective categorization79. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 263, 263 n.155 (defining the
"direct approach" through reference to "article 26 of the American Convention, various provisions of the American Declaration, and the totality of the
San Salvador Protocol").
80. Curiously, Cavallaro and Schaffer except two of the rights guaranteed
in the San Salvador Protocol from their broad generalizations: education
and unionization, norms over which the Commission and Court are granted
express subject matter jurisdiction in the individual petitions process. Given
the broadness of their justiciability and legitimacy assertions as they relate to
economic, social, and cultural rights in general-which, if true, transcend
mere subject matter jurisdiction-the basis for this exception is never, however, explained. Indeed, both the Commission and Court are also granted
express subject matter in the individual petitions process over the economic,
social, and cultural rights protected in the American Convention and/or
American Declaration, including the rights to education and unionization
American Convention, supra note 23, arts. 16, 26, 33, 44,
therein. See, e.g.,
48, 62, 63.
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and, relatedly, the scope of the corresponding remedy pursued
through adjudicatory procedures. Accordingly, while this Article firmly supports "mixed" approaches in the strategic litigation of controversies involving economic, social, and cultural
rights-using jurisdictionally-appropriate procedural and substantive norms of any hue, as called for by the particular factual circumstances of each concrete case-it emphatically rejects the notion that "direct" approaches are inherently suspect and that so-called "indirect" approaches are always to be
preferred. 8 1 To the contrary, when jurisdictional rules and
factual circumstances are properly taken into account, the "direct approach" can often be the preferable strategic option.
As with all litigation, the precise strategy to be used should not
follow predetermined strictures,8 2 but should be responsive to
the precise factual circumstances and context of the controversy at issue, taking the inherent jurisdictional limitations of
adjudicatory process into account. These limitations are not
restricted to any particular category or class of rights but
rather inhere in the procedures that attend to rights-based
claims of any complexion.
The following two Sections address, first, the judicial enforceability of economic, social, and cultural rights in the regional human rights system and, second, the legitimacy of social rights litigation in the Americas more generally. To properly address the former, Section A is divided into a discussion
of, first, the contentious ratione mateiaejurisdiction of the inter-American human rights organs over autonomous social
81. See, for example, chapters 6-9 of PROTECrING, supra note 7, at 193357. These describe how economic, social, and cultural rights can be protected effectively though the individual petitions process of the inter-American system using each of the twenty-three substantive "protected rights"
norms of the American Convention on Human Rights. These twenty-three
rights are divided between neutrally-framed "process rights" (non-discrimination, due process, and judicial protection), "classic civil-political rights"
(life, integrity, liberty, association, etc.) and "classic economic-social-cultural
rights" (health, education, housing, social security, etc.). All of these rights
may be invoked in legal pleadings to protect economic, social, and cultural
rights through four stylized approaches: the "indirect approach," "integration approach," "direct approach," and "complex violations approach."
82. It is for this reason that this author generally rejects attempts to define in the abstract the precise contours of the "minimum core content" of
rights, divorced from case-by-case adjudication in which factual violations
can be assessed in their context.
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rights norms and, second, the justiciability of claims invoking
those norms.
A.

The JudicialEnforceability of Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights in the American Region

The basic error underlying the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis is
that economic, social, and cultural rights, as autonomous
rights, are not judicially enforceable in the inter-American
human rights system. That is, while accepting that such rights
are expressly recognized as "protected rights" in three of the
regional system's primary jurisdictional instruments, Cavallaro
and Schaffer nonetheless argue that the corresponding provisions "contain no enforceable rights," "no concrete duties,"
and "no definite grounds for state responsibility";8 3 as such,
they are not amenable to litigation and should not be invoked
in the individual petitions process. The authors chastise advocates, NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, and adjudicatory bodies for a proliferation of efforts seeking to "expand,
often by mere affirmation, the scope of justiciability of economic, social, and cultural rights."8 4 In their view, only civil
and political rights are judicially enforceable in the interAmerican system given that only they bear specific, justiciable
obligations.8 5 Economic, social, and cultural rights, they as83. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 267 ("reluctance to enforce economic, social, and cultural rights through the application of provisions that
clearly establish such rights, but that provide no definite grounds for state
responsibility, or that fail to establish a mechanism for enforcement, such as
article 26 of the Convention, or the majority of the San Salvador Protocol"),
268 ("article 26 enumerates no specific rights enforceable on an individual
basis."), 274 (recommending focus on civil and political rights "rather than
to force the Commission and Court to recognize economic, social, or cultural rights as such, without sufficient basis in law."), 274 ("economic, social,
and cultural rights not deemed ripe for international litigation by states").
84. Id. at 222-23. Ironically, they do so after recognizing that "[a] broad
consensus has gradually emerged, affirming the need for increased 'justiciability' of economic, social, and cultural rights." Id.
85. See id. at 252 (asserting American states recognize traditional "distinction between civil and political rights on the one hand (which are understood to impose specific, justiciable obligations on states, and which are regularly enforced by mechanisms for human rights protection) and economic,
social, and cultural rights on the other (whose concomitant obligations are
less clear, and whose enforcement has been more complicated)"), 263-65
(recommending incorporation of economic, social, and cultural rights elements "within the scope ofjusticiable civil and political rights" and alleging
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sert, have proved "incapable of imposing immediate obliga86
tions on states."
In making such claims, Cavallaro and Schaffer neglect not
only the jurisdictional significance of justiciability doctrine
under adjudicatory procedure but, particularly, the critical distinction between justiciability and subject matter jurisdiction.

They appear to conflate justiciability, which refers to the appropriateness for adjudication of a given claim (i.e., in the inter-American system, one that properly demonstrates adverse
interest, concrete individualized injury, and a causal nexus between that injury and state conduct), with litigant errors regarding the jurisdictional competence of an adjudicatory body
over the specific legal norm under which that claim, whether
justiciable or not, may be made. By failing to distinguish between the two, Cavallaro and Schaffer create a false dichotomy
between provisions protecting so-called "civil and political
rights" and those protecting "economic, social, and cultural
rights," whereby claims made under the former are automatically 'justiciable" and those under the latter "non-justiciable,"
irrespective of the scope of the claims actually made. This
leads them to dramatically understate proper usages of the "direct" approach to social rights litigation while dramatically
87
overstating proper usages of their "elements" approach.
The authors' conflation of these concepts is most clearly
illustrated by the examples they offer in support of the affirmed non-justiciability of the economic, social, and cultural
rights found in the American Declaration, the American Convention, and the San Salvador Protocol. With regard to the
the violation of civil and political rights to "ensure initial access to the InterAmerican system").
86. Id. at 222 (asserting that activists and policymakers have been "inca-

pable of imposing immediate obligations on states to protect and ensure
economic, social, and cultural rights").
87. In effect, Cavallaro and Schaffer attempt to habilitate non-justiciable
claims by wrapping them in the mantle of civil and political rights, while
denying judicial competence over claims framed as autonomous social rights
that objectively fulfill all the requirements of ajusticiable case. Proper attention to subject matter jurisdiction and the existence of a justiciable controversy, as distinct jurisdictional issues, would avoid these errors. The overstatement of proper usages of the "indirect approach" is clear from the testcase hypotheticals that Cavallaro and Schaffer recommend in Part IV of their
article. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 274-80; see discussion infra
Part IV.
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Declaration and Protocol, Cavallaro and Schaffer offer only
two cases in support of their non-justiciability thesis, both involving litigant arguments invoking provisions over which the
88
They deadjudicating body lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
clined to cite the adjudicated cases in which jurisdictionallyappropriate norms protecting economic, social, and cultural
rights were invoked under these instruments, thereby properly
grounding state responsibility for the harms caused. 8 9
Similarly, in making their claim that article 26 of the Convention is notjudicially enforceable, Cavallaro and Schaffer do
not offer a single case in which article 26 claims were dismissed on the merits as non-justiciable. They refer only to a
lone piece of obiter dictum on the obligations attaching to
those rights in their collective dimension (a dimension not directly cognizable in the system's individualpetitions process),90
together with dated statements made by scholarly commentators to the effect that the inter-American system has not resolved many social rights cases and that it has yet to do so
88. Menfndez, Caride et al. v. Argentina, Case No. 11.670, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 03/01, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001);Jorge
Odir Miranda Cortez v. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 29/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2000) [hereinafter Odir Miranda]. In each of these cases, the Commission lacked jurisdictional competence over both the American Declaration and the San Salvador Protocol.
As such, litigant claims under both instruments were dismissed on standard
subject matter jurisdiction grounds, while only the claims under the American Convention were preserved for adjudication on the merits. The fact that
the norms invoked under the jurisdictionally-improper instruments were of
a "social and economic" variety (health, social security, work) and those invoked under the jurisdictionally-proper instrument were of a "civil and political" hue (judicial guarantees, property, equal protection, judicial protection, life, integrity) was irrelevant to the Commission's appreciation of the
admissibility of the various litigant arguments. This is clear in the Odir Miranda case, in which the Commission properly found petitioners' right-tohealth claim admissible under article 26 of the American Convention, while
dismissing as inadmissible the same claim under the Protocol of San Salvador. Odir Miranda,supra, 45. Though jurisdictionally unimpeachable, the
inclusion of article 26 in the admissibility findings, and its treatment, in the
words of Cavallaro and Schaffer, "on a similar footing with [allegations] involving the violation of certain civil and political rights" appears to surprise
the authors who find the Commission's position in the case with respect to
article 26 "unclear." See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 266.
89. See infra notes 109-14.
90. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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under article 26,91 a fact that is no longer accurate. 9 2 Plainly
however, if the infrequency of litigation were the test of justiciability half of the "protected rights" in the Convention
(e.g., those enshrined in articles 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18,
20 and 23) would also be "non-justiciable." 93 The infrequency
of litigation of particular norms, particularly in light of the historic homogeneity of the system's docket,9 4 imports no necessary judgment as to their judicial enforceability. 95
Rather, in the inter-American system, the judicial enforceability of a given norm-whatever its normative characterization-turns on the existence of four standard prerequisites to

91. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225-26.
92. See, e.g., Milton Garcia Fajardo et al v. Nicaragua, Case 11.281, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 100/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., at 536
(2001) (finding state responsibility for violating labor rights of workers
under article 26). The Commission has found claims admissible under article 26 in many pending cases. See, e.g., Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community and its Members v. Ecuador, Petition 167/103, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 64/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2005) (right to culture,
right to health, right to education under article 26); Jescis Manuel Naranjo
Cirdenas et al. v. Venezuela, Petition 667/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
69/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1
61-64 (2005) (right to social
security under article 26); Ana Victoria Villalobos et al. v. Costa Rica, Case
12.361, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 25/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5
rev. 1
52, 70 (2005) (right to health under article 26); OdirMiranda,supra
note 88, 47 (right to health under article 26).
93. These Convention provisions protect the rights to juridical personality, freedom from slavery, freedom from ex post facto laws, compensation,
freedom of conscience and religion, reply, assembly, family, a name, a nationality, and participation in government, respectively. Long neglected in
the system's docket, these conventional norms are only beginning to be explored through case-based adjudication.
94. This homogeneity reflects the region's recent traumatic history with
repressive military dictatorships and civil war, and its consequences for the
types of cases that have predominated in the caseload of the regional system's organs over the past two decades: forced disappearance, torture, massacres, extrajudicial executions, and unlawful detention. As the conditions
in the Americas change, so too have the types of claims that come before the
regional human rights organs. Naturally and necessarily, these have taken
on a more social, economic, and cultural complexion.
95. A case in point is the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which lay dormant in the United States for almost 200 years, before being rehabilitated in
the Fildrtiga line of decisions, beginning in 1980. See FilIrtiga v. Pefia-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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the exercise of contentious jurisdiction 96 : (1) proper subject
matter jurisdiction (ratione materiae) over the invoked norm by
the adjudicating body; (2) temporal and spatial jurisdiction
(ratione temporis and loci) over the facts giving rise to the claim;
(3) personal jurisdiction (ratione personae) over the parties to
the litigation; and, closely related to this latter element, (4)
the presentation of ajusticiable controversy-i.e., one demonstrating concrete harm to individualized rights-holders and a
causal nexus between that harm and the conduct of the
state. 97 Where these jurisdictional predicates are met, the direct approach is juridically indistinguishable from indirect approaches. Where they are not met, no claim may be "saved" by
recasting it under a civil or political rights norm.
The following two sections discuss how the direct approach may properly be employed in the inter-American system, taking into account, respectively, both subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability considerations.9" While litigant
mistakes are distressingly frequent as to both in the regional
system, it must be emphasized that it is these jurisdictional errors, and not the nature of economic, social, and cultural
rights as such, that have caused problems with recent attempts
to successfully use the direct approach. By presenting such
mistakes as "evidence" of the invalidity of the direct approach,
rather than exposing and correcting them, Cavallaro and
96. Where supranational litigation is concerned, additional jurisdictional
requisites apply in function of the principles of subsidiarity, fairness, and
comity, such as the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, filing
time limits, and non-duplication of international procedures involving the
same claims. For more on these jurisdictional rules in the inter-American
system, see PROTECrING, supra note 7, at 75-110.
97. The Commission addresses each of these categories, along with those
previously mentioned, in every case-related admissibility report it issues. Id.
Only when the Commission is satisfied it enjoys proper jurisdiction over the
contours of each claim presented to it will it proceed to the merits phase in
resolving the case.
98. Temporal and locational jurisdiction, while critically important in
framing the proper contours of a case, will not specifically be addressed
here, as they tend to raise case-specific issues that are not implicated in the
overgeneralizations made by Cavallaro and Schaffer as to the judicial enforceability of economic, social, and cultural rights as autonomous rights.
For discussion of these jurisdictional requisites, see PROTECrING, supra note
7, at 75-110; Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SociAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1.
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Schaffer do a grave disservice to the regional human rights system.
1.

ProperSubject-MatterJurisdiction

The inter-American system is in fact vastly equipped, from
a jurisdictional perspective, to enable the direct litigation of
economic, social, and cultural rights through the individual
petitions process-perhaps more so than any other supranational system, regional or universal. 9 9 This is true under the
American Declaration, the American Convention, and, in
more limited fashion, the San Salvador Protocol and the InterAmerican Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women ("Belem do Pard Convention").1 0 0 Indeed,
99. It is for this reason that Cavallaro and Schaffer's attempts to draw
conclusions for the inter-American system from the jurisprudence of the
U.N. Human Rights Committee (with competence over only the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the European Court of
Human Rights (with a similarly-restricted mandate) are so unwarranted.
While the European Committee on Social Rights has direct competence
over the autonomous social rights protected in the European Social Charter,
it does not enjoy an individual complaints mechanism; neither, at present,
does the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
African Commission on Human Rights does enjoy such a competence, although the tools currently at its disposal for making individual complaints
effective are far less sharp than are those of the inter-American human rights
organs. The same is true of other U.N. Committees with competence over
social rights claims and individual complaints procedures, such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.
100. This latter instrument is not directly discussed in this Article. Its adjudicable provisions are, however, vital for protecting women from the institutional and private abuse that often trap them in situations of poverty, destitution, and social exclusion and impede them from accessing jobs, education, healthcare, and other essential social rights. The Convention in fact
defines "violence against women" as including sexual harassment in the
workplace, educational institutions, health facilities, or any other place, by
any person, and recognizes that such violence "prevents and nullifies" the
exercise of a woman's economic, social, and cultural rights. Though the
Commission is jurisdictionally limited to adjudicating article 7 of the Convention-which, oddly, enshrines only state obligations (not "rights)-the
Commission reads these obligations in light of the substantive provisions of
the Convention. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, "Convention of Beim
do Pari," arts. 2 & 5,Jun. 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994) [hereinafter Belem
do Pard Convention]; id. art. 12 (limiting Court's competence to alleged
violations of article 7); Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am.
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given the wealth ofjurisdictional norms subject to contentious
process in the inter-American system that directly protect economic, social, and cultural rights, case-based litigation of the
autonomous rights to health, education, housing, social security, adequate labor conditions, fair remuneration, and culture
can, as ajurisdictional matter, proceed against every OAS member state. 01
In properly invoking these norms, however, close attention must be paid to the contentious subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission and Court vis-d-vis the defendant state.
The Commission and the Court are organs of limited subject
matter jurisdiction, and thus failure to allege the correct jurisdictional norm will generally lead to dismissal of one's claim,
regardless of its technical justiciability. Litigant errors with respect to subject matter jurisdiction-particularly with regard
to improper invocation of the American Declaration and San
Salvador Protocol-are in fact the single largest contributing
factor to the dismissal of direct-approach claims in the regional system.
For the thirty-five OAS member states, the contentious
subject-matter competence of the inter-American organs
under the "direct approach" breaks down along three distinct
lines: states for whom the norms of the American Declaration
are principally applied; states for whom the norms of the
American Convention are principally applied; and states for
whom two provisions of the San Salvador Protocol may be applied. While the Commission and Court may apply the Convention and Protocol concurrently to a state that has ratified
both instruments, they may not generally apply the Declaration and Convention concurrently. 10 2 "Hybrid" complaints in
this regard are generally a red-flag of jurisdictional error.
C.H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., at 704 (2000)
(finding Brazil responsible for failure to take adequate measures to protect a
battered woman from a habitually abusive husband, about whom it had
knowledge).
101. While these tools have been insufficiently utilized to date, for a number of historically-contingent reasons, their jurisdictional availability is not
subject to question.
102. See, e.g., Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
art. 2.1, Oct. 10, 1979, OEA/Ser.P/IX.O.2/80, vol. 1, at 88 [hereinafter Commission Statute] (defining "human rights" for purposes of Commission's
mandate as "[t]he rights set forth in the American Convention on Human
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Taking into account the respective treaty ratifications and
denunciations of all thirty-five OAS member states as of February 2006, the "direct approach" may, as ajurisdictional matter,
properly be used in supranational litigation before the Commission and Court in three ways. First, contentious complaints
alleging violation of the rights to housing, health, education,
culture, work, fair remuneration, rest, social security, and
property, to the detriment of identifiable individuals, may be
adjudicated by the Commission (but not the Court 0 3 ) under
Rights, in relation to the States Parties thereto" and "[t] he rights set forth in
the American Declaration [], in relation to the other member states"). See
also IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 23, art. 49. While the Court's
contentious competence does not extend to the Declaration's norms on a
direct basis, the Commission, through its caselaw and in spite of its Statute,
has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that the Convention and
Declaration cannot be applied concurrently to the same state-although the
necessity and propriety of both are questionable in light of the underlying
rationales for their creation. The first arises in the case of "continuing violations" in which the initial acts giving rise to the violation occurred before,
and continued after, the defendant state ratified the Convention. See, e.g.,
Octavio Ruben Gonzalez Acosta v. Paraguay, Case 12.358, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 83/03 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2, at 405 (2003); Claudia Ivette Gonzdtlez v. Mexico, Petition 281/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report N 16/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 (2006). The second has been recognized where the petition alleges violation, by a state party to the Convention,
of rights that are consecrated in the Declaration, but not in the Convention
in substantially identical terms. See, e.g., Elba Clotilde Perrone andJuanJos6
Preckel v. Argentina, Case 11.738, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report N - 67/98, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev.
31-33 (1999) (recognizing competence to apply the right to work and to fair remuneration under Declaration article XIV
to a state party to the Convention); Amilcar M46nendez et al v. Argentina,
Case 11.670, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 3/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc.
20 rev., at 95 (2001) (recognizing competence to apply rights to health and
to social security under Declaration articles XI, XVI, XXXV and XXXVII to a
state party to the Convention). This second exception appears to contradict
both the plain text of the Convention and the Commission Statute, while
overextending Convention article 29.d. It has been rendered effectively obsolescent by the Commission's growing article 26 jurisprudence. For a discussion of the error underlying this exception, see TaraJ. Melish, The Protocol of San Salvador: Riddle, Redemption or Just Plain Redundant? (unpublished
manuscript, on file with New York University Journal of International Law &
Politics).
103. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights lacks direct adjudicatory
competence over the American Declaration. It can, however, apply it indirectly in interpreting the overlapping norms in the American Convention on
Human Rights. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 29.d; see also
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
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articles IV, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI and XXIII of the American Declaration against eleven American states: Antigua and
Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Guyana, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Trinidad
and Tobago, and the United States.
Second, contentious complaints alleging violation of the
rights of identifiable individuals to education, health, adequate housing, social security, food, unionization, strike, adequate labor conditions, and fair remuneration may be adjudicated by both the Commission and Court 0 4 under article 26
of the American Convention against the remaining twentyfour American states: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivian, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Third, contentious complaints alleging violation, to the
detriment of specific persons, of the rights to education and
unionization may be adjudicated by both the Commission and
Court under articles 8.1.a and 13 of the San Salvador Protocol
against thirteen American states: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay.
The following three sections discuss more fully each of
these three categories. The discussion makes clear that, as a
jurisdictional matter-and in contrast to the far more limited
ratione materiae competence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee and European Court of Human Rights, to which Cavallaro and Schaffer seek to draw direct comparisons-the full
panoply of classically-recognized economic, social, and cultural rights may be adjudicated in the inter-American system
under the direct approach. This is true with respect to every
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, 1
46-47 (July 14, 1989).
104. In contrast to the other twenty-one OAS member states that are states
party the Convention, Dominica, Grenada, andJamaica have not recognized
the mandatory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The Court may exercise contentious jurisdiction over those four states only
on a case-by-case basis when accepted by special agreement. See American
Convention, supra note 23, art. 62.
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OAS member state, albeit under the instrument(s) jurisdictionally appropriate to each.
a.

American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man

The 1948 American Declaration provides express jurisdictional protection, subject to the Commission's adjudicatory
competence, 10 5 of the rights to housing (arts. IX and XI), to
health (art. XI), to education (art. XII), to culture (art. XIII),
to work, fair remuneration, and rest (arts. XIV and XV), to
social security (art. XVI), to property (art. XXIII), and to special protection for mothers, children and the family (arts. VI
and VII). These provisions are found interspersed among a
series of others of more classical civil-political vintage. In accordance with its Statute and Rules of Procedure, the Commission enjoys contentious jurisdiction to examine individual
complaints submitted to it that allege violation, to the detriment of determinable individuals, of each of these provisions. 1° 6 Such petitions may, however, be lodged only against
the eleven OAS member states that have not yet ratified the
American Convention or have denounced it.107 Once such
ratification occurs, the Convention-and not the Declaration-becomes the jurisdictional instrument defining the applicable "human rights" the ratifying state is committed to respect and ensure, and hence the primary instrument the Com105. The Commission has jurisdiction to consider individual petitions
lodged against all thirty-five OAS member states by virtue of such states' ratification of the OAS Charter and pursuant to the Commission's Statute and
Rules of Procedure. See, e.g., Victor Nicolds Sdnchez, et al. v. United States,
Case 65/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124,
doc. 5 50 (2006).
106. See IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 23, arts. 49 ("The Commission shall receive and examine any petition that contains a denunciation of
alleged violations of the human rights set forth in the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man in relation to the Member States of the
Organization that are not parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights."), & 50 (establishing procedure); Commission Statute, supra note
102, arts. 20 & 1.2.

107. Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention in 1998. The remaining ten states that have not ratified the Convention include: Antigua
and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Cuba, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, and the United States. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, availableat
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html.
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mission is competent to apply in the individual petitions
process. I0
The Commission has never hesitated to utilize this jurisdictional competence to hold states internationally responsible, through the individual petitions process, for a wide spectrum of social rights violations under the Declaration. It has
held American states to account for violating the right to education (art. XII),109 the right to health (art. XI),1o the right to
work and rest (arts. XIV and XV),111 the right to inviolability
of the home (art. IX),112 the rights to indigenous property and
culture (arts. XXIII and XII),113 and the right to special pro108. Thereafter, the Commission is jurisdictionally competent to apply the
American Declaration only indirectly, as an interpretive aid, in determining
the scope and content of the provisions of the American Convention. See
American Convention, supra note 23, art. 29.d.
109. Jehova's Witnesses v. Argentina, Case No. 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979) (state responsible under Declaration for violating right to education of 300 children arbitrarily dismissed
from school or prevented from taking final exams); Yean and Bosico Girls
Case v. Dominican Republic, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130,
29
(2005) (noting Commission's merits-based finding that the state violated the
girl's right to education under article XII of the American Declaration by
dismissing her from school).
110. Coulter et al. Case v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
12/85, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985) (failure
to offer adequate preventive and responsive health and social services-either before or after building a highway through Yanomami territory with the
aim of facilitating miners' access thereto-causing hundreds of Yanomami
Indians to die); Case 1802 (Paraguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.43, doc. 21, corr. 1 (1978) (failure to take appropriate measures to protect
members of the Ach6 tribe from a fatal epidemic proximately caused by state
conduct and from deprivation of medical attention and medicines during
that epidemic); see also Case 6091 (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 3/
82, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev.1 (1982) (failure to protect health and
well-being in custody); Jorge Luis Garcfa Perez-Anttnez (Cuba), Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev.,
28 (2002) (failure to provide
appropriate medical treatment); Francisco Chaviano Gonzdlez (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, 50 (2003) (precautionary measures).
111. Case 1802 (Paraguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc.
21 corr. 1 (1978) (imposition of inhuman conditions of work on indigenous
population).
112. See Case 2006 (Paraguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43 doc.
21 corr. 1 (1978).
113. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2005) (state responsibility for violating
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That the numbers of such

cases are not large owes principally to the low level of use of
the inter-American system by human rights advocates in the
countries that have not yet ratified the American Convention,
and thus for whom the American Declaration is the principal
regional human rights instrument for application in the individual petitions process. 1 5 The early right-to-education and
right-to-health cases adjudicated under the Declaration were
in fact presented to the system by advocates in southern-cone
states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) that have since ratified the
Convention. 116 Such cases must now be brought under the
Convention or, where appropriate, the San Salvador Protocol.,

17

In fact, the Commission not only does not hesitate to use
the direct approach to protect autonomous social rights under
the Declaration but, in a properly-implemented integration
approach, has used these rights to protect classic civil-political
rights as well. It has, for example, found Cuba responsible for
violating the rights of individuals to health and well-being
under Declaration article XI for acts involving custodial torright to ancestral property under Declaration); Mary and Carrie Dann v.
United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.120, doc. 5 rev. 1, at 860 (2002). See also Grand Chief Michael
Mitchell v. Canada, Case 790/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 74/03,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2, at 160 (2003) (finding claim admissible
regarding right to culture and requesting additional briefing on meaning of
right to culture under Declaration and why breached under facts of case).
114. Case 1802 (Paraguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43, doc.
21 (1978) (sale of indigenous children).
115. Advocates in these countries have tended to either neglect the interAmerican system altogether or limit their use of it largely to death penalty
challenges. The Commission has, in fact, never fully adjudicated a case
presented to it against Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Guyana, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or St. Lucia.
116. Argentina ratified the American Convention in 1984, whereas Brazil
and Paraguay did so in 1992 and 1989, respectively. For signature and ratification status of the American Convention, see ORG. OF AM. STATES, BASIC
DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
56, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 9 (2003).
117. Brazil and Paraguay ratified the San Salvador Protocol in 1996 and
1997, respectively. For these states-along with Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay-petitions alleging violations of the fight to education and to unionization under the Protocol may be submitted to the inter-American human
rights organs. See id. at 85.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2006]

RETHINKING THE "LESS AS MORE" THESIS

ture and inhumane treatment.' 18 It has done so while also using article XI to protect more classic health-based threats, such
as failure to reasonably provide adequate medical attention.
In several cases the Commission has invoked article XI in issuing health-related precautionary measures, requesting OAS
member states to transfer inmates suffering health ailments to
specialized hospitals or to grant them specialized medical attention, often to be administered in collaboration with a physician selected by the victim's family. 19 States generally comply
with these orders-indeed, no less than they do with respect to
orders issued under indirect approaches.
Cavallaro and Schaffer obscure this reality through two
devices. One, they simply fail to mention any of the cases
properly litigated under the American Declaration using the
direct approach-that is, against states that are not parties to
the American Convention. Two, they cite only to so-called "hybrid" cases in which the Declaration's social rights norms were
invoked by litigants against states that are parties to the American Convention, i.e., states for whom the Commission lacks ad120
judicatory competence over the American Declaration.
They then use the Commission's unsurprising dismissal of
these Declaration norms-together with their adjudicatory
embrace of the Convention-based civil-political-rights normsas evidence that the direct approach should generally be
avoided in the inter-American system and that classic civil-political-rights norms should be preferred in supranational litiga118. Case No. 6091 (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 3/82, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.57, doc. 6 rev.1 (1982) (finding Cuba responsible for violations
under the Declaration of both the right to the preservation of health and to
well-being (article XI) and the right to humane treatment while in custody
(article XXV)). Interestingly, the American Declaration lacks an express
provision guaranteeing the right to personal integrity, freedom from torture, and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment-the right to humane treatment being textually limited to custodial
situations under article XXV. This would lead to the presumption that these
fundamental rights were intended to be incorporated into article XI, enshrining the right to preservation of health and well-being.
119. See, e.g., Jorge Luis Garcia Prez-Antfinez (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
28 (2002) (precautionary measures);
OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev.
Francisco Chaviano Gonzdlez (Cuba), Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 1 50 (2003) (precautionary measures).
120. See cases cited supra note 88.
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tion.121 Obviously, had the same civil-political rights norms
been invoked under the Declaration, they too would have
been dismissed as jurisdictionally improper, as the Commis122
sion's regular jurisprudence makes clear.
In sum, once subject-matter jurisdiction is properly taken
into account, the validity of the direct approach under the
American Declaration is unquestionable. Litigants should not
hesitate to invoke the Declaration's autonomous social rights
in any case lodged against one of the eleven OAS member
states that are not party to the American Convention.
b.

American Convention on Human Rights

For the remaining twenty-four American states-those
that are party to the American Convention-the rights to education, health, adequate housing, social security, food, unionization, strike, adequate labor conditions, and fair wages may
similarly be alleged in the individual petitions process, albeit
using different jurisdictional provisions. For all of these states,
the primary norm for the direct approach is article 26 of the
American Convention, 123 a single incongruously-titled norm
that directly protects, and renders amenable to contentious
process, those economic, social, and cultural rights derived
from the standards in the OAS Charter, as amended in
1967.124 Those treaty-based standards, set out in Chapter VI of
121. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 264-67.
122. Indeed, the Commission regularly finds civil-political-rights claims
inadmissible when raised under the Declaration in complaints against states
party to the Convention. See, e.g.,
Claudia Ivette Gonzdlez v. Mexico, Petition
281/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 16/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5
15-16 (2006) (life, liberty, integrity); Fernando A. Colmenares Castillo v.
Mexico, Petition 12.170, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/05, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.124, doc. 5 30 (2006) (liberty, due process, property).
123. This may be supplemented, for eleven of them, with the San Salvador
Protocol, but only in cases involving the rights to education and unionization. See San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, art. 19.6.
124. Formally titled "Progressive Development," article 26 provides: "The
States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standardsset forth in the Charterof the Organization
of American States as amended by the Protocolof Buenos Aires [of 1967]" (emphasis
added). The Spanish text, considered the "official" version for purposes of
interpretation, uses the decisively more affirmative term "that derive from"
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the Charter, refer expressly to the "right to education," the
"right to material well-being," the "right to work," the "right to
"right to collective bargaining," and the
unionization," the
"right to strike."' 125 They refer implicitly to the right to health,
the right to adequate housing, the right to social security, the
right to food, the right to just labor conditions, the right to fair
wages, and the right to culture. 126 Each of these classic social
rights may be adjudicated under article 26 when violated to
the detriment of duly-identified individuals through conduct
imputable to the state.
While article 26 is the lone provision under the chapter of
the American Convention formally entitled "Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights" (Ch. III), it is important to underscore
that many of the norms included in Chapter II-formally entitled "Civil and Political Rights"-also expressly protect rights
appropriately understood as economic, social, or cultural.
These include inviolability of the home, freedom from compulsory labor, freedom of labor association, and the right to
property. 127 This is in addition to expansive, textual, or procedural readings of Chapter II norms to protect the rights to
health, to education, to labor guarantees, to social security,
and to ancestral territory, an interpretive practice that now
forms part of the constantjurisprudence of the inter-American
human rights organs. 128 Indeed, the integrated nature of
("que se derivan de" rather than the more passive "implicit in." See Charter of
the Organization of American States, arts. 45, 49, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3, 2 U.S.T. 2394 (1996) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
125. Id.
126. See id. arts. 30, 34, 45-52.
127. See American Convention, supra note 23. For example, article 11
guarantees expressly against arbitrary interference with the home, a simple
restatement of the duty to respect the right to housing. Article 6 protects
against compulsory labor, while article 16 protects the right to freedom of
labor association. The right to property, protected in article 21, is generally
conceived as an "economic right" and, in relation to indigenous peoples, a
"cultural right." The right to special protection of the child and family (arts.
17 and 19) are included on equal terms in the Convention and San Salvador
Protocol, as well as the ICESCR and ICCPR. All other rights in the Convention, moreover-i.e., life, integrity, due process, non-discrimination,judicial
protection, etc.-have as many economic, social, and cultural dimensions as
they have civil and political dimensions.
128. For an analysis of this jurisprudence, see Melish, Inter-American Court
of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity, in SocIAL RIGHTs JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 1; Melish, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Defending Social
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Convention rights underscores the broad illogic in approaches
that aim to distinguish as separate categories "economic, social, and cultural" and "civil and political" rights and that then
attribute 'justiciable" or "enforceable" character exclusively to
one. Such distinctions are particularly suspect given the Convention's express grant of contentious competence to the
Commission and Court over alleged violations of all Convention-guaranteed rights and freedoms-that is, those recog129
nized in Chapters II and III inclusive.
To be sure, article 26 has historically been the subject of
neglect in regional adjudication initiatives. Contrary to Cavallaro and Schaffer's suggestion, however, this owes not to any
belief that article 26 fails to consecrate discretely-identifiable
"specific rights" of an economic, social, or cultural nature. 130
The inter-American human rights organs have repeatedly recognized the protected status of these discrete rights under article 26. The Commission, for example, in addition to making
broad statements on the Convention's extensive protection of
economic, social, and cultural rights in general, 13 has recogRights through Case-Based Petitions, in SocIAi RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 1.
129. See American Convention, supra note 23, arts. 1-2, 44-51, 63.
130. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225 ("Article 26 fails to establish any specific rights"); see also id. at 268 ("Article 26 enumerates no
specific rights enforceable on an individual basis."). Such neglect owes principally to two factors: first, the substantive homogeneity of the system's
caseload since the Convention entered into force in 1978 and, second, historically-based misperceptions about the nature of the state obligations that
attach to economic, social, and cultural rights, these being inappropriately
distinguished from those applicable to classic civil and political rights. See
discussion infra Part III.A, III.A.2.
131. According to the Commission, "[t]he Inter-American states have
pledged in the Charter and in the Convention [], or through the Declaration, to promote and protect civil and political rights, and economic, social
and cultural rights." OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 doc. 9 rev., at 563 (1994). The
2005 President of the Inter-American Commission affirmed that "the observance by the States of the rule of law and the effective protection of economic, social and cultural rights" are the "foremost challenges" that the
Commission must now confront. Dr. Clare K Roberts, President, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Address before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (Apr. 15, 2005). Likewise, a former President has affirmed that
"[m]ore than any of the other great human rights instruments of the modern world, the American Convention emphasizes economic rights and economic development, as does the Charter of the Organization of American
States." Dr. Alvaro Tirado Mejia, President, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Address
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nized expressly that article 26 consecrates the right to
health, 132 the right to social security, 13 3 labor rights protections such as freedom of unionization, 34 and the right to
property (in the sense of land distribution). 135 It has likewise issued precautionary measures to protect the right to
housing and housing-related land resources 136 and the right
before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (Feb.
6, 1995), in OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996), at 275, 278.
132. See, e.g., Odir Miranda, supra note 88, 1 47 ("[T] he IACHR will take
into account the provisions related to the right to health in its analysis of the
merits of the case, pursuant to the provisions of articles 26 and 29 of the
American Convention."); Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral and others affected by
HIV/AIDS v. Guatemala, Case 642/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 32/05,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5 7 42 (2006) (recognizing that article 26 protects the right to health, in both its curative and preventative dimensions).
133. See, e.g., Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51,
142 (summarizing Commission's arguments to the Court on the right to social security under Convention article 26);Jestds Manuel Naranjo Cdrdenas et al. v. Venezuela, Petition 667/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 69/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122,
doc. 5 rev. 1, 7 61-64 (2005) ("[T]he Commission finds that the nonperformance of the judicial judgment dictated in the internal order guaranteeing the right to social security, alleged by the presumed victims as entitlement, might characterize a violation of the Article 26 of the American Convention.").
134. See, e.g., Milton Garcia Fajardo et al v. Nicaragua, Case 11.281, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 100/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., at 536
(2001) (finding state responsibility for violating labor rights of workers
under article 26).
135. See, e.g., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V.II.88, doc. 9 rev. (1995), at 175-76 (finding, under
promotional mandate, state in breach of article 26 by engaging in unjustified delay in the implementation of a program of land transfers to demobilized combatants).
136. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua People v. Paraguay, Petition 12.313, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 2/02, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, 11 11-12 (2003) [hereinafter YakyeAxa Case]
(requesting that the state "suspend the enforcement of any court or administrative order involving the eviction and/or removal of the homes of the
Yakye Axa indigenous community"); Pueblo Indigena Kichwa De Sarayaku y
Sus Miembros v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/04, OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1, at C1 (2005) (precautionary measures), 7 16 (Colombia) (requesting Colombia to "adopt the necessary measures to guarantee
adequate accommodations and the necessary conditions for the subsistence"
of individuals violently evicted from their settlement); Mercedes Julia
Huenteao Beroisa et al. v. Chile, Petition 4617/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 30/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1, 1 15 (2005) (requesting
Chile to "avoid[] or suspend[] any judicial or administrative action that entails eviction of the petitioners from their ancestral lands").
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to education 137 with respect to states parties to the Convention.
Similarly, the Court-having more limited opportunities
to address the provision in the individual petitions processhas recognized implicitly that article 26 protects the right to
social security, the right to health, and the right to education
as autonomous individually-held rights. 138 It has made broad
statements in favor of economic, social, and cultural rights
under its advisory jurisdiction, particularly in relation to the
interlinkages between the rights to health and education in
article 26 and articles 4 and 19.139 Indeed, even states that are
parties to the Convention readily recognize that article 26 protects a series of rights creating legal obligations for them. In
the recent case Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,the
state admitted partial international responsibility in proceedings before the Court for violating article 26 of the Convention
on the ground that its agents failed to take adequate measures
to ensure the rights to food, health care, and other essential
social services for a highly vulnerable population to which it
140
owed duties of care.
137. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 rev. 1 27 (2000) (Dom. Rep.) (requiring the state to adopt the measures necessary to prevent a young girl "from
being deprived of her right to attend school and to receive the education
provided to other children of Dominican nationality").
138. See Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51, 147-48 (recognizing that article 26 protects the right to social security, but declining to pronounce on it
in the context of the case); Case of Children's Rehabilitation vs. Paraguay,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112,
255 (Sept. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
PanchitoL6pez Case] (recognizing that article 26 protects the rights to health,
education, and recreation, but declining to pronounce on it in the interests
of judicial economy given that violations of articles 4 and 5 already found
based on same facts).
139. See, e.g., Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory
Opinion OC-17/02, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 17, 77 137(8), 86 (Aug.
28, 2002) (resolving that "true and full protection of children entails their
broad enjoyment of all their rights, including their economic, social, and
cultural rights" and highlighting that "education and care for the health of
children ... are the key pillars to ensure enjoyment of a decent life");
Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138. See generally Juridical Condition and
Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18/03 (Sept. 17, 2003).
140. See Yakye Axa Case, supra note 136,
204. The state, however, defended its omissions on the ground of lack of available resources due to its
status as a "less developed country" and the "inequalities in international

commerce." Id.
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Nevertheless, Cavallaro and Schaffer insist that "article 26
fails to establish any specific rights."' 14 1 They base this conclusion on two unwarranted grounds, one referring to the treaty's
travaux priparatoires,the other to a jurisdictional limitation
over rights in an entirely separate treaty. Regarding the first,
they purport to rely on the existence of an internal debate between states in the negotiation of the Convention's text about
whether to include express protection of autonomous economic, social, and cultural rights. Leaving aside the precept
against referral to the travaux prparatoireswhere the text of a
treaty provision is not ambiguous or obscure in light of its or14 2
dinary meaning and the object and purpose of the treaty as is the case with article 26-an actual reading of the travaux
should in fact have led Cavallaro and Schaffer to the opposite
conclusion.
Indeed, the treaty negotiation process shows broad support for the inclusion of autonomous economic, social, and
cultural rights, as "protected rights," in the American Convention. The objection voiced by most states was that the draft
text prepared by the Commission and used as the basis for negotiations was not strong enough in its social rights protec141. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225; see also id. at 268.
142. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the preparatory work of international conventions is only a supplementary means of
interpreting a treaty and is to be accorded little, if any, weight if the meaning
of a treaty provision is not ambiguous or obscure in light of the ordinary
meaning to be given to its terms in their context, in light of the treaty's
object and purpose, and in the absence of a special meaning affirmatively
accorded to a term by the parties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. "Preparatory work is an
aid to be employed with discretion, since its use may detract from the textual
approach, and, particularly in the case of multilateral agreements, the
records of conference proceedings, treaty drafts, and so on may be confused
or inconclusive." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
636 (1998). The International Court ofJustice, like its predecessor, has generally refused to resort to preparatory work if the text is sufficiently clear in
itself. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a
State to the United Nations, 44 AM.J. INT'L L. 582, 582-86 (1950). The interAmerican human rights organs follow this approach as well. See, e.g., Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 3, 1 50 (Sept. 8, 1983) ("[O]bjective criteria of interpretation
that look to the texts themselves are more appropriate [in the case of human
rights treaties] than subjective criteria that seek to ascertain only the intent
of the Parties").
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tions. 143 They wanted a clearer, more technically-drafted reference to "rights" with concrete corresponding legal obligations. Thus, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala,
Panama, and Uruguay urged amendments to the Commission's draft text to include explicit reference to "rights" rather
than declaratory statements on "standards," 14 4 as well as more
technical legal wording to ensure the obligations attendant
thereto were viewed as "legal" and "effective."' 45 They also
urged closing the substantial gaps left by the Commission's underinclusive enumeration of the standards in article 31 (now
article 34) of the OAS Charter. That enumeration omitted,
for example, the rights to strike, to education, and to culture,
all of which were directly protected under other provisions of
the OAS Charter and merited inclusion as "protected rights"
in the American Convention. 146 Even the United States urged
143. Draft Inter-American Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights, prepared by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, draft
arts. 25 & 26, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19, doc. 48 (1968). The Commission's draft
textually replicated, in declaratory and non-legal terms, the standards assumed by OAS member states in what is currently article 34 of the OAS
Charter. It then subjected those standards to a periodic state reporting procedure.
144. See, e.g., Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights,
Acts and Documents, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2, doc. 6, at 36-37 (Uruguay)
(Sept. 26, 1969) [hereinafter Specialized Conference on Human Rights]
(noting that such "declaratory text" does not seem appropriate for a convention"); id. doc. 53, at 268 (Chile) (urging a better drafting of the economic,
social and cultural rights in the Convention, following the technique of the
United Nations and European Council).
145. See, e.g.,
id. doc. 53, at 268 (Chile) (suggesting inclusion of clear binding corresponding legal obligations similar to article 2.1 of the ICESCR). As
Cavallaro and Schaffer point out, the draft Conventions presented by the
American Committee of Jurists, by Panama, and by Chile "gave extensive
recognition to economic, social, and cultural rights." Cavallaro & Schaffer,
supra note 2, at 268 n.175 (quoting Matthew Craven, The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Inter-American System of Human
Rights, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 289, 297 (David J.
Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998)).
146. Specialized Conference on Human Rights, supra note 144, at 121-128
(Brazil). In offering an amendment aimed at giving "economic, social and
cultural rights the maximum protection compatible with the peculiar conditions of the great majority of American States," Brazil noted objections to
both draft paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Commission's draft: "The drafting of
paragraph 1 is vague, limiting itself to a manifestation of intention. For its
part, paragraph 2, by reducing the content of article 31 of the Protocol of
Buenos Aires, forgot the right to strike which is already consecrated, with
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only deletion of the first paragraph of the Commission's draft,
on the technical ground that it was already included in a subsequent draft article;1 4 7 it voiced no formal objections to general inclusion in the Convention of norms related to economic, social, and cultural rights. The Dominican Republic
was the lone voice in proposing that the provision be moved
outside the chapter on protected rights. 48 While Argentina
and Mexico did voice concerns, these were not related principally to the inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights
in the Convention. Rather, they were directed to the technical
competence of the Commission to formulate recommendations on the measures states might adopt to ensure such
rights 149 and to the legal determination of which domestic authority would be responsible for violations thereof. 150 Outside
of these technical matters, Argentina otherwise supported inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights in the protected rights section of the American Convention, following
the position of Brazil. 15 1 Indeed, the argument of most states
was that they had already committed to ensuring economic,
social, and cultural rights in other legally-binding treaties, and
hence the omission of such rights from the Convention was
unjustified. 5 2 Urging an entire chapter on economic, social,
and cultural rights, Guatemala in fact implored delegates that
"our Governments must lend greater attention to economic,
certain limitations, by the internal law of the American States, as well as the
norms on education, science and culture foreseen in Article 47 of the same
Protocol." Id.
147. Id. doc. 53, at 268 (United States).
148. Id. doc. 9, at 50-91 (Dom. Rep.).
149. Id. doc. 8, at 45-49 (Arg.).
150. Id. doc. 11, at 99-103 (Mex.). Mexico did, however, subsequently express general doubts about the convenience of including in the Convention
the "rights" contemplated in the Commission's draft article 25. Id. doc. 53,
at 268. It did not, however, feel strongly enough to include itself in the final
drafting committee of interested states on that article. Mexico is today a
reliable supporter of supranational adjudicatory procedures exercising competence over social rights claims.
151. Id. doc. 53, at 267 (Arg.).
152. See id. Chile urged explicit reference to and enumeration of economic, social, and cultural rights, following the technique of the United Nations and the European Council. Id. doc. 7, at 38-44,
14-15 (Chile). Uruguay objected to the lack of reference to rights in the Commission's draft
article 25.2, and took issue with restrictions on the right to unionize. Id. doc.

6, at 36-37.
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social, and cultural rights, given that their full realization is the
only hope to solve the multiple problems that lead to un53
derdevelopment.,
In response to the objections as to vagueness and underinclusiveness voiced by OAS member states to the Commission's draft discussion text, a Working Group was formed to
draft a compromise text based on the various amendments
proposed at the Conference. t 54 To address the "vagueness"
objection, an express reference to "rights" was added to current article 26, together with a specific obligations clause to
supplement the general obligations clauses laid out in Chapter
I of the Convention. That specific clause was drafted in terms
similar to article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), a treaty adopted
just three years prior that established autonomous social rights
similar to those referred to in article 26.155 To address the
"underinclusiveness" objection, the Commission's initial textual duplication of the standards enumerated exclusively in
one provision of the amended OAS Charter was replaced by a
concise, non-exclusive reference to all the "rights implicit in
the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards" set forth therein. This shorter, inclusive reference diminished the risk-a constant concern in human rights treaty
drafting negotiations-that overly-specific references might, in
the future, be construed erroneously as an intention of the
drafters to limit rights to precise specifications, rather than to
allow them to evolve progressively as circumstances, understandings, and technologies change. The task of deciphering
the specific rights protected would fall to interpreting bodies
in case-specific contexts as treaty law and jurisprudence devel-

153. Id. doc. 24 (Guatemala) (Nov. 8, 1969). The delegate continued,
"neither let us forget that in the developed nations there also exist great
nuclei of the population in which the promotion of these fights are imperative." Id.

154. The Working Group was comprised of delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and the United States. Id. at 268.

155. For a general assessment of the critical role played by Latin American
states in the drafting process, see generally Paolo G. Carozza, An Historical
View of the Latin American Contribution to the Idea of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, in SocALk RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 74 (Alicia Eli Yamin, ed., forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter An Historical View].
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oped, as well as through the dialogic work of states, the Com56
mission, and civil society in the periodic reporting process. 1
Perhaps most tellingly, while the Convention drafters did
place the newly-drafted article 26 in a separate Chapter III entided "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights"-following the
recommendation of Chile and the contemporaneous lead of
the United Nations 1 57-it

did not remove it from the overarch-

ing section enumerating "Protected Rights" (as the Dominican
Republic had proposed). That is, the Commission's original
treaty draft had included a single Chapter II entitled "Protected Rights," in which it had placed all of the substantive
norms of the Convention-i.e., those of a civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights nature. Significantly, in creating a new Chapter III for article 26, the framers did not
maintain the old title of "Protected Rights" for Chapter II as
they could have, had they not wanted to subject Chapter III
rights to the same standards as Chapter II. Rather, it renamed
Chapter II "Civil and Political Rights" and relocated both
Chapters II and III under a new Part I entitled "State Obligations and Rights Protected." By doing so, they made their intention clear that the economic, social, and cultural rights protected in Chapter III were not to be interpreted as second-class
rights, but rather were to be treated under the same general
obligations, supplemented by those in article 26, and the same
individual complaints procedure as were the civil and political
rights in Chapter

11.158

The travaux, therefore, support the

otherwise textually-unambiguous reading of the Convention
that article 26 establishes individually enforceable "specific
156. Although a periodic reporting process was formally established
under the American Convention for the rights recognized in article 26, see
American Convention, supra note 23, art. 42, it was never systematically put
into practice in the inter-American system.
157. As one former Inter-American CourtJudge has noted, the separation
in the Convention "between civil and political rights and economic, social
and cultural rights follows merely historical reasons and not juridical differences among them." Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, supra note 52, 6 (Piza EscalanteJ.,
concurring and dissenting).
158. The synopsis of the Convention's drafting process relied upon by
Cavallaro and Schaffer does not appear to reflect the documentary record
fully; it tends to draw conclusions from the final draft that do not reflect a
reading of the Convention as a whole. See Craven, supra note 145, at 297306.
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rights" and that these rights-as "protected rights"-are enforceable to the same degree and under the same standardsas the
Convention's rights enumerated in Chapter J1.159
Cavallaro and Schaffer make the equally misplaced argument that, to the extent article 26 is "ambiguous" as to the
creation of enforceable rights, the "OAS appears to have resolved these doubts when it drafted and adopted the San Salvador Protocol."'160 According to the authors, this is due to a
jurisdiction-granting provision in the San Salvador Protocol,
which limits the number of norms in that treaty that may be
adjudicated in the individual petitions process to two: articles
8.1.a and 13, protecting the rights to education and unionization, respectively. Apparently, this limitation on the contentious ratione materiaejurisdiction of the Commission and Court,
by its terms applicable exclusively to one treaty, "proves" the
unwritten intent of the drafters of a prior treaty, adopted
twenty-years earlier, to exempt, sub silencio, a single norm
(out of twenty-three) from jurisdiction-granting provisions that
otherwise plainly include it.161

159. This view of equal status between rights has been expressly affirmed
by one former Judge of the Court. For him, speaking over two decades ago,
the "standards of the Convention" are "applicable to the so-called 'economic, social and cultural rights'" in the same way, and under the same
circumstances, they are applicable to "civil and political rights." See Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, supra note 52, 6 (Piza Escalante,J., concurring and dissenting).
Although Judge Piza used different terminology ("reasonably requirable in
themselves" vs. "not reasonable requirable in themselves"), he effectively
aimed to express the same idea presented in this article regarding the equal
applicability to all rights of "quadrant 1" and "quadrant 4" duties. See infra
Part III.A.2.
160. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 268.
161. See American Convention, supra note 23, arts. 41.f, 44-51, 61-65. The
Commission is authorized to adjudicate alleged violations "of any of the
rights protected by this Convention." Id. art. 48.1 (emphasis added). So,
too, does the contentious jurisdiction of the Court comprise "all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention." Id. art. 62.3. The Court is authorized to issue remedies in such cases
whenever it finds "there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by
this Convention." Id. art. 63.1 (emphasis added). The rights protected in article 26 are plainly included in this language.
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This view not only neglects accepted norms of treaty interpretation, 162 it leads to absurd results. Indeed, if the Cavallaro-Schaffer understanding were extended to other norms
and treaties that contained rights similar to Convention norms
but that were drafted in more specific language and were not
subject to the individual petitions process, numerous Convention-based rights would instantly be excised from the contentious jurisdiction of the Commission and Court. For example,
two inter-American treaties were adopted by OAS member
states in 1994 and 1999, respectively, to address discrimination
and violence against groups in particularly vulnerable situations: women and persons with disabilities. Although the
rights of "all persons" (i.e., including women and persons with
disabilities) to non-discrimination and to equal protection of
the law are expressly protected in articles 1 and 24 of the
American Convention, OAS member states determined that,
in light of enduring discrimination and violence against these
groups, more specifically-worded, reinforcing protections were
necessary. Both supplementary treaties, nonetheless, excepted
their more precisely-defined guarantees either entirely or
mostly, from the regional system's individual petitions pro63
cess. 1
Extending the reasoning of Cavallaro and Schaffer to
these subsequent treaties, we should draw from this limitation
the understanding that Convention articles 1 and 24 were
never intended to be adjudicable in the individual petitions
process-at least not with respect to women and persons with
disabilities. In fact, extending further the Cavallaro-Schaffer
view, neither should articles 17 and 19 of the Convention.
These provisions protect, respectively, the rights of the family
and the rights of children to special measures of protectionrights that, like freedom from non-discrimination, are protected by congruent, more precisely-defined norms in the San
162. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 142, arts.
30-31.
163. See Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, art. 6, Jun. 7, 1999, AG/
RES. 1608 (1999) (contemplating a periodic reporting process for the rights
enshrined therein, rather than subjection to the individual petitions process); Belem do Pard Convention, supra note 100, art. 12 (limiting competence of individual complaints mechanism to alleged violations of article 7).
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Salvador Protocol.16 4 If the Protocol's jurisdictional limitation
in article 19.6 renders Convention article 26 non-adjudicable,
so too does it render non-adjudicable Convention articles 1,
17, 19, 24, and potentially many others. The absurd results
attendant to the Cavallaro-Schaffer understanding of the interAmerican organs' ratione materiaejurisdiction should stand as a
cautionary tale in efforts to reconstruct article 26 as a
1 65
programmatic norm lacking adjudicable content.
Indeed, precisely to avoid such untoward interpretations,
the San Salvador Protocol includes a "savings provision" in article 4. That provision expressly prohibits invoking norms of
the Protocol to restrict or curtail rights that are in effect in a
state by virtue of a different treaty-such as the American Convention-on the pretext that the Protocol fails to recognize those
rights or recognizes them to a lesser degree.' 66 That is, correctly understood, article 4 of the San Salvador Protocol prohibits the use of Protocol article 19.6 as a pretext to limit or
restrict the adjudicability of the rights consecrated in Convention article 26 for states parties to that instrument.
Cavallaro and Schaffer's view of the impact of Protocol
article 19.6 on the adjudicability of Convention article 26167
also overlooks the fact that the American Convention does not
single out in its jurisdictional grant any specific provision or set
of provisions. It broadly establishes the jurisdictional competence of the Commission and Court to receive contentious
164. See San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, arts. 3, 15, 16.
165. There are in fact many reasons why states draft new treaties consecrating established rights in more specific form; the San Salvador Protocol
is no exception.
166. San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, art. 4 ("A right which is recognized or in effect in a State by virtue of its internal legislation or international
conventions may not be restricted or curtailed on the pretext that this Protocol does not recognize the right or recognizes it to a lesser degree.") (emphasis added).
167. Cavallaro and Schaffer seek to draw a non-congruent comparison between the San Salvador Protocol, which affirmatively grants contentious
competence to the Commission and Court over two of its treaty provisions,
and the American Convention, which does not single out any specific norm
in its jurisdictional grant. The authors' seem to find meaning in the absence
of an affirmative grant ofjurisdiction over article 26, when there is no affirmative grant of jurisdiction over any individual provision. Rather, jurisdiction
is granted to "all protected rights." This category includes all those rights
recognized in articles 3 through 26 inclusive. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra
note 2, at 227.
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complaints "alleging violation of any of the rights protected by this
Convention. 1 6 8 This grant covers all Chapter II and Chapter

III rights, including the specific rights to education, health,
housing, social security, and labor protections guaranteed
under article 26.
c.

San Salvador Protocol

In contrast to the Convention's unrestricted grant of adjudicatory competence to the Commission and Court over all
rights recognized therein, including those in article 26, the
San Salvador Protocol grants the inter-American organs contentious competence over only two of its rights-based norms:
the rights to education and to unionization. 169 Contrary to
popular belief, then-which often views the Protocol as "filling
the gap" in regional treaty law-the Protocol is in fact of notably limited direct use in supranational adjudicatory processes
at present. This comes in spite of its detailed protections of
the rights to health, a healthy environment, food, work, just
and equitable conditions of work, social security, the benefits
of culture, and special protection for the family, children, elderly, and persons with disabilities,1 70 none of which may be directly invoked in the individual petitions process under the
Protocol.
This does not mean, however, that these rights do not
lend themselves to the direct approach in the inter-American
system. As effectively all of the rights protected in the Protocol
(plus a few more 7l ) are likewise protected by the jurisdictional norms of the American Declaration and American Convention, over which the Commission and/or Court do enjoy
unrestricted contentious subject-matter jurisdiction, the direct
approach may be used to protect these rights vis-a-vis every
American state. The Protocol in no way alters the inter-Ameri168. See American Convention, supra note 23, arts. 48 (emphasis added).
The Convention similarly grants remedial powers over any "violation of a
right or freedom protected by this Convention." Id. art. 63.1; see generally id.
arts. 44-63.
169. See San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, art. 19.6.
170. Id. arts. 6-18.
171. The right to housing, for example, is not expressly mentioned in the
Protocol of San Salvador, while it is expressly protected in both the American Declaration and American Convention. American Declaration, supra 78,
arts. 9 & 11; American Convention, supra note 23, art. 26.
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can organs' contentious subject-matter jurisdiction over these
prior instruments.
Rather, the primary value of the Protocol in the individual
petitions process-as distinct from its broader, unrestricted
role in monitoring and promotional work-lies in its fleshingout, in binding treaty form, of the rights to which American
states have previously committed in other less precisely-worded
instruments, particularly the American Convention. This interpretive function is textually sanctioned by Convention article 29.b, which prohibits the interpretation of Convention
norms, including article 26, in a way that restricts the enjoyment of any right recognized by the San Salvador Protocol for
states that are party to both instruments. 172 In the interpretive
practice of the Commission and Court, this means that the
Protocol's norms can be taken into consideration in interpreting the normative content and scope of the economic, social,
and cultural rights protected in Convention article 26.173 This
172. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 29.b ("No provision of
this Convention shall be interpreted as ... restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of... another convention
to which one of the said states is a party."); Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, supra note 52,
20 ("[Article 29] was designed specifically to ensure that [the Convention]
would in no case be interpreted to permit the denial or restriction of fundamental human rights and liberties, particularlythose that have already been recognized by the State.") (emphasis added). Finding article 29's "innovating
breadth ...unmatched in any other international document," a former Inter-American Court Judge has in fact described the provision as incorporating into the Convention, to some degree, the "principles in other international instruments, in the country's own internal regulations and in the
trends in effect in the matter of human rights." Id. 20 (Piza EscalanteJ.,
concurring and dissenting).
173. In the Court's evolving jurisprudence under the American Convention, for example, it has repeatedly turned to the San Salvador Protocol and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, when ratified by the state in
question, to "determine the content and scope" of the general provision established in article 19 on special measures of protection for the child. In the
Court's words, this is necessary as these instruments "form part of a very
comprehensive corpus juris of protection of children that the Court must
148; G6mez-Paquiyauri
respect." Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138,
166 (July 8,
Brothers Case v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110,
2004); Villagrn Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
194-95 (Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Street Children Case];Juridical Sta63,
tus and Human Rights of the Child, supra note 139, 24. Accordingly, it has
found that the special measures of protection to which article 19 refers in-
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is true, at a minimum, for states parties to both instruments.
Thus, while litigants should never plead direct violations of the
Protocol's substantive norms outside articles 8.1.a and 13, they
can use the Protocol's extensive catalogue of social rights as
interpretive tools when invoking the broadly overlapping, but
more vaguely-defined rights subject to the Commission and
Court's contentious jurisdiction through Convention article
26. 174

cludes those necessary to ensure children's rights to education and to
health, as part of the obligation to ensure an adequate standard of living and
what the Court has dubbed a "project of life."
Similarly, the Court has turned to domestic law, customary law, and a
series of ratified ILO Conventions-often in conjunction with the San Salvador Protocol-to determine the content and scope, in a labor context, of
the Convention's guarantee of the right to association, as well as the right to
property for indigenous peoples. Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72, 159 (Feb. 2, 2001); Pedro Huilca Tecse v. Peru,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121 (Mar. 12, 2005) (labor association); Awas
Tingni Case, supra note 51 (indigenous property). Significantly, in addition
to the jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, to which it frequently turns, the Court has also
looked to the interpretive jurisprudence of the ILO Labor Union Freedom
Committee, ILO Committee of Experts, and the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including its General Comments, to assist
it in interpreting the content and scope of Convention provisions. See, e.g.,
Baena Ricardo Case, supra, 162-65; Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51, 1 147;
Plan de Sdnchez Massacre Case v. Guatemala, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 105 (Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Plan de Sdnchez].
This integrative practice stems from the Court's expansive view of the
Convention as a "living instrument," for which "dynamic interpretation" is
needed, corresponding not to the circumstances that existed at the time of
its drafting, but rather to the new juridical and factual circumstances in
which a controversy arises. See, e.g.,Juridical Status and Human Rights of the
Child, supra note 139,
28; Street Children Case, supra, 193; The Right to
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
16, 114 (Oct. 1, 1999). This characteristic of the Court's constant jurisprudence is vital for the progressive inclusion in the regional human rights system of more detailed and nuanced guidelines-such as those developed in
relation to the critical guideposts of availability, accessibility, adequacy, and
acceptability in the General Comments of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights-for the effective protection of fundamental social rights.
174. This "indirect" use of the Protocol is particularly important given that
the Protocol did not enter into force until November 1999 and has been
ratified by only thirteen of thirty-five American states. Because of jurisdictional limitations that require available remedies to be exhausted, together
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Cavallaro and Schaffer overlook this proper use of the
Protocol and instead conflate the Protocol's restricted grant of
contentious subject-matterjurisdictionover its norms with the justiciability of the rights therein. 1 75 They thus arrive at the conclusion that, given article 19.6, the Protocol-based rights to education and unionization are the only justiciable economic, social, and cultural rights in the inter-American system. This
leads them to their overall, and distinctly contradictory, 176 thesis that, outside these two Protocol-based rights, social rights
litigation in the regional system should be based on expansive
constructions of classic civil and political rights, "rather than
on formal acceptance of [economic, social, and cultural]
17 7
rights themselves."

The authors' jurisdictional analysis thus errs in two critical
ways. First, it neglects the inter-American organs' indisputable
contentious competence over the array of social rights guaranteed autonomously in the Declaration and Convention, rights
that may be applied in the individual petitions process against
all OAS member states, not only the thirteen that have ratified
the Protocol. These norms include, but are not limited to, the
rights to education and unionization; they extend to the rights
with a requirement that the facts giving rise to a violation take place after a
given instrument takes effect, a significant mass of cases in which the Protocol may properly be alleged directly will not, in practice, reach the interAmerican system for another several years. For a discussion of the "indirect
application" of economic, social and cultural rights norms over which the
inter-American organs lack contentious jurisdiction, see PROTECTING, supra
note 7, at 125-51.
175. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 227 ("Although petitioners
to the Commission have sought to defend the justiciability of all of the rights
protected in the Protocol, the Commission has construed Article 19 restrictively.").
176. Indeed, Cavallaro and Schaffer never explain why the Protocol-based
rights to education and unionization are enforceable if-as they likewise assert-economic, social and cultural rights have proved "incapable of imposing immediate obligations on states." Id. at 222. They appear to overlook the
fact that the duties corresponding to the education and unionization provisions in the Convention and Protocol are effectively identical. Given that subject-matter jurisdiction exists over the relevant rights in both instruments and
the corresponding obligations do not differ in any material way, why adjudication is proper under one instrument and not under the other is never explained. See id. at 274-75.
177. Id. at 275 (describing strategy as based on two Protocol norms plus
expansive interpretations of civil and political rights).
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to health, housing, culture, social security, fair remuneration,
and adequate labor conditions. Second, and just as importantly, by conflating subject-matter jurisdiction with justiciability Cavallaro and Schaffer not only understate the scope
ofjusticiable claims that may be presented in the system using
the direct approach, but substantially overstate those that may
be brought under either the elements approach or the Protocol's education and unionization provisions. Emphatically,
not all claims made under jurisdictionally-appropriate norms
are in fact justiciable. It is to this critical point that the next
section turns.
2.

The Justiciability of Direct-Approach Claims

To be cognizable through contentious process, a legal
claim must not only encompass norms, parties, and facts over
which the adjudicatory body exercises jurisdiction; 178 the
claim itself must also be 'justiciable": appropriatefor judicial or
adjudicatory review. 179 Advocates and scholars often err by
talking about the 'justiciability" or "non-justiciability" of rights.
In fact, it is not rights that are or are not justiciable; it is the
claims crafted under them that fulfill, or fail to fulfill, the elements of ajusticiable controversy. In this sense, the number of
justiciable claims properly made under jurisdictionally-appropriate norms cuts equally across all civil, cultural, economic,
political, and social rights. 180
178. That is, the contentious body must exercise ratione materiae, ratione
personae, ratione temporis, and ratione loci competence over the claim. All admissibility reports of the Commission address each of these aspects as a condition for proceeding to the merits stage of litigation. The Commission also
assures itself that the claim "tends to establish a violation" of the instrument
under consideration, in which it considers additional admissibility factors
that speak directly to 'Justiciability," such as causation and concrete harm.
See Diaz et al. v. Colombia, Case 11.227, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 5/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev.
34 (1997).
179. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 865 (6th ed. 1990).
180. The Commission regularly holds cases involving both civil-political
and economic-social-cultural rights inadmissible under its contentious jurisdiction where they fail to fulfill the requirements of a justiciable case. See,
e.g., Janet Espinoza Feria et al. v. Peru, Case 12.404, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. I rev. 1 (2003); Felix Roman
Esparragoza Gonzalez and Nerio Molina Pefialoza v. Venezuela, Case 12.210,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1
(2005); Queenan v. Canada, Communication No. 13/9/2005, CCPR/C/84/
D/1379/2005 (Aug. 28, 2005); Santana et al. v. Venezuela, Case 453/01, In-
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The precise contours of a justiciable case or claim can
vary at the margins across jurisdictions, depending on the respective rules governing access to the judiciary, particularly
those related to party standing. 8 1 Ajusticiable claim is nevertheless generally described as one involving a live controversy
between adverse parties in which breach of a legally-defined
duty held by one party is alleged to have proximately caused
concrete injury to an identified rights-holder or set of similarly-situated rights-holders to which that duty is held. Its contours serve to concretize disputes in judicially-manageable
ways, delimiting the types of claims appropriate for judicial review and for party-specific remedies.
As is true with most supranational bodies that concurrently exercise adjudicatory and promotional/advisory functions, the inter-American organs jealously guard the boundary
between their distinct competences,18 2 limiting their contentious jurisdiction to what has been defined as a concrete
"case." 18 3 The Commission, for example, regularly culls from
ter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 92/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2
(2004); Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama (2003), Case 11.533, InterAm. C.H.R., Report No. 88/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003).
181. These rules often reflect distinct levels of political accountability at
the domestic level. Standing rules tend to become more expansive-blurring the line between adjudicatory and promotional/advisory functionswhere the democratic branches are viewed as unaccountable and courts are
compelled to take on a more political role. Courts will often accommodate
the relative intrusiveness of their orders to the political reality of the day,
pulling back or forging forward according to their domestic appreciation of
separation-of-powers considerations. Because domestic courts may operate
under distinct standing and justiciability rules it is important that supranational adjudicatory bodies operate under a set of rules viewed as legitimate
by all states subject to their jurisdiction. As a practical matter, this will generally mean that justiciability should be viewed narrowly, keeping the boundary between adjudicatory and promotional functions sharp. This has been
the time-tested approach of the European Court of Human Rights, which,
like the inter-American system, exercises jurisdiction over states with differing rules governing litigant access to the domestic judiciary.
182. Article 2 of the Court's Statute, for example, underscores that the
rules governing the Court's "adjudicatory jurisdiction" are distinct from
those governing its "advisoryjurisdiction." The former are constituted in the
"case-based" provisions of articles 61-63 of the American Convention, while
the latter are separated in article 64. See American Convention, supra note
23, arts. 61-64.
183. The American Convention limits the claims the Court may consider
under its contentious jurisdiction to judicial "cases." American Convention,
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contentious complaints presented to it claims deemed inappropriate for contentious resolution. 18 4 These "non-justiciable" claims are either dismissed entirely or, in function of the
gravity of the situation, reserved for consideration under the
system's non-contentious promotional mandate, pursuant to
18 5
Convention article 41(a-d).
A 'justiciable case" in the inter-American system must, at a
minimum, demonstrate two critical features: injury-in-fact to
supra note 23, art. 62.3 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all
cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this
Convention that are submitted to it [after completing the procedures in articles 48-50], provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have
recognized such jurisdiction. .. .") (emphasis added). The Commission's
competence over "petitions" is not so confined, but in practice is exercised
in a "case-based" manner under justiciability rules similar to those of the
Court.
184. Conversely, the Court regularly vets requests for advisory opinions to
ensure that they are not in fact dressed up petitions for the resolution of
justiciable controversies; it will not entertain an advisory request that "is
likely to undermine the Court's contentious jurisdiction." See, e.g., Certain
Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion, 1993 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 13,
15 (July 16, 1993);
"Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser A) No. 1, 31 (Sept. 24, 1982);
Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2) (h) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 12, OC-12/91,
30 (Dec. 6, 1991).
185. See, e.g., Vfctor NicolAs Sdnchez et al. v. United States, Petition 65/99,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 104/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5
76
(2006) [hereinafter Operation Gatekeeper] (finding inadmissible complaint regarding right to life of border-crossing migrants-including because not sufficiently identified by name-but deciding to "continue to supervise the situation, in accordance with its broad mandate to promote the observance and
protection of human rights in the Hemisphere" given the gravity of the situation); Elias Santana et al. v. Venezuela, Case 453/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 92/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 7 90-92 (2004) (finding inadmissible complaint involving freedom of association, but instructing
the Commission's Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression to prepare
a special report on the situation given its gravity and importance for the
region); see also Corumbiara v. Brazil, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 32/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 124 (2005); Statehood Solidarity Committee v. United States, Case 11.204, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 98/03, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 70 rev. 2 1 18 (2003) ("1 am of the
view that the type of issues dealt with in the present case can and should be
dealt with by the Commission and other organs of the Organization of
American States through their promotional functions rather than by deciding on a claim or communication.").
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the rights of a specific person or persons and a causal nexus
between that injury and the conduct of a state in breach of a
legally-held duty to the alleged victim. These elements serve
to ensure that the case under consideration is sufficiently specific and contextual to allow the adjudicatory body to determine, under accepted rules of international law, the nature
and scope of state responsibility for specific alleged harms
and, consequently, to order claimant-specific remedial redress.
Claims advanced in abstracto, without reference to specific, concretely injured victims and the specific conduct alleged to have caused that injury, are not deemed appropriate
for "case-based" adjudication in the regional system. They may
be considered only in a non-adjudicatory manner through the
1 86
inter-American organs' promotional and advisory powers.
Both the Commission and Court have repeatedly insisted that
they will not entertain actiopopularis,public interest actions, or
other abstract claims under their contentious jurisdiction in
which alleged victims are not specified, determinate, and dulyidentifiable. 1 87 This is particularly true in proceedings before
186. See, e.g., International Responsibility for the Promulgation and En-

forcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2, American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 14, OC-14/94, 49 (Dec. 9, 1994) ("The contentious jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and freedoms of specific
individuals, not to resolve abstract questions. There is no provision in the
Convention authorizing the Court, under its contentious jurisdiction, to determine whether a law [or other conduct imputable to the state] that has not
yet affected the guaranteed rights and freedoms of specific individuals is in
violation of the Convention. As has already been noted, the Commission has
that power and, in exercising it, would fulfill its main function of promoting
respect for and defense of human rights. The Court also could do so in the
exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 64(2).").
187. See, e.g., Janet Espinoza Feria et al. v. Peru, supra note 180 (finding
inadmissible petition submitted by Ombudsman "on the collective behalf of
the women who are potential voters" in certain electoral districts); Felix Roman Esparragoza Gonzalez and Nerio Molina Pefialoza v. Venezuela, supra
note 180, 1 40 ("The IACHR finds the petition inadmissible where it claims
the infringement of the rights of 'the great majority of Venezuelan citizens
who voted in the elections on Sunday' ... because the petition constitutes an
actio popularis presented in the name of an indeterminate group of persons."). The same is true of the Human Rights Committee. See, e.g., Queenan v. Canada, supra note 180, 4.2 ("The Committee considers that in the
absence of specific claimants who can be individually identified, the author's
communication amounts to an actio popularis and is therefore inadmissible
under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol.").
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the Court, in which every alleged victim must not only be determinable, as required by the Commission, but identified by
name.' 88 Equally important, the harm alleged to each such
person must be concrete in a classic, personal sense; it cannot
be abstract, speculative or diffusely shared among a large number of people.'8 9 Claims alleging such abstract or diffuse
harms, especially to broad or undifferentiated collectivities,
are regularly dismissed from the regional organs' contentious
jurisdiction as nonjusticiable.
A claim appropriate for adjudicatory review also requires
a causal nexus between the claimed injury and the conduct of
the defendant state in breach of a legal duty held to the victim. 190 Without such a nexus between conduct and injury, the
international responsibility of the state for the specific concrete harm at issue could not be established. This follows from
the fact that the inter-American system does not recognize
strict liability as a basis for state responsibility in the individual
petitions process. State responsibility is judicially assessable
only where the cause of concrete injury can be imputed to the
state through the direct acts of its agents or their failure to
take measures that, under the circumstances, they were legally
required to take. In other words, imputation of state responsibility in the inter-American system requires breach of a "con188. Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138, 1 109; Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, 1 62 (Nov. 9, 2004); Moiwana
Community v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, 11 177-78
(June 15, 2005); cf AcevedoJaramillo et al. v. Perl, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 144, 1 227 (Feb. 7, 2006) (appearing to open door to potential future class actions).
189. See, e.g., Elias Santana et al. v. Venezuela, supra note 180, 45 (finding complaint inadmissible given that "petitioners have not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate the specific manner in which their personal
situation was injured by the operative portion of the judgment"); Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama, supra note 180, 1 27-31 (finding inadmissible petition challenging highway authorization because "it is overly broad";
"the Commission requires a petition denouncing a concrete violation with

respect to a specific individual").
190. See, e.g., Operation Gatekeeper, supra note 185, Concurring Opinion of
President Clare K. Roberts (concluding case "manifestly unfounded" on
ground that state not legally responsible through its conduct for alleged
harm). Many cases are submitted to the system with this problem, although
they are often returned to the petitioner without a formal admissibility decision being rendered.
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duct-based duty" held by the state to the alleged victim or victims at issue.
In principle, the regional system's doctrine on justiciability functions to safeguard the interests of litigants and
non-litigants alike. It safeguards the interests of litigants by ensuring that, in any adjudication that purports to bind party
conduct directly, those parties' individualized interests and circumstances are fully represented in the context of an actual
controversy, in which factual and legal issues can be squarely
confronted. It safeguards the interests of non-litigants by helping to ensure that the adjudicatory organ's decisions do not
unfairly burden the rights and duties of persons whose distinct
interests, perspectives, and circumstances were not taken into
account in rendering a final order.191
The importance of establishing the elements of ajusticiable controversy in supranational litigation cannot be overstated. Just as litigants often make subject-matter jurisdiction
mistakes in employing the direct approach-e.g., improperly
invoking norms of the American Declaration or San Salvador
Protocol-they also frequently engage in justiciability errors.
These errors, closely associated with the inter-American organs' law on legal standing, most often relate to improper victim identification (alleging harm to broad or undifferentiated
collectivities rather than to specific, duly-identified individuals),192 failure to allege concrete (as distinct from abstract,
speculative or diffuse) harm, 193 and failure to properly identify
causal conduct through which the harm is imputable to the
191. It is contended in this regard that "collective complaints" procedures
that presuppose unitary interest and experienced harm among members of
a non-self-defined collective are generally more akin to promotional or advisory procedures than to adjudicatory ones.
192. See cases cited supra note 187. A case in point is a petition presented
in 1999 to the Commission against the United States challenging the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("Welfare Reform Act") of 1996. The challenge was based on the law's generalized effects
over the population of welfare-benefit recipients and the poor in general, as
measured in statistical and testimonial reports. Nonetheless, without reference to any particular victim around which ajusticiable controversy could be
grounded for purposes of assessing state responsibility for distinct types of
factual harm, the petition was properly dismissed without prejudice by the
Commission in pre-admissibility vetting procedures.
193. See cases cited supra note 189.
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defendant state. 19 4 These errors cut across all categories of
rights, arising most commonly in the inter-American system in
classic civil-political rights cases-involving, for example, the
right to vote or freedom of expression-where advocates err
by aiming "too big," seeking broad diffuse, structural, or
without reference to concrete individualsectoral vindication
19 5
ized injury.
The same justiciability errors arise in social rights cases,
particularly where viewed improperly as "distributive justice"
claims for broad collectivities, rather than concrete violations
of individual rights. 19 6 Cavallaro and Schaffer replicate these
errors in many of their proposed "social rights" hypothetical
cases, 19 7 rendering them inappropriate for consideration
under the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the inter-American system. 198 These case-framing errors are addressed more directly
in Part IV, infra.
A larger, more invidious justiciability error must be addressed here, one which underlines the Cavallaro-Schaffer approach to social rights litigation as a whole. Indeed, even
where all of the core elements of a justiciable controversy are
presented in a petition-individualization, concrete harm,
and state-specific causal conduct-social rights litigation in the
inter-American system (and beyond) often faces an additional
externally-imposedjusticiability hurdle. This critical barrier will
be the focus of the remainder of this section, as it is the basis
on which Cavallaro and Schaffer, assuming that it inheres in
the rights at issue, rather than being improperly applied
thereto, establish their "non-justiciability" thesis for economic,
social and cultural rights. Undoubtedly, it represents the sin194. See case cited supra note 190.
195. Social rights claims presented to the system also frequently suffer
from these maladies, although the Commission often appears more inclined
to return the claim to the victims for correction or reassessment without a
formal admissibility finding.
196. The frequency with which Cavallaro and Schaffer equate "economic
and social rights" with "distributive justice" and "social justice" is concerning.
See, e.g., Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 218-19 ("[W]e urge lawyers
and activists in the Inter-American system to recognize the limited and often
subsidiary role of legal advocacy in promoting the recognition of economic
and social rights and distributive justice.").
197. Id. at 274-80.
198. See discussion infra Part IV.
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gle gravest threat to rational social rights litigation in the
Americas.
This externally-imposed justiciability hurdle lies in the application, for purposes of establishing state responsibility in individual complaints procedures, of the improper dimensions of
human rights obligations to direct-approach claims, distinguishing them from the dimensions applied uniformly to classic civil-political rights claims under adjudicatory process.
That is, the corresponding legal duties undertaken by states
upon ratification of human rights treaties are complex and
multi-dimensional. They have many orientations, including
but not limited to those of a negative, positive, individual, collective, conduct-based, and result-based nature. All of these
dimensions are binding, politically-enforceable, and apply to
all human rights. Only some, however, correspond to the classic dictates of a justiciable controversy in the inter-American
system. Hence only some may be applied directly to human
rights claims under that system's contentious individual complaints mechanism. Cavallaro and Schaffer err by associating
the litigation-appropriatedimensions of human rights obligations with civil and political rights and the litigation-inappropriate dimensions with economic, social, and cultural rights. 99
When direct-approach claims, judicially assessed under this latter standard, are predictably not cognizable in the system, they
blame the nature of the rights, rather than their own improper standard.
The distinct dimensions of human rights obligations may
be visualized spatially along multiple and intersecting planes.
For purposes of the present analysis, two such planes are considered. 20 0 Each corresponds to one of the core justiciability
199. In practical application, they in fact rely on the litigation-inappropriate
dimensions of human rights obligations with respect to civil-political rights
claims as well. This follows from their reliance on classic rights-based stereotypes, rather than on the dimensions of duties that render claims amenable
to adjudicatory process. See infra Parts IV & VI.
200. Other distinct dimensions exist that are not specifically dealt with
here. For example, the conduct-based plane may be divided between "negative" and "positive" duties, referring to what a state must not do and what it
must do in terms of its conduct to ensure respect for human fights. The fact
that these duties are located in the "conduct-based" plane-and not in the
"result-based" plane-helps to explain why Cavallaro and Schaffer's recognition of the falsity of the negative/positive dichotomy between civil-political/
economic-social-cultural rights was unable to assist them in overcoming their
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requirements of contentious process in the inter-American
human rights system: individual injury and causal conduct.
The first refers to duties of an individual-orientedand collective-oriented nature. That is, under human rights treaties states
assume legal obligations to "respect," "ensure," "secure," or
"guarantee" the protected rights of "all individuals" or "everyone" subject to theirjurisdiction.2 0 Such duties extend to individual rights-holders qua individuals as well as to "everyone" as
represented by the collective. This latter dimension is often
represented by the duty to achieve or realize rights over the
population as a whole or disaggregated populations within it.
While neither the individual nor the collective dimension can
be considered wholly in isolation, the distinct nature of each
demands different forms of general supervision, measurement, and assessment. The individual-oriented dimension of
state obligations, for example, is most frequently assessed
through individual complaints procedures, which require a focus on individualized concrete harm. The collective-oriented
dimension, by contrast, is most frequently assessed through periodic reporting processes, collective complaints procedures, 20 2 and general monitoring of the human rights situaview of an immediate/progressive dichotomy (a distinction that straddles
the conduct/result-based plane) between those rights.
201. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 2.1 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."); ICESCR, supra note 78, arts. 6-15 ("The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize [or "undertake to ensure"] the right of everyone to [right x]"); American Convention, supra note 23, art. 1.1 ("The
States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to theirjurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms."); European
Convention, supra note 74, art. 1 ("The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of this Convention."); African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, "Banjul Charter," art. 2,Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981), ("Every
individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter.").
202. Although collective or diffuse actions are recognized at the domestic
level by many OAS member states, the inter-American system does not recognize a collective complaints procedure. In this author's opinion, collective
complaints procedures-when not predicated on concrete harm to specific
individuals, such as in class actions-often serve more of an advisory or promotional role, rather than a strictly adjudicatory one.
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tion in a particular jurisdiction. These latter procedures measure state compliance with obligations over the sum of the
population or with respect to disaggregated sub-groups within
it, rather than with respect to specific individuals.
The second plane considered here refers to duties in
their conduct-based and result-based dimensions. 20 3 These distinct dimensions of state obligations are likewise reflected in
all major human rights treaties. The former is reflected in the
duty to "adopt the necessary/appropriate measures" (or to
"take the necessary/appropriate steps") to "respect and ensure," "give effect to," "secure," "fully realize" and/or "progressively achieve the full realization of' protected rights. 20 4 Its
flexible qualifier of "appropriateness," "necessity" or, most fre203. Legal distinctions between "obligations of conduct" and "obligations
of result" have long been debated in international law. Because the two have
been interpreted in different ways in different legal systems and because
they may so easily be finessed, the International Law Commission ultimately
decided to omit the distinction from its Draft Articles on State Responsibility. This author does not purport to reopen sterile and unuseful debates on
the scope of these terms; they elucidate little when discussed in the abstract.
Rather, she seeks to affirm and recover the conceptually useful distinction
between "conduct-based" and "result-based" obligations in the sense that it is
only through states' conduct that they may be held causally responsible for
distinct harms in non-strict-liabilityjurisdictions. The distinction is thus conceptually of extreme utility from the perspective of delimiting the arguments
that may be made as a function of classic justiciability doctrine. It is also
critical for differentiating the dimensions of obligations that are better dealt
with through monitoring initiatives, rather than case-by-case adjudication.
The distinction is particularly important given that so much work has been
done in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights at the international
level in defining the scope of states' "result-based obligations." It is imperative that these concepts not be transferred uncritically into adjudicatory contexts for purposes of establishing state responsibility.
204. ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 2.2 ("[E]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps ...

to adopt such legislative or

other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant.") (emphasis added); ICESCR, supra note 74, art. 2.1
("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps... by all

appropriatemeans [to achieve progressively "the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant].") (emphasis added); American Convention, supra note 23, art. 2 ("States Parties undertake to adopt.

.such legisla-

tive or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms."), art. 26 ("States Parties undertake to adopt measures... by legislation or

other appropriate means [to achieve] the full realization of the rights .... ")
(emphasis added); African Charter, supra note 201, art. 1 ("undertake to
adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to [enshrined ights]").

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2006]

RETHINKING THE "LESS AS MORE" THESIS

quently in practice, "reasonableness" allows a spectrum of contextual and circumstantial factors to be taken into account in
each discrete assessment of whether or not a state has complied with its conduct-based duties. Given this, conduct-based
duties are always of "immediate" enforceability in individual
and collective settings alike. Result-based duties, by contrast,
correspond to whether or not protected rights have, as a factual matter, been "respected and ensured," "given effect," "secured," "realized fully," or "progressively achieved." Such a
standard is relative and progressive, adjusting as rights understandings, conditions, and technologies evolve with time and
over space. It can, however, be empirically assessed or statistically measured at temporal junctures. This is true with respect
to individuals, the collective, or any given sub-group of the collective. Such temporal snapshots can then be tracked over
time to assess progress or setbacks in state achievement with
respect to their result-based duties. They can also provide critical information for determining the scope of states' conductbased obligations and whether a failure to change course or
adopt new measures constitutes breach thereof.
Accordingly, while assessment of conduct-based duties
measures what states have done or are doing to achieve a particu-

lar end, assessment of result-based duties measures the factual
results achieved at any given juncture. Both are critical for supervising state compliance with human rights commitments;
indeed, each requires the other for meaningful assessment. As
with individual- and collective-oriented duties, however, their
direct assessment tends to be the respective focus of different
types of supranational procedures. While results-based duties
tend to be the primary but non-exclusive focus of monitoring
procedures, 20 5 conduct-based duties are the focal point of con205. Periodic reporting procedures tend to require states to report on
both the "measures they have adopted" to give effect to rights and the "progress made" in achieving the observance of those rights. See, e.g., ICESCR,
supra note 74, art. 16.1; ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 40.1; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 18.1, Sept.
3, 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 19.1,June 26, 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46,
annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51; Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 44.1, Sept. 2, 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25, 44
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49.
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tentious processes. This follows from the centrality of causal
conduct in the definition of a justiciable controversy in most
supranational human rights adjudicatory procedures.
The two planes considered above, when they intersect, indicate the dimensions of state legal duties that may properly
be applied by supervisory bodies in the exercise of their distinct and discrete functions, both promotional and contentious. We are particularly interested in how they correspond
to the core requirements of a justiciable case in the interAmerican system, although their implications extend to other
jurisdictions that define justiciability similarly. Arrayed in a
two-by-two matrix, the intersected planes result in what may be
called quadrant 1, quadrant 2, quadrant 3, and quadrant 4 duties. Only quadrant 1 duties, it is contended, are appropriate
for direct application in supranational individual complaints
procedures.
FIG. 1:

THE DIMENSIONALITY OF HuMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS:
A PERSPECTIVE

Conduct-based
"s
S0

Result-based

Quadrant 1 Duties:

Quadrant 2 Duties:

Duty to adopt appropriate
measures to respect and ensure
rights to individuals

Duty to (factually) respect
and ensure rights to
individuals

Quadrant 3 Duties:

Quadrant 4 Duties:

Duty to adopt appropriate
measures to progressively
achieve rightsfor collective

Duty to (factually) achieve
rights progressivelyfor
collective

In this matrix, the upper left quadrant (quadrant 1)representing individual-oriented and conduct-based obligations-corresponds to the adjudicabledimension of applicable
human rights duties in supranational individual complaint
procedures, where the justiciability requirements of concrete
individualized injury and causal conduct delimit the competence of the supervisory instance. That is, it is the only dimension that allows assessment of whether concrete individualized
harm can be imputed to the state through breach of a conductbased duty held to the individualvictim. By contrast, the lower
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right quadrant (quadrant 4)-encompassing duties of a collective- and result-based nature-corresponds most directly to
traditional periodic-reporting, indicator-monitoring, benchmark-setting, and other non-individual-specific mechanisms of
a promotional nature, where statistical progress and set-backs
in human rights enjoyment over the population as a whole
and disaggregated sub-groups within it take center stage, and
where justiciability issues, such as party standing, are not deci20 6
sive, or even relevant.
The folly of the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis is that it is based
on the uncritical assumption that the obligations in quadrant
4-broadly developed by the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights pursuant to its monitoring mandate 2 7-attach by nature to economic, social, and cultural
rights, while those in quadrant 1 attach axiomatically to civil
and political rights. 20 8 That is, they view the distinct dimensions of obligations as inhering in separate categories of rights,
rather than reflecting the jurisdictional parameters of the two
primary types of human rights enforcement mechanisms at
the international (and national) level: contentious individual
206. Quadrants 2 and 3, representing individual-oriented/result-based duties and collective-oriented/conduct-based duties, also play critical roles in
litigation and promotional work. Neither, however, can be directly applied
for purposes of establishing state responsibility in contentious individual petitions processes given standing rules, on the one hand, and causation requirements, on the other. This quadrant-based perspective helps to explain
why popular social rights concepts, such as minimum core content (which
corresponds to quadrant 2) are critical for monitoring, assessment and advocacy, but are not directly justiciable in themselves.
207. Under its competence to review states parties' periodic reports under
the ICESCR, the Committee monitors the progress and setbacks achieved in
the realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. While the Committee reviews both conduct and results, advocates have tended to focus on the
Committee's development of the concept of "progressive realization" in its
results-based dimension. See, e.g., General Comment No. 3, The nature of
States parties obligations (art. 2 para. 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Comm. on Econ.,

Soc. & Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3,
10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23
(1990) [hereinafter General Comment No. 3] (" [A] State party in which any
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic
forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under
the Covenant.").
208. As demonstrated in their test-case hypotheticals, Cavallaro and Schaffer also transpose quadrant 1 and quadrant 2 duties under their elements
approach. See infra Part IV.
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complaints procedures and monitoring of the general human rights
situation. Because these supervisory mechanisms have, in recent history, been associated with one category of rights or the
other,20 9 the particular dimensions of state obligations assessed by the corresponding supervisory instances-as further
developed and doctrinally refined by academics, advocates,
and U.N. bodies-have been tethered conceptually to the
rights supervised, rather than to the jurisdictional parameters
of the supervisory instance itself. It is this subjective association, moored in the doctrinal imagination but lacking any logistands as the principal barrier to
cal or objective basis, 2that
10
social rights litigation.
In human rights vernacular, quadrant 1 duties are typically described as the duty to adopt all necessary, reasonable,
or appropriate measures to respect and ensure the rights of
every person within a state's jurisdiction. Quadrant 4 duties
are synopsized in the duty of progressive realization. Both sets
of duties apply to all human rights, irrespective of subjective
209. This distinction stems from the decision taken in 1966 by the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights to establish an individual communications
procedure under the ICCPR, through the adoption of an Optional Protocol,
while declining to adopt a congruent Optional Protocol under the ICESCR.
Consequently, the exclusive supervisory procedure under the ICESCR has
been a periodic state reporting procedure, while the ICCPR has benefited
additionally from a contentious procedure to resolve adverse controversies
between individuals and states parties. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. It
is often overlooked that a periodic state reporting procedure-under which
distinct collectively-oriented obligations are applied-is also contemplated
under the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supranote 74, art. 40. The historic discrepancy
in supervisory procedures at the U.N. level is currently in the process of being reassessed and corrected by member states, which have agreed to begin
drafting an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, establishing an individual
complaints procedure thereunder. See Open-ended Working Group on an
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, Res. 2006/3 (June 29, 2006), http://
www.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/docs/res2006_3.pdf (deciding to begin
drafting process).
210. This is true both of advocates who are skeptical of direct approaches
to social rights litigation, like Cavallaro and Schaffer, and those who strongly
advocate it but under standards derived from quadrant 2 and 4 duties, such
as "minimum core content" and "prohibitions on regressivity." These latter
standards are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be addressed elsewhere.
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categorization,2 11 interacting in dynamic synergy in both
human rights advocacy and litigation initiatives. Only quadrant 1 duties, however, may be applied directly in victim-centered adjudicatory contexts, such as individual complaints procedures, as only they are capable of establishing the critical
justiciability elements of individual injury and causal responsibility for that injury. 21 2 Such duties, assessed under a reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard, are of immediate effect,
as are all duties of conduct. By contrast, quadrant 4 duties, as
result-based obligations, are not immediately enforceable in
adjudicatory contexts.
Cavallaro and Schaffer focus on this immediacy verses nonimmediacy (or progressivity) dichotomy as the basis for their
claim that economic, social, and cultural rights are non-justiciable ("lack concrete duties" and "provide no definite grounds
for state responsibility" 2 13 ) and that civil and political rights
should therefore be preferred. They contend that, despite noble attempts, advocates have been "incapable of imposing immediate obligations on states to protect and ensure economic,
social, and cultural rights." 21 4 They contrast this with civil and
political rights, which decidedly, in their view, are "immedi21 5
ately enforceable" and hence justiciable.
211. Under the Commission's promotional mandate, for example, it is expressly empowered "to make recommendations to the governments of the
member states when it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of
progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to
further the observance of those rights." American Convention, supra note
23, art. 41.b (emphasis added).
212. Quadrant 2, 3 and 4 duties may be applied indirectly to establish the
broader context within which quadrant 1 duties may be assessed. For example, population-based statistical information, particularly when disaggregated, or the measures adopted by a state to progressively achieve rights
from a macro-perspective can be highly useful in litigation contexts to the
extent they are offered to prove the context or framework in which a particular
individual violation takes place. They may be used, for example, to establish
a "policy" or "practice" on the part of the state of which directly-challenged
state conduct is part. It may also be useful in helping to establish a necessary
scienter requirement (e.g., knowledge, negligence) for purposes of establishing state responsibility.
213. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225 & 267.
214. See id. at 222 (emphasis added).
215. Cavallaro and Schaffer set up a progressively false dichotomy by
which civil and political rights are "immediate," hence "justiciable," hence
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This view, however, underappreciates the complex and
detailed nature of human rights obligations. All human rights
bear corresponding "immediate" and "progressive" obligations. As longstanding jurisprudence at the international and
regional levels makes clear, these correspond in significant
part to their conduct- and result-based dimensions. The U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, has addressed this distinction in the context of interpreting the constitutive dimensions that inhere in the general
obligations clause, article 2.1, of the ICESCR. 2 16 The Committee has explained that while "progressive realization" represents the "principal obligation of result' under the Covenant,
the "central obligation" under article 2.1 is the obligation (of
conduct) to "take steps . . . by all appropriate means" to give

effect to the individually-held economic, social and cultural
rights consecrated therein. That obligation, the Committee
asserts, is of "immediate effect" and is not, in itself, "qualified or
limited by other considerations." 2 17 That is, the Committee
has made clear that a state can never use progressive realization or resource constraints as ajustification for not immediately
taking "all appropriate measures" to respect and ensure (pro2 18
tect/fulfill) human rights.

"legitimate." By contrast, economic-social-cultural rights are "non-immediate," thus "non-justiciable," and thus "not legitimate." Id. at 225.
216. ICESCR, supra note 74, art. 2.1 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.").
217. General Comment No. 3, supra note 207,
2. The U.N. Human
Rights Committee has come to the same conclusion with respect to the obligation of conduct under the congruent article 2 of the ICCPR: "The requirement under Article 2, paragraph 2, to take steps to give effect to the
Covenant rights is unqualified and of immediate effect. A failure to comply
with this obligation cannot be justified by reference to political, social, cultural or economic considerations within the State." General Comment No.
31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., 1 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/
Add.13 (2004).
218. What is "appropriate" or "reasonable" cannot generally be determined a priori, but rather is subject to judicial determination based on assessment of the concrete facts under consideration, including the gravity of
the immediate harm, the capacity and involvement of the state, and the con-
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The same approach is taken by the inter-American human
rights organs (as well as the European Court of Human
Rights2 19 ). Both the Commission and Court restrict the
dimensions of human rights obligations that they apply directly under the individual petitions process to quadrant 1 duties. That is, they apply to contentious complaints the duty to
"adopt all appropriate measures" to respect and ensure protected rights, reserving assessment of states' result-based obligations, particularly over the collective, for its broader promotional mandate. 220 As a review of their jurisprudence reveals,
this is true equally of their treatment of classic civil and political rights and of autonomous economic, social, and cultural
rights.
Cavallaro and Schaffer neglect this longstanding jurisprudence in arriving at their concluding assessment that economic, social, and cultural rights "lack concrete duties" and

"provide no definite grounds for state responsibility." 22 ' Curi-

ously, in making this claim, they provide no independent analysis of either the text of the respective obligation clauses of the
regional human rights instruments or the constant jurisprudence developed thereunder by the Commission and Court.
Rather, they appear to base their thesis, unconditionally and
uncritically, on two grounds: the classic critique that economic, social, and cultural rights, subject only to a duty of
"progressive realization," are not immediately enforceable,222
flicting rights of others in a democratic society. In this sense, any assessment
of what constitutes appropriate measures must necessarily take resource constraints and the reasonable possibilities available to a state into account, as it
must with classic civil-political rights.
219. See, e.g., Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, App. No. 1012634 (1988) (concluding that obligation undertaken by
82, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
states parties under provisions of European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms "is an obligation as to measures to be taken and not
as to results to be achieved") (emphasis added).
220. While the inter-American organs sometimes short-hand this duty as
the obligation to "respect and ensure," they assess state responsibility consistently on the basis of the "measures" states have taken or failed to take in
order to ensure respect for rights in particular discrete contexts. The precise measures that are required depend on the circumstances of each concrete case. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 1 (1).
221. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225, 267.
222. See id. at 225 (citing private view of one member of Court). The assertion is particularly curious given the authors' recognition that traditional
negative/positive distinctions between categories of rights are misdirected
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and a single piece of misplaced obiter dictum on Convention
article 26 in a recent Court decision that, read outside the context of the arguments urged by litigants, appeared to reflect a
similar understanding. 22 3 The authors accept this dicta so unconditionally that they reflexively extend it to all autonomous
economic, social, and cultural rights, under not only the Con2 24
vention but also the American Declaration.
A slightly closer interrogation is warranted. The following
three sections address the nature of state obligations corresponding to the social rights provisions found in the American
Declaration, the San Salvador Protocol, and the American
Convention, assaying both the respective treaty texts and their
jurisprudential interpretation by the inter-American human
rights organs. Such a review evidences that the obligations in
the inter-American system attaching to economic, social, and
cultural rights are no different than those attaching to civil
and political rights. That is, when the directly justiciable
(quadrant 1) dimensions of state obligations are properly
taken into account, the "direct" approach to social rights litigation is indistinguishable from indirect approaches.
a.

American Declaration

The American Declaration, like its universal counterpart,
does not textually contain a general obligations clause.2 25
Nonetheless, in exercising its treaty-based mandate to "promote the observance and protection of human rights," 226
which since 1966 has included the examination of individual
complaints, 227 the Inter-American Commission has been conand do not constitute a valid ground for differentiating the nature of their
corresponding state obligations.
223. For an analysis of this decision, see A Pyrrhic Victory, supra note 17.
224. This is apparent from the authors' advocacy of a generic strategy that
avoids litigation under the "direct approach" of economic, social, and cultural rights in the inter-American system, excepting-without explanationonly articles 8.1.a and 13 of the San Salvador Protocol. See Cavallaro &
Schaffer, supra note 2, at 263-65.
225. See American Declaration, supra note 78; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
226. See OAS Charter, supra note 124, art. 106.
227. Following authorization by the OAS member states in 1965, OEA/
Ser.C/I.13, at 32-34 (1965), the Commission amended its Statute in 1966 to
include the examination of individual petitions as part of its regular compe-
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sistent in applying to each of the rights in the Declaration's
twenty-seven substantive provisions a single set of general state
obligations. This consists in the conduct-based obligation to
take all appropriate and necessary measures to respect and ensure (or "give proper effect to") the free and full exercise of
the rights consecrated therein to all individuals subject to an
OAS member state's jurisdiction. 228 These measures are broken down into those corresponding to "negative" duties of abstention or restraint in the exercise of arbitrary state conduct
and to "positive" duties of reasonable prevention, diligent response, and appropriate provision when individuals' rights are
threatened or harmed by the conduct of either state agents or
private actors. 2 29 State responsibility for a given human rights
violation is thus determined on the basis of whether or not
concrete individualized harm, once established, may reasonably be imputed to the state through the unreasonable acts or
omissions of its agents.
Significantly, the Commission applies these general conduct-based duties to all rights-based Declaration norms in the
individual petitions process. That is, what matters for establishing state responsibility is not the subjective characterization
of a given norm as civil-political or economic-social-cultural,
but rather how the state in fact responded or failed to respond
to alleged rights-based harms. This is perhaps best exemplified by the Commission's jurisprudence in which concurrent
breaches of classic social rights (e.g. health, education, work,
tence. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.14, doc. 35, at 26-27 (1996). That competence is
currently reflected in its Rules of Procedure and Statute. See IACHR Rules of
Procedure, supra note 23, arts. 49-50; Commission Statute, supra note 102,
art. 20.
228. See, e.g., Maya Indigenous Communities, supra note 113,

132, 134, 143

(finding Belize responsible for failures regarding "the positive steps that the
State must take to respect and ensure ...rights," including their failure "to
take the appropriate measures to protect the right" at issue and their failure
"to take appropriate or adequate measures" to consult affected populations)
229. "Negative" and "positive" duties held by states to honor human rights
commitments refer, by definition, to duties in their "conduct-based" dimensions. It is for this reason that Cavallaro and Schaffer's acceptance of the
falsity of classic negative/positive dichotomies and of the consequent need
for a "a new analytical framework" for social rights litigation, Cavallaro &
Schaffer, supra note 2, at 254, was not able to shake their view that "progressive realization," in its result-based dimension, was the exclusive duty applicable to economic, social, and cultural rights.
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family) and classic civil and political rights (e.g. life, integrity,
religion) are imputed under the Declaration on the basis of
common state conduct.
With regard to the right to health, for example, the Commission has decided multiple cases in which the same acts and
omissions, under the same circumstances, have given rise to
concurrent violations of the right-to-health and right-to-life
norms of the American Declaration (articles XI and I). In
Coulter v. Brazil, the Commission found the state responsible
for violating both rights with respect to a group of Yanomami
Indians whose health, integrity, culture, and lives were concretely injured by a state policy affecting their territory. Specifically, after finding valuable mineral deposits under Yanomami
ancestral territory, Brazil approved a plan for their extraction.
That plan, for which no consultation or prior impact studies
had been undertaken, included the building of a large highway through Yanomami territory to facilitate access by miners
and prospectors to the minerals. State responsibility arose
from the Government's "failure... to take timely and effective
measures" to both consult with the affected Yanomami and to
protect them from new diseases brought in by third parties
who, with the government's active assistance, were exploiting
natural resources on Yanomami ancestral territory and exposing them to serious, even deadly, health risks. Indeed, as a
result of the government's acts and omissions in unreasonably
failing to offer appropriate preventive and responsive measures, hundreds of Yanomami died and even more suffered
concrete injuries to their health, their form of life, and their
free movement and residence. 2 30 There was no need to limit

the health-related findings to the "right to life." Neither was
the "progressive" dimension of any applicable duty relevant to
230. Coulter et al. Case v. Brazil, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
12/85, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, at 24, 33 (1985). The Commission also found violations of articles I and VIII, protecting the rights to "life,
liberty, and personal security" and "residence and movement," respectively.
The highway construction, which brought mining companies, independent
prospectors, construction workers, and new farmers into Yanomami territory
for the first time, resulted in the introduction of new diseases that killed
hundreds of Yanomami. The tribe was forced to abandon its traditional
land, its culture and social organization were fractured, and prostitution was
introduced. The Brazilian government tried to resettle the tribe, but failed
to respond with adequate social or health services.
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the state's unreasonable conduct in the context-specific circumstances of the case.
Similarly, in an earlier case, the Commission held Paraguay internationally responsible for concretely violating, to the
detriment of members of the Ach6 tribe, its obligations with
respect to the rights to health, to work, to rest, and to special
protection of the family, under Declaration articles XI, XIV,
XV and VI. State responsibility for violating the right to health
arose from Paraguay's failure to take appropriate and necessary preventive and responsive measures to protect members
of the tribe from concrete harm caused by the onset of a fatal
epidemic. Not only was that epidemic foreseeable and largely
preventable given the nature of known state and third-party
conduct in the victims' ancestral habitat, but the state was
found to have actively deprived the tribal members of medical
attention and medicines. International responsibility for violation of the right to work and the right to special protection of
the family was similarly imputed on the basis of the state's failures to take reasonable measures to, respectively, protect
against the inhuman conditions of work imposed on members
23 1
of the Ach6 tribe and prevent the sale of Ach6 children.
With respect to all of these concrete personal harms (illness,
inhuman conditions of work, death, and sale of children), the
Commission had little difficulty, under the case-specific factual
circumstances presented, finding state responsibility for
breach of Paraguay's conduct-based legal obligations to take
all appropriate measures to respect and ensure the individual
rights to health, work, rest, life, and family.
The conduct-based obligations corresponding to the right
to health under the Declaration have also been understood by
the Commission to include the duty to reasonably provide
231. Case 1802 (Paraguay), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43 doc. 21
corr. 1, at 36-37 (1978). A companion case concerning the indigenous population of Paraguay was resolved and published in the same Annual Report.
In that case, the Paraguayan government detained a group of persons working in the "Project Marandai" (an initiative "designed to improve economic
and social conditions of the indigenous population") raided its offices and
sequestered documents. The Commission resolved that Paraguay had violated the rights to inviolability of the home (art. IX), inviolability of correspondence (art. X), and freedom of association (art. XXII). See Case No.
2006 (Para.), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43 doc. 21 corr. 1, at 37-39
(1978).
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health care services and medicines to persons within a state's
jurisdiction, especially those in state custody.2 32 Invoking its
power to request urgent measures of protection on the part of
OAS member states, the Commission has, for example, requested Cuba to transfer an inmate suffering lung cancer to a
specialized hospital and to grant him specialized medical attention, to be administered in collaboration with a physician
selected by his family. Although the request was returned to
the Commission-the Cuban government having been excluded from the OAS in 1962-the inmate was in fact transferred to a specialized hospital, where he began to receive specialized treatment.2 33 Similar measures were requested in
2002 for another prisoner suffering a series of health ailments,
asking Cuban authorities to provide the inmate with special234
ized medical care.

The right to education, under Declaration article XII, is
also understood by the Commission to have clear-cut corresponding state obligations permitting case-by-case adjudication in distinct factual contexts. In Jehova's Witnesses v. Argen-

tina, for example, the Commission held Argentina responsible
for violating the article XII right to education of three-hundred primary school children. State responsibility arose from
discrete state conduct-i.e., the issuance of a presidential decree ordering the prohibition of all activities of the Jehova's
Witness religious order in Argentina-and its foreseeable effects in both public and private schools on the individual victims, who refused to give up their religious faith. Indeed, as a
result of the order, each of the petitioning children was either
expelled from school, denied enrollment, or prevented from
taking final exams because of his or her religious faith. 23 5 This
concrete harm inflicted on each child's right to education was
232. For a general overview of states' positive obligations in the interAmerican system to take all appropriate or reasonable measures to prevent,
respond and fulfill rights-based guarantees, see TaraJ. Melish & Ana Aliverti,
Positive Obligations in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 15 INTERIGHTS

(Issue 3) 120 (2006).
233. Jorge Luis Garcfa Prez-Antilnez (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/
Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev. 28 (2002) (precautionary measures).
234. Francisco Chaviano Gonzalez (Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser.L/
V/II.117, doc. I rev. 1 50 (2003) (precautionary measures).
235. Jehova's Witnesses v. Argentina, Case No. 2137, Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979).
BULLETIN
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caused by the state's breach of its obligation to take all appropriate and necessary measures to respect and ensure the free
and full enjoyment of the right to education for all persons
within its jurisdiction.
The Commission has similarly found state responsibility in
the Dominican Republic for violation of the right to education
of a young girl arbitrarily dismissed from school on account of
her nationality. In that case, like others, responsibility arose as
a result of the state's breach of its unvarying obligation to take
all appropriate measures to respect and ensure236the right to
education for all persons within its jurisdiction.
The right to property, protected under Declaration article
XXIII, may also be highlighted. Though oft-considered a civil
and political right, the right to property in the Declaration is
defined expressly in terms of its social-welfare function: "Every
person has a right to own such private property as meets the
essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the
individual and of the home."2

37

The Commission has decided

several cases in which it has found OAS member states responsible for violating the right to property under the American
Declaration by failing to take appropriate measures to protect
this essential entitlement. This has particularly been true for
indigenous communities, for whom ancestral territory is often
vital for the physical subsistence, economic livelihood, and cultural integrity of the membership group.
In the Maya Toledo v. Belize Case, for example, the Commission found Belize responsible for violating article XXIII of the
Declaration to the detriment of the members of the Mopan
and Ke'kchi Maya people of the Toledo District of southern
Belize. 2 38 Responsibility was generated by the state's failure
236. While the Commission's final report on the case is not published
given its submission to the Court, its main recommendations are included in
the Court record. See Yean and Bosico Girls Case, supra note 109, 29 (noting
Commission's finding that the state violated the girls' right to education
under article XII of the American Declaration).
237. American Declaration, supra note 78, art. 23 (emphasis added). This
underscores yet again the unusefulness of trying to place rights into distinct
categories, each carrying different legal consequences.
238. Importantly, given the centrality of ancestral territory to the culture,
health, religion, identity, and well-being of indigenous populations, the
Commission found the petitioners' allegations with respect to the rights to
health (XI), to life (1) and to religious freedom (III) subsumed in the article
153-55.
XXIII violation. See Maya Indigenous Communities, supra note 113,
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"to take the appropriate measures to protect the right of the
Maya people in their territory"-both through its failure to
take appropriate measures to delimit, demarcate, and tide
their territory "on which their rights exists," and to "take appropriate or adequate measures to consult" with the Maya people concerning extractive-resource concessions granted to
their lands by the state. 23 9 The state thus took insufficient
measures to respect and
to ensure the right to property of the
0
24
case-specific victims.

The record evidences, therefore, that the Commission has
little difficulty identifying the "concrete duties" and "grounds
for state responsibility" that correspond to the full range of
social rights consecrated in the Declaration. These duties are
no different than those that correspond, in an undifferentiated manner, to the civil-political rights protected in the same
instrument.
b.

San Salvador Protocol

The San Salvador Protocol also imposes clearly-identifiable and concrete obligations on states to adopt all appropriate and necessary measures to respect and ensure the eco24
nomic, social, and cultural rights consecrated therein. '
Given that the inter-American organs have yet to resolve a case
under the Protocol in the individual petitions process, 242 the
nature of these obligations is discernable not through a jurisprudential analysis-as with the Declaration-but rather
through textual analysis of its general and specific obligations
clauses.
239. Id.
131, 134, 142-43, 151 & 186-87.
240. Id. 133. The same was true in Mary and Carrie Dann v. United
States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. 1, at 860
(2002).
241. The Protocol also imposes obligations of result. These, however, are
not directly enforceable in the individual petitions process; they are appropriately applied in contentious proceedings only to establish context and,
hence, the "reasonableness" or "appropriateness" of state conduct in distinct
circumstances.
242. The Commission issued its first admissibility report finding a claim
admissible under the San Salvador Protocol in 2002. See Adolescents in the
Custody of the Febem v. Brazil, Case 12.328, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
39/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2003).
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The San Salvador Protocol includes three general obligations clauses in articles 1, 2 and 3 that apply to the exercise by
individuals of all of the rights set forth therein, including the
right to work, satisfactory conditions of work, unionization, social security, health, a healthy environment, food, education,
and culture, among others. Under the first clause, states that
are party to the Protocol undertake to "adopt the necessary
measures" to achieve progressively the "full observance" of the
individual rights recognized within it.243 The second reinforces this obligation by requiring states to "guarantee" the exercise of these rights in the domestic legal order by adopting
all "measures as may be necessary for making those rights a
reality." 244 Finally, states undertake to "guarantee" the exercise of the rights set forth "without discrimination of any
kind." 245 In this sense, the general obligations found in the

San Salvador Protocol closely track those applied by the Commission in adjudicating violations of the rights under the
American Declaration. They also closely track those found in
articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention, discussed infra,
which require states to adopt all appropriate and necessary
measures to respect and ensure the treaty's recognized rights
on a non-discriminatory basis.
These general obligations are supplemented by specific
obligations found in the substantive provisions of the treaty,
which clarify or reinforce them in discrete contexts. Thus,
with regard to the right to work, states undertake to adopt
measures that will make that right "fully effective" and to
"guarantee" in their internal legislation just, equitable and satisfactory conditions of work. 246 Under article 8, states "shall
ensure" both the right to free unionization and the right to
strike. Under articles 9, 10 and 14, states commit that they
"shall" take certain actions, including measures to "ensure" the
right to health and to "ensure" the right to culture. Again,
these obligations closely track those found in provisions of
other human rights instruments protecting classic civil and political rights. As with those instruments, when applied in con243.
244.
245.
246.

San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 3.
Id. arts. 6-7.
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tentious processes it is the conduct-based, individual-oriented
dimensions of those obligations that should prevail.
The Protocol's textual language thus undermines assertions that the jurisdictional limitation in Protocol article 19.6
owes in any way to the "lack of concrete duties" attaching to
social rights other than those to education and unionization.
Indeed, the corresponding obligations are identical for all
rights enshrined in the Protocol: to adopt all appropriate and
necessary measures to guarantee the full observance of those
rights, both for individuals and for the collective. While the
Protocol's result-based obligation of "progressive achievement" or "full observance" is not absolute and immediate--in
that, as with all rights, it is limited by available resources and
technologies, internal constraints and contingencies, and the
equal rights of others in a democratic society-the conductbased obligation to "adopt all necessary measures" within
those constraints is immediate and absolute. 247 It is this obligation, one which leaves broad discretion to OAS member
states in experimenting with how best to guarantee the full observance of rights in differing and evolving circumstances, that
is directly justiciable in the individual petitions process. It
leads to state responsibility when states fail to comply reasonably
with it under the circumstances, as determined by an independent and impartial adjudicator in the context of a concrete
case, and individuals suffer concrete, personal injury as a result.
c.

American Convention

The American Convention is likewise unambiguous in
identifying the "concrete duties" that correspond to the economic, social, and cultural rights enshrined therein. While
the Convention does, unnecessarily, separate the treaty norms
consecrating its "protected rights" into two substantive chapters-one entitled "Civil and Political Rights," the other "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights"-it subordinates the rights
in both chapters equally to the two general obligations clauses
established in Chapter I. These Chapter I duties, articulated
247. This is also the approach taken by the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in interpreting the nature and scope of the general obligation clause (article 2.1) of the ICESCR. See General Comment No.
3, supra note 207, 2.
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in articles 1 and 2, apply by their terms to all of "the rights and
freedoms recognized" in the Convention, that is, in articles 3
through 26 inclusive. Seen in this light, the affirmation by
Cavallaro and Schaffer that the rights in article 26 lack corresponding "concrete duties" and are not "enforceable on an individual basis"2 48 would not seem to have a basis in the text of

the Convention. Neither does it have a reliable basis in the
inter-American organs' jurisprudence.
The Convention's general obligations clauses include the
duties to respect and to ensure, to all persons subject to a
state's jurisdiction, the free and full exercise of all the rights
and freedoms recognized in articles 3 through 26 of the Convention on a non-discriminatory basis. 249 To achieve this result, states "undertake to adopt
such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights and
freedoms." 250 Though this duty is generally short-handed as
the duty to "respect and ensure," states are uniformly held to it
in adjudicatory contexts through their conduct-based obligation
to adopt all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that
protected rights have legal effect. That is, state responsibility
arises not because a person is objectively impaired in his or her
enjoyment of a protected right but rather because the state
failed to adopt the measures required of it in the particular circumstances to reasonably prevent the harm or to respond to it
appropriately and with "due diligence." 25 1 As the Court has
248. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 225 ("Article 26 fails to establish
any specific fights or concrete duties."), 268 ("Article 26 enumerates no specific rights enforceable on an individual basis.").
249. American Convention, supra note 23, art. 1; Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 7 162-64 (July 29, 1998)
[hereinafter Veldsquez Rodriguez Case] ("[Article 1.1] specifies the obligation
assumed by the States Parties in relation to each of the rights protected [in the
Convention].") (emphasis added); Godfnez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 5, 17 171-73 (Jan. 20, 1989); Neira Alegria et al. Case, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, 85 (Jan. 19, 1995).
250. American Convention, supra note 23, art. 2.
251. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249,

175 (underscoring

that "the existence of a particular violation does not, in itself, prove the failure to take preventive measures" and hence give rise to state responsibility);
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140,
123 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Pueblo Bello Case];Juan Herndndez v. Guatemala, Case 11.297, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/
11.95, doc. 7 rev. 61 (1997) (finding state responsible for violating the right
to health and life of a detainee by failing to act with "due diligence" given
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stated, "[i]t is not possible to make a detailed list of all such
measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of
each State Party." 2 52 Nevertheless, the Court insists on its ability to determine, in discrete factual contexts and on a case-bycase basis, when the measures adopted by the state have been
"unreasonable," "inappropriate," "inadequate," or "insufficiently diligent" to appropriately ensure an aggrieved individual's rights, and hence when such measures (or lack thereof)
253
are generative of state responsibility for the alleged harm.

Emphatically, such a determination in no way hinges on
whether a claim looks more "civil and political" or more "economic, social, and cultural."
The article 1.1 obligation to "respect" all protected rights
constitutes the negative duty of abstention or restraint in arbitrary state conduct, requiring that state agents refrain from
conduct that affirmatively harms individuals' enjoyment of
their protected rights, without first providing appropriate procedural safeguards. 25 4 By contrast, the article 1.1 obligation to
"ensure" goes a step beyond, requiring states to take affirmathat the death was caused by cholera-induced dehydration, easily cured
through the provision of sufficient rehydration formula and transfer to a
hospital, which prison authorities negligently failed to provide).
252. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249, 175. What is "appropriate"
or "reasonable" in the circumstances will also vary with the nature and gravity of the harm, evolving norms of decency, legislative priorities, and resource availabilities, including new technologies.
253. As the Court has stated, "Article 1 (1) is essential in determining
whether a violation of the human rights recognized by the Convention can
be imputed to a State Party .... Any impairment of those rights which can be
attributed under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any
public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which assumes
responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention." Id. 164 (emphasis
added). The Court regularly refers to the legal duty to take "reasonable"
steps to ensure rights. See, e.g., id. 174 ("The State has a legal duty to take
reasonable steps"); Pueblo Bello Case, supra note 251, 1 123 (noting that the
obligation to adopt measures is conditioned on "reasonable possibilities" of
preventing or avoiding the noted harm).
254. For example, the state may deprive a person of their liberty or property only after due process has affirmatively been provided in advance. This
includes housing evictions, which are lawful only after proper notice and an
opportunity to be heard has been granted, along with other procedural protections. See, e.g., General Comment No. 7, Forced evictions, and the right to adequate housing, U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rs., 16th Sess., Annex
IV, at 113, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22 (1998) [hereinafter General Comment No.

7].
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tive measures, of a judicial, legislative, and executive nature,
"to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all
the structures through which public power is exercised, so that
they are capable ofjuridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."

255

This obligation includes specific

state duties to take all reasonable measures to "prevent," "investigate," "punish," and "repair" any violation of rights recognized by the Convention. 25 6 This is true whether the violation
was committed in the first instance by state agents or by private
third parties. 257 Where the state fails to undertake reasonable
or appropriate measures in each of these categories it in a
making the
sense "aids" the abusive conduct at issue, "thereby
2 58
State responsible on the international plane."

In certain contexts, the role of the state goes beyond that
of reasonable prevention and appropriate response to direct
provider of the goods and services required for the enjoyment
of human rights-e.g., court services, health interventions, ac255. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249, 166.
256. Id. 7 174 ("The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out
a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure
the victim adequate compensation.").
257. The Court has repeatedly recognized the "horizontal" dimension of
human fights guarantees and insisted that article 1.1 generates extensive
positive duties on the state to regulate "inter-individual relations" in society
that may violate the interests safeguarded by human rights. See Pueblo Bello
Case, supra note 251, 7 113-14 (citing Court's many cases, opinions, and
orders that have affirmed this principle). See, in particular, Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249, 7 176 ("when the State allows private persons or
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention ... the State has failed to comply with its duty to
ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons within its
jurisdiction."); id. 172 ("[Acts of private persons] lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack
of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by
the Convention."); id. 1 173 ("What is decisive is whether a violation of the
rights recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or the
acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to
take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible.").
258. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249, 7 177; see also Pueblo Bello

145; Mapiripdn Massacre v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct.
Case, supra note 251,
H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, 1 137, 233 (Sept. 15, 2005); Panchito Lopez Case, supra
note 138, 1 158.
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cess to voting facilities, housing accommodation, schools, and
emergency food aid. This conduct-based duty, applied in concrete contexts on the basis of "reasonableness in the circumstances," 259 is heightened with respect to custodial populations
(e.g., detainees, institutionalized persons) 2 60 and persons in
abvulnerable situations who cannot meet their needs in26the
1
sence of state facilitative or direct-provider assistance.
The Commission and Court have unvaryingly applied
these principles since the Convention entered into force in
1979.262 Their application has not turned on whether a particular claim looked more "social," "cultural," "economic," or
"civil-political." That is, the inter-American organs have consistently applied an integration approach to the Convention's
norms, recognizing that these constitutive dimensions cut
across all rights in the Convention. Thus, the Commission and
Court have resolved an increasing variety of cases, under a
spectrum of Convention norms, involving the rights to health,
to social security, to housing, to education, to union freedoms,
2 63
to property and cultural integrity, to food, and to sanitation,
holding states accountable to their duties to adopt all appropriate measures to respect and ensure to all individuals the
rights protected in the Convention. Most recently, they have
insisted on states' meeting their positive duties, under article
259. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 1 178 (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter
Sawhoyamaxa Case] (declaring Paraguay responsible for violating article 4.1
of the Convention "for not having adopted the necessary positive measures
within the scope of its authority that reasonably were to be expected to prevent or avoid the risk to the right to life of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa
Community") (author's translation).
260. See, e.g., Panchito Lopez Case, supra note 138 (state correctional facility
for children and adults).
261. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Case, supra note 136 (displaced indigenous population living in desperate conditions on the side of a highway); Sawhoyamaxa
Case, supra note 259.
262. The Court resolved its first merits case in 1988, in which it enunciated these principles. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 249. The Commission has been applying them in regular fashion since it began operation
in 1959, first under the Declaration, then under the Convention.
263. For an analysis of the growing jurisprudence of both the Court and
Commission in this regard, see Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Beyond Progressivity,in SocILk RIGHTSJURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1; Melish, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Defending Social Rights
through Case-based Petitions, inSociAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1.
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2, to implement short, medium, and long term plans of actions adequately targeting the most vulnerable sectors to ensure the full spectrum of human rights, particularly those related to health, education, housing, land demarcation, water
26 4
access, and social assistance.
In a single piece of case-based obiter dictum in 2003, however, the Inter-American Court appeared to depart from the
system's longstanding tradition of indivisibility in which the
same conduct-based obligations are applied to all rights in
contentious processes. In it, the Court appeared to suggest a
distinction between the obligations attaching to the rights protected through Chapter II norms and Chapter III norms, suggesting that quadrant 4 rather than quadrant 1 duties might
apply to the latter. Cavallaro and Schaffer seize on this isolated dictum as ajustification to reject as non-justiciable article
26 and all the autonomous social rights it and other binding
provisions guarantee in the regional system. As correctly recognized by one judge on the Court, however, that dictum
"does not appear to find any basis in the American Convention." 2 6 5 Significantly, the Court has never repeated it, consistently declining to extend that dictum into its binding jurisprudence or even to refer to it again-despite four square oppor6
tunities to do

So.

26

264. See, e.g., Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138,
316-17; Plan de
Sdnchez Massacre Case v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, 1
105 (Apr. 29, 2004).
265. Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51 (Reasoned Opinion of Judge de
Roux Rengifo).
266. The Court's manifest discomfort with its article 26 dictum has led it
not only to avoid extending or even referring to it again in any subsequent
case but also, unfortunately-given the lack of a clear vision for resolving the
quadrant I/quadrant 4 difficulty-pronouncing on article 26 at all. See
Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138, 1 255 (recognizing that article 26 protects the rights to health, education, and recreation, but declining to pronounce on it in interests of judicial economy given previous findings, on
same facts, of violations of articles 4 and 5); YakyeAxa Case, supra note 136, 1
163 (using article 26's protection of the right to health to assist Court in
interpreting article 4); Yean and Bosico Girls Case, supra note 111, 11 38 and
185 (recognizing arguments alleging violation of the right to education consecrated in article 26, but using them to assist in the interpretation of article
19 only); AcevedoJaramillo et al. v. Peri v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 144, 285 (Feb. 7, 2006) (resolving to consider the "particularly grave
effects" of the article 26 claim at the reparations stage only).
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Cavallaro and Schaffer's rejection of article 26 as a basis
for contentious complaints is thus unjustified. 2 67 Indeed,
given the dramatic departure such a result would entail for the
system's jurisprudence (and the Court's credibility as a human
rights tribunal), the failure to critically unpack and examine
the meaning and motivation of the Court's two paragraph dictum before accepting it as precluding all article 26 litigation is
deeply troubling. 268 The following section briefly examines
the case in which the referenced dictum was enunciated. 69 It
concludes that, read in context, the Court's dictum should be
understood as rejecting only one particular type of article 26

claim: claims on which state responsibility for substantive
rights infringement rests on alleged breach of quadrant 4,
rather than quadrant 1, duties. Once attention in social rights
litigation is properly returned to the quadrant 1 dimensions of
state obligations, the perceived difficulties in adjudicating article 26 claims are revealed as no different than those attending
any other norm.
d.

The Five Pensioners Dictum
On February 23, 2003, the Court decided the Five Pension-

ers Case,2 70 its first opportunity to consider an article 26 claim

in a concrete contentious case. Involving the individual right
to a pension as part of the broader right to social security, the
case arose in the context of national pension reform in Peru.
Initiated in 1992 and aimed at rationalizing distortions in the
267. Cavallaro and Schaffer conclude that the Five Pensioners Case, supra

note 51, is a "significant and revealing decision" that "leaves no doubt as to
[the Court's intention to limit the scope of Article 26 as a basis for the protection of individual economic, social, and cultural rights," "preclud[ing]
consideration of Article 26 violations in any contentious case." See Cavallaro
& Schaffer, supra note 2, at 259-60, 264.
268. It is effectively upon this obiter dictum alone that they build their
thesis that economic, social, and cultural rights are "non-justiciable" in the
inter-American human rights system, and hence civil and political rights
should form the basis of all supranational litigation at the regional level. See
Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 259-60 (calling the Five Pensionerscase,
supra note 51, a "significant and revealing decision" and using the Court's
dictum as "evidence that article 26 is generally a weak tool for enforcing
economic, social, and cultural rights").
269. A more extensive analysis of the opinion can be found in A Pyrrhic
Victory, supra note 17.
270. Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51.
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Peruvian pension regime, that reform reduced by a hefty seventy-eight percent the specialized pension benefits enjoyed
since at least 1990 by the five alleged victims, all high-level
civil-service banking retirees receiving privileged benefit packages. Relying on a skillfully-inserted provision in the 1993
Constitution aimed at neutralizing, for public sector employees, the effects of the impending pension reform, the affected
pensioners sued and won each of their amparo actions before
the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of Peru. The Peruvian
authorities, in clear defiance of their article 25 obligations
under the American Convention, nonetheless refused to execute the orders of the nation's two highest courts.
In December 2001, after processing by the Commission,
the case was presented to the Court. In addition to the article
25 violation for failure to enforce the domestic judicial orders,
the pleadings centered on the legality of the reductions in the
five individual pensioners' benefit levels. The Commission,
the victims' representatives, and amicus curiae all alleged that,
given the pensions' prior vesting at fixed benefit levels, the reductions breached the pensioners' rights to property and to
social security, under Convention articles 21 and 26, respectively. Inappropriately focusing on the formal title of article 26
("Progressive Development") rather than its substance, 2 7 1 the
parties nonetheless characterized the article 26 claim as a
breach of the state's duty to "progressively develop" economic,
social, and cultural rights in general, and the right to a pension in particular. That is, in framing their pension claim
under article 26, they focused on the quadrant 4, rather than
quadrant 1, duties corresponding to that right-attempting to
271. The difficulties that have dogged article 26 can, in many ways, be
traced to the provision's incongruous title, "Progressive Development," together with its particular phraseology, which draws heavily from article 2.1 of
the ICESCR. These have led not only to a view that different obligations
apply to Chapter II and Chapter III rights, but also that article 26 protects a
so-called "right to progressive development," rather than a set of autonomous rights derived from article 26 corresponding to individual titulaires
and subject to the corresponding individual-oriented general obligations in
articles 1 and 2 to "respect and ensure." That is, "progressive development"
has been interpreted as constituting, simultaneously, the principal right protected in article 26 and the adjudicable obligation corresponding to that
right. Both of these suppositions are flawed-the former as a matter of
treaty interpretation, the latter as a matter of justiciability. See American
Convention, supra note 23.
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import into the inter-American system's case-based procedures
standards developed on "progressivity" and the correlative
"prohibition of regressivity" by U.N. bodies under non-parallel
periodic reporting procedures. 272 By contrast, they alleged a
breach of the standard quadrant 1 duties with respect to the
right-to-property and judicial-protection claims under articles
21 and 25 of the Convention.
The Court responded, as only it could, by adjudicating
the claims argued under quadrant 1 duties while declining to
consider the merits of the claim argued under quadrant 4,
over which it lacked competence. With respect to the article
21 and 25 claims, the Court applied to the case's facts the standard individual-oriented, conduct-based obligations and, basing its determination on the state's unreasonable conduct in
failing to execute the domestic judicial orders in the alleged
victims' favor, unanimously found state responsibility for the
violation of the pensioners' individual rights to property and
to judicial protection. By contrast, despite the "social security"
and "property" claims being but logical flip-sides of each
other, 27 3 the Court then declined to pronounce on the alleged
social-security violation under article 26. Cavallaro and Schaf272. Indeed, the litigants relied heavily on these standards. Notable
amongst the texts cited are General Comment No. 3, supra note 207; The
Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
43rd Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17 (1987); The Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 HUM.
RTS. Q. 691 (1998); Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean (July 24, 1998), reprinted in 2 YALE HUM. RT. & DEv. L.J. 215 (1999).
In focusing their arguments on "progressivity/regressivity," litigants and
amici nonetheless only partially represented the content of these interpretations. The critical piece omitted from their arguments is that international
doctrine on state obligations under the ICESCR has tended to proceed
along two distinct, though often conflated, tracks. One focuses on a tripartite set of obligations that extends to all human rights: the duties to "respect," "protect" and "fulfill" rights. The other focuses on the concept of
"progressive realization." Only the former is adjudicable in individual complaints procedures (in its conduct-based dimensions); the latter is the reserve of reporting, monitoring and promotional activities of advocates,
states, and human rights organs, without reference to specific individuals.
273. Indeed, the right to property claim was characterized simply as failure to appropriately ensure "the patrimonial effects of their pensions." See
Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51,
103.
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fer attribute this to the nature of the rights at issue. In fact, it
is because the petitioning parties-intent on transferring the
quadrant 4 standard of "progressive realization" into the individual complaints procedure-failed to offer a manageable judicial standard upon which the Court could74assess state re2
sponsibility under its case-based jurisdiction.
The Court, accordingly, rejected the request urged upon
it by petitioners: "to rule on the progressive development of
economic, social and cultural rights in Peru." It then proceeded to make a general dicta-based statement on that particular type of claim in the context of a concrete case. Critically,
it did not do so before first recognizing that such rights also
have an "individual" dimension. The Court's full response to
the article 26 claim is as follows:
Economic, social and cultural rights have both an individual and a collective dimension. This Court considers
that their progressive development, about which the

United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has already ruled, should be measured in function of the growing coverage of economic,
social and cultural rights in general, and of the right
to social security and to a pension in particular, o[ver]
the entire population, bearing in mind the imperatives

of social equity, and not in function of the circumstances of a very limited group of pensioners, who do
not necessarily represent the prevailing situation.
274. The concept of "progressive realization," as currently understood in
international law, is incapable of illuminating the classic hallmarks of ajusticiable case. Indeed, developed in the context of monitoring state periodicreporting commitments, it was designed to assess neither individual injury
nor causal responsibility for such harm, Rather, it principally serves to assess
statistical achievement of rights over broad collectivities (the entire population or vulnerable subgroups within it), usually through the use of indicators
and benchmarks, the nomenclature of "progress" and "backsliding" (or retrogressions), and the collection and analysis of relevant demographic, legislative, jurisprudential, educational, health and other statistical data. The
goal is to raise states' awareness about worrisome trends and best practices,
not to assess individual circumstances nor to disaggregate the often complex
and interlocking causes of general progress or setbacks at different levels or
dimensions of achievement. For a discussion of the often perverse results
that follow from attempting to force "progressive realization" into the mold
of ajusticiable case, see Melish, A Pyrrhic Victory, supra note 17, at 63.
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It is evident that this is what is occurring in the
instant case; therefore, the Court considers that it is
in order to reject the request to rule on the progressive development of economic, social and cultural
275
rights in Peru, in the context of this case.
Understood by reference to petitioners' quadrant 4 arguments, the Court's response is thus unremarkable. The tribunal would have reached the same conclusion had "progressivity/regressivity" arguments been urged as the basis of state re276
sponsibility under any other Convention-based norm.
Indeed, the Court can never rule, in the context of a concrete
case, on the "growing coverage" of any right-much less of
"economic, social and cultural rights in general"-"over the
entire population." Such a collective-oriented, result-based
ruling would be ultra vires as exceeding the Court's limited
case-based jurisdiction. 277 This was recognized formally in a

separate opinion by Judge de Roux Rengifo:
IT]he reasoning according to which only State actions that affect the entire population could be submitted to the test of Article 26 does not appear to
have a basis in the Convention, among other reasons
because, contrary to the Commission, the Inter-American Court cannot monitor the general situation of human

rights, whether they be civil and political, or economic, social and cultural. The Court can only act when
the human rights of specific persons are violated, and the

Convention does not require that278there should be a
specific number of such persons.
275. Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51,
147-48 (emphasis added).
276. The Court has repeatedly referred in dicta to the "individual" and
"social" dimensions of Chapter II rights as well, although it has not drawn
the necessary analytical conclusions attendant to the distinction from the
standpoint ofjusticiability. See, e.g., Huilca Tecse v. Perdi, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.

(ser. C) No. 121,

77-78 (Mar. 3, 2005) (right to labor association).

277. That jurisdiction restricts the Court's contentious competence to the
determination of state responsibility for concrete harm to the rights of dulyidentified individual rights-holders (not broad, undifferentiated collectivities) that can be imputed to the state through the acts and omissions of its

agents (not through the general situation of human rights achievement in a
country). See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
278. Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51 (Reasoned Opinion of Judge de
Roux Rengifo) (emphasis added).
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The appropriate aspect, then, of the two paragraph dictum for future article 26 litigants to focus on is not the "collective," "result-based" aspect urged by petitioners and amici.
Rather, it is the Court's implicit acceptance that article 26 is a
repository of a variety of autonomously-conceived economic,
social, and cultural rights, including the right to social security, and that each of these autonomous rights has an "individuat' dimension. It is this dimension, and only this dimension,

that, in the words of the Court's President, Judge Sergio Carcia-Ramfrez, supports their 'justiciable nature." 279 While the
Court was unable or unwilling-either because arguments focused exclusively on quadrant 4, or because the case was so
weak under quadrant 1-to recognize this individual justiciable nature in the context of the Five Pensionerscase, the Court's
express recognition of its existence lays the basis for moving
forward in future litigation efforts.
In this view, the solution to the article 26 "problem" is not
to avoid litigation of claims under the norm, as the CavallaroSchaffer thesis urges, but rather to insist on application of appropriate individual-oriented,conduct-based (quadrant 1) duties to

those claims. Had the Court done so in the Five Pensioners
case, there would have been no difference between the pension claim adjudicated under the "right to social security" and
the same pension claim adjudicated under the "right to property.

' 28 0

In sum, once the proper dimensions of state obliga-

tions are taken into account, Convention-based claims framed
279. Five Pensioners Case, supra note 51 (Reasoned Concurring Opinion of
Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez) ("The Convention is a body of rules on
human rights precisely, and not just on general State obligations. The existence of an individual dimension to the rights supports the so-called 'justiciable nature' of the latter, which has advanced at the national level and has a
broad horizon at the international level.").
280. In this author's view, given the peculiar factual circumstances of the
case, the Court should have found that Peru violated neither article 21 nor
article 26 of the Convention with respect to the pension reductions. That is,
Peru's conduct in initiating national pension reform that had the effect of
reducing the benefit-levels of certain pensioners receiving disproportionately high benefits was justified in the circumstances, in light of articles 30
and 32.2, and did not rise to the level of constituting a breach of the state's
duties under the Convention. Meanwhile, Peru did clearly violate the pensioners' right to judicial protection under article 25 through failure to execute the domestic judicial orders in the pensioners' favor. See A Pyrrhic Victory, supra note 17.
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under Chapter II and Chapter III are equally adjudicable in
individual complaints procedures. That is, from ajusticiability
perspective, the direct approach is indistinguishable from indirect approaches.
B.

The "Legitimacy" of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Litigation in the Americas

Cavallaro and Schaffer appear to caution against the direct approach, however, even if the judicial enforceability of
autonomous economic, social, and cultural rights is not called
into question. Indeed, they offer a second, "realpolitik"justification for their thesis that civil-political rights should a priori
be privileged in supranational litigation: Economic, social,
and cultural rights are "not deemed ripe for international litigation by states." 28 1 That is, regardless of their technical justiciability and proper contentious subject-matter jurisdiction
over them, adjudication of such rights is considered "illegitimate" by American states, who will resist and ignore supranational orders purporting to give them
effect, given their per28 2
ceived "[in]sufficient basis in law."

Cavallaro and Schaffer assert that "governments tend to
support the view that economic, social, and cultural rights
should not be afforded the same protection given to civil and
political rights" 28 3 and that, "[w]hile most of the American

states have formally accepted the theoretical basis for recognizing economic, social, and cultural rights, practice tends to reflect the traditional, generational approach to human rights,"
whereby states make a distinction between immediately enforceable civil and political rights and non-enforceable economic, social, and cultural rights. 28 4 They advise that advo-

cates should be attentive to governmental resistance to the enforcement of such rights, attributing this to "a number of
practical, political, and historical reasons," 28 5 although they
28 6
never specify these.
281. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 274.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 270.
284. Id. at 251-52.
285. Id. at 269.
286. For a view on Latin America's historic support of and contribution to
the development of economic, social and cultural fights, see Carozza, An
Historical View, supra note 155.
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Cavallaro and Schaffer in fact do not offer any empirical
support for their assertion that social rights litigation is perceived as illegitimate by Latin American states. They make no
mention of the substantial legal protections for economic, social, and cultural rights found in the constitutions, legislation,
and national jurisprudence of American states or the regular
subjection of such norms to judicial process under a wide
range of causes of action. The existence of such protective law
and related jurisprudence undermines the claim that direct
adjudication of economic, social, and cultural rights will somehow "provoke extreme reactions from the member states of
the OAS." 28 7 Indeed, adjudication of social rights matters is

scarcely new or revolutionary to American governments and
society. It is also now a central demand of regional social
movements, particularly in Latin America. 28 8 Ironically, Cavallaro and Schaffer themselves admonish potential litigants to
"confer with and respect the decisions of social movements,"
being "careful not to set the agenda on their own," and to
"avoid taking the lead on strategic decision-making regarding
the use of the Inter-American system." 289 Taking their own advice, they might reach different conclusions on economic, social, and cultural rights in the Americas.
Particularly in light of the failure to provide any practical
examples of American states' "resistance" or "extreme reactions" to litigation in the area of economic, social, and cultural
rights, assertions in this regard appear unsustainable and overwrought. They also appear to contradict social reality in the
region, including the processes of norm legitimatization and
consensus formation around these rights that have taken place
there, processes that are central to legitimacy considerations
in national and supranational litigation alike. 290 The Ameri287. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 270.
288. Social rights groups in North America have also long incorporated
social rights litigation into their advocacy strategies. While this has tended
not to be pursued under the rubric of "human rights" or international treaty
law-but rather under federal and state constitutional or statutory law-that
too is beginning to change as social rights groups increasingly incorporate
human rights standards and comparative jurisprudence into their work.
289. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 275.
290. While Cavallaro and Schaffer formally advocate use of an "evolutionary approach" to norm interpretation in the inter-American system-one
that, properly applied, ties international norm interpretation to a regional
consensus principle based on evolving understandings at the local level-
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can region has in fact historically been among the most progressive on the world stage with respect to economic, social,
and cultural rights. This is true with regard to the development of international treaty law, national constitutions, domestic protective legislation, and national-level jurisprudence, although implementation of these norms and jurisprudence is
always-as with civil-political rights-a complex work-in-progress.
Latin American states, for example, have almost universally ratified, and subjected themselves to individual complaints procedures under, all of the major international
human rights treaties protecting economic, social, and cultural rights: the ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Elimithey in fact advocate something very different. That is, when it comes to
economic, social, and cultural rights they appear to eschew any use at all of
the "evolutionary approach." For these rights, they prefer an "original intent" or "historical approach" that keeps modern societies tied to prior historically-based understandings. In fact, they even reject a "textual approach." By contrast, when it comes to classic civil-political rights, Cavallaro
and Schaffer trumpet the "evolutionary approach" in name, but in fact subscribe to something very different: an "autonomous approach" to international human rights law that looks to what other internationalhuman rights

bodies are doing in other regions of the world, rather than what is occurring
at the domestic and regional levels in terms of norm development. They
refer repeatedly to the jurisprudential precedents of the U.N. Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, which they commend the inter-American organs to replicate in order to have a "basis in
law." See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 271 (asserting that new lines
of precedent in the inter-American system "must be the logical culmination
of trends in international human rights law") (emphasis added). Yet, in the

sixty-four pages in which their article develops, they make not a single reference to national level precedents in the American region (which would reflect legitimacy considerations). They make no mention of the rapidly-evolving laws or jurisprudence of the thirty-five American states. Nor do they
refer to the increasingly active and savvy social movements that have made
economic, social, and cultural rights their principal demand. Traditional
human rights groups, labor organizations, environmental advocates, consumer groups, indigenous movements, and health rights advocates are increasingly cooperating and leading the charge for new understandings of
human rights in the region-among both government authorities and civil
society more broadly. These are the critical considerations that must be
taken into account in any discussion of "legitimacy" in supranational litigation.
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nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.2 9 1

They have

also broadly ratified the core labor rights conventions of the
International Labor Organization (ILO), as well as those protecting indigenous rights, such as ILO Convention 169.292
They regularly submit to the ILO's contentious jurisdiction
over violations of freedom of association and other core
rights. 2 93 Latin American states have also been instrumental at
the international level in pushing through individual complaints mechanisms in new treaties under development, with
the aim of subjecting economic, social, and cultural rights to
supranational adjudicatory process. This is true under the
draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 29 4 which would create
291. Each of these treaties have been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suiname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (updated to June 9, 2004). Cuba is the single major Latin American state that
has not ratified the ICESCR, although it is party to the CRC, CEDAW, and
CERD. Id.
292. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 72 I.L.O. Official Bull. 59 (Sept. 5, 1991). ILO Convention
169 has been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and
Venezuela. In fact, all but four of the ratifying states are American. For
more information on the ratification status of the core ILO conventions, see
ILOLEX: Database of International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.org/
ilolex/english/index.htm.
293. The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association was established in
1951 for the purpose of examining complaints about violations of freedom
of association and has since become one of the most widely used international human rights complaints procedures. For more information on the
supervisory procedure of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association,
see Committee on Freedom of Association, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/applying/freedom.htm and Lee Swepston, Human
Rights ComplaintsProcedures of the InternationalLabor Organization, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 89 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed.
2004).
294. Latin American states, as a group, supported the immediate drafting,
under a comprehensive approach, of the Optional Protocol at the third session (Feb. 2006) of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) for the Optional Protocol. This support was reflected in Decision No. 586 of 2004 of
the Andean Parliament-comprised of the governments of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela-in which the Parliament made an explicit commitment to the elaboration of the Optional Protocol, viewed as
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an individual communications procedure for the rights in the
ICESCR, as well as under the draft U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which broadly protects economic, social, and cultural rights (including the rights to
health, to education, to work, and to social security) and in
which Latin American support has been instrumental. 29

5

In-

deed, it is fair to conclude that the Latin American and Caribbean block in the United Nations (GRULAC) is the most vocal
and reliable in supporting international litigation of economic, social, and cultural rights, on an equal basis to civil and
296
political rights, under individual complaints procedures.
part of its obligations according to the Andean Charter for the Promotion of
Human Rights. According to the Parliament's Secretary-General, the "Protocol will guarantee the fulfillment of the economic, social, and cultural rights
of the citizens of all states, and equally of the civil and political rights
through an international petition system which could contribute to a major
understanding of the substantial contents of international norms and provoke real changes in the lives of people." See Andean Parliament, Press release, General Secretary of the Andean Parliament supports elaboration of Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.parlamentoandino.org/content/
modules/general.jsp?ID=2198&param4=100&param3=1&param2=2&param
1=1. Likewise, at an international seminar on economic, social, and cultural
rights in Mexico City (August 18-19, 2005) organized by the Mexico/European Commission Program for Cooperation in Human Rights, the General
Director of the Office of Human Rights and Democracy of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Juan Jos6 G6mez Camacho, emphasized that the
Government of Mexico would propose that drafting begin on a comprehensive protocol.
295. Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico have been particularly vocal in expressing the support of GRULAC states for a strong international monitoring
mechanism for the new treaty, including an individual complaints procedure and competence to issue precautionary measures and undertake onsite
visits. See Transcript of Proceedings, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Sessions of
the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International
Convention on the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (August
2005, January 2006, August 2006) (author's transcript from U.N. floor debate, on file with The New York University Journal of International Law &
Politics).
296. Latin American support for economic, social, and cultural rights as
equally-protected fundamental human rights dates back to the United Nations' founding and, specifically, the drafting of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,
both adopted in 1948 and both including all rights on an equal, undifferentiated basis. For some of the history of Latin America's influence on the
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, particularly, the
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Latin American states stand out internationally as well in
granting constitutional hierarchy (i.e., priority over domestic
law) to international human rights treaties that protect economic, social, and cultural rights29 7 and in enshrining explicit
autonomous protections for such rights in their political constitutions-including subjecting them to adjudicatory complaints mechanisms at the domestic level (such as amparo and
tutela actions).298 This is important since international treaty
ratification can be an empty exercise when not reflected in domestic law. The rights to social security, to health, to education, and to labor unionization, for example, are guaranteed
in the political constitutions of most Latin American states, including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil,
Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. 299 The same is true of the rights to
health, to education, and to food. Indeed, since the adoption
of the 1917 Mexican Constitution, virtually every American
state has broadly incorporated a wide array of economic, social, and cultural rights into its political constitution and domestic legislation. 30 0 These norms have become increasingly
expansive with the adoption of new constitutions in many
Latin American states over the past decade and a half, such as
Colombia's in 1991 and Argentina's in 1994.
incorporation of economic, social, and cultural rights, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 57-58, 140-41, 158, 164 (2001).
297. The Constitution of Argentina, for example, incorporates eleven
human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The
rights consecrated in these constitutionalized instruments take precedence
over those found in the Political Constitution and laws of Argentina. See
CONST.ARG. art. 22 (1994). The same is true of Colombia. See COLOM.
CONST. art. 93 (1991).
298. This is true, for example, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
299. See, e.g., DERECHO HUMANO A LA SEGURIDAD SocIAL: APUNTES Y REFLEXIONES DESDE LA EXPERIENCIA DE AMRICA LATINA 39-45 (Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, 2003).
300. In this regard, see, for example, PIDHDD, COMPILACI6N DE LA LEGISLACION DE DERECHOS ECON6MICOS, SOC1ALES Y CULTURALES EN EL MERCOSUR

11-15 (2005) (compiling references to internal legislation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay protecting the rights to education, culture, health, work, social security, food, housing, and access to
land). See also Carozza, An Historical View, supra note 155.
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Given this broad incorporation of economic, social, and
cultural rights into domestic law by the representative
branches of government, national courts in the Americas are
also adjudicating an increasing number of social rights cases.
While labor rights cases are common fare in all American
states-most of which have specialized labor courts, boards, or
commissions with adjudicatory powers-the region's social
rights jurisprudence increasingly spans the spectrum of rights,
including the rights to education, to health, to food, to water,
to housing, and to a clean environment. The jurisprudence of
the courts of Argentina and Colombia stand out particularly in
this regard, 30 1 although they are far from alone; increasing soin Brazil, Ecuador, Peru,
cial rights jurisprudence is emerging
30 2
and Venezuela, among others.
Interestingly, in one recent study of the use of human
rights treaty law by Brazilian trial court judges in Rio de
Janeiro, judges self-reported using the ICESCR in the resolution of cases in effectively equal percentages as the ICCPR
(twenty-three and twenty-four percent, respectively). 3 03 They

also reported proportional use of the San Salvador Protocol
and the American Convention (thirty-one and thirty-three per301. The Argentine courts have, for example, adjudicated numerous highprofile cases involving the right to health and, as a component thereof, the
right to water. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 24/10/2000,
"Campod6nico de Beviacqua, Ana Carina v. Ministry of Health," JA 2001-I464 (Arg.) (ordering uninterrupted medical supply for treatment of child
with Kostman's Syndrome); Viceconte, M. v. Estado Nacional,
C.Nac.Cont.Adm.Fed., Sala 4, 2/6/1998, JA 1999-1-485 (ordering federal
government to comply "strictly and without delay" with a timetable for the
production of a vaccine for endemic disease in southern zone of Buenos
Aires). The Colombian Constitutional Court has likewise adjudicated numerous important constitutional cases in the social rights area, including
those related to the rights to health, education, and culture. See, e.g., Magdalena Sepfilveda, Colombia, in SocIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1 (reviewing cases).
302. This is particularly true with regard to HIV/AIDS cases and other
health rights litigation.
303. SeeJos6 Ricardo Cunha, Human Rights andJusticiability:A Survey Conducted in Rio dejaneiro, SUR: INT'LJ. HUM. RTS. 2005, Issue 3, at 133, 146-49
(2005). These percentages were broken down between "frequent" and
"rare" use, as contrasted with "no" use. Five and three percent of judges
reported "frequent" use of the ICCPR and ICESCR, respectively, while
nineteen and twenty percent, respectively, reported "rare" use.
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cent, respectively).3°4 These percentages, though not high, indicate plainly that Brazilian trial court judges do not evade judicial enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights on
the ground that they are any less "legitimate" than civil-political rights. To the contrary, to the extent judges in Latin
America resort to human rights treaty law at all, they do not
distinguish between legal norms protecting one "set" of rights
or the other. All ratified treaty rights are deemed legally enforceable on an equal basis by virtue of the state's equal legal
commitment to them under law. Courts also readily recognize
the inherent indivisibility and interdependence of rights, making differentiation between them a largely arbitrary and unhelpful exercise.
Though many examples could be provided in the areas of
education, social security, housing, food, water, environmental, and labor rights, the right to health-and, within this
broad category, the right to treatment for persons living with
HIV/AIDS-has met with a particularly favorable response
from Latin American courts, civil society, and governmental
authorities in recent years. Litigation on behalf of persons living with HIV/AIDS has resulted in favorable decisions in Argentina, 30 5 Brazil,3 0 6 Chile, 30 7 Colombia,308 Costa Rica,30 9 the
304. Id. at 148-49. Slightly lower but congruent percentages were self-reported for CERD (23%), CEDAW (25%), the OAS Women's Convention
(25%), the OAS Torture Convention (26%), the U.N. Torture Convention
(25%), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (30%), and the OAS Disability Convention (28%). Id. at 150-55.
305. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 17/12/1996, "B.R.E. c/
Policfa Federal Argentina s/amparo," La Ley [L.L.] (1997-B-77) (Arg.);
Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal [CNCiv.],
01/06/2000, "Asociaci6n Benghalensis y otros c/ Ministerio de Salud y Acci6n Social - Estado Nacional s/ amparo Ley 16.986," La Ley [L.L.] (2000-A186) (Arg.); Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal [CNCiv.], 19/04/2001, "Farell-De Las Carreras, O.G.L.G. c/Instituto
Nacional de Servicios Sociales Para Jubilados y Pensionados s/Amparo,"
Causa No. 7982/99 (Arg.).
306. See, e.g., Reuters NewMedia, Brazil Judge Orders State to Supply AIDS
Medication, July 10, 1996, http://www.aegis.com/news/re/1996/RE960773.
html. The decision, based on the right-to-health guarantee of the Brazilian
Constitution, established that the state of Sao Paulo had an obligation of
regular and timely delivery of all treatments that were medically required for
the petitioner, as determined by her doctor. See id. Thousands of similar
decisions have been favorably decided by Brazilian courts. The state responded in 1996 by passing Law 9313 guaranteeing the fight to antire-
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Ecuador,3 1 1 El Salvador, 3 12 Mexico, 31 3

and Venezuela. 315 These decisions-brought under
both right-to-health and right-to-life provisions of national laws
or constitutions-have tended to require states to provide
comprehensive medical attention to persons living with HIV/
Peru, 3 14

troviral drugs free of charge by the public health system for all people living
with HIV/AIDS in Brazil. See Lei No. 9.313, de 13 de Novembro de 1996
(Brazil), available at http://www.pge.sp.gov.br/centrodeestudos/biblioteca
virtual/dh/volume%20i/saudelei9313.htm.
307. See, e.g., Court of Appeals of Santiago, petition for protection, no.
2,614-99, 14/6/99, "Garcia L6pez c/ Servicio de Salud Metropolitano SurOriente y otros" (Chile).
308. See, e.g., Judgment T-271/95, 23.6.1995 (Colom.); Judgment T-505/
92, 22.8.1992 (Colom.).
309. See, e.g., William Garcia Alvarez v. Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social
(1997), Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 05934 (Costa
Rica), available at http://www.poder-judicial.go.cr/transparencia/rendicion
decuentas/magistrado%-20adrian%20vargas/1997-05934.htm.
310. HIV/AIDS cases have been decided in favor of persons living with
this ailment with respect to their constitutional right to privacy (confidentiality of HIV/AIDS status) and their labor rights. See, e.g., Latin American and
the Caribbean Counsel of AIDS Services Organizations (LACCASO),
Diagn6sticode La Situaci6n de los Derechos Humanos en la Repblica Dominicana,
3-4, available at http://www.laccaso.org/pdfs/minirepdoc.pdf.
311. See, e.g., Edgar Carpio Castro Jofre Mendoza & Ors v. Ministry of Public Health and the Director of the HIV-AIDS National Programme (amparo
writ), Resolution No. 0749-2003-RA (Constitutional Court of Ecuador), Jan.
28, 2004, available at http://www.dlh.lahora.com.ec/paginas/judicial/
PAGINAS/R.O.Febrero. 11.2004.htm.
312. See, e.g.,Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. Salvadoran Social Security
Institute, supra note 69.
313. See, e.g., Castro v. Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social, Amparo Decision 2231/97 (Plenary Court of the Supreme Court of Justice, April 2000),
available at http://200.38.86.53/NR/rdonlyres/9D918A95-F4DB-4700-B0993
FC584B1BDD-B/O/AmparoenRevision223197delPelno.doc; see also Antonio
Medina, Historico Fallo de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, LA JORNADA (Mexico),

Apr. 6, 2000, availableat http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2000/04/06/ls-fallo.
html.
314. See, e.g., Azanca Alheli Meza Garcia v. el Estado Peruano, Exp. No.
2945-2003-AA/TC (Peruvian Constitutional Court).
315. See, e.g., Bermdez Bermfidez v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia
Social, File N - 15.789 Supreme Court of Justice, Judgment N9 916 (1999)
(Venez.), available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/sentencias/SPA/spal507199915789.html; Antonio A. v. Instituto Venezolano de Seguros Sociales (1997);
JRB et al v. Ministerio de la Defensa, Decision 14000 (Administrative Law
Court of the Supreme Court ofJustice, January 20, 1998); NA et al v. Ministry of Health, Decision 916 (Administrative Law Court of the Supreme Court
of Justice, Aug. 14, 1998).
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AIDS and have generally been complied with by Latin American states. Often they are followed by national decrees,
adopted as a function of the constitutional right to health, explicitly establishing the responsibility of the state to provide
necessary medications to persons living with HIV/AIDS. 3 16 In
protecting this right, moreover, national courts have often referred directly to the American Declaration, the San Salvador
Protocol, and the ICESCR-which are viewed as creating binding, legally-enforceable commitments for Latin American
states. 317 The strong acknowledgment by Latin American
states of their legal duty to ensure the right to health has been
affirmed, also, in contentious supranational cases before the
Commission. In a 2004 Commission hearing on an HIV/AIDS
case filed against Guatemala, for example, the Guatemalan authorities insisted that the state recognized the right to health
of all persons in Guatemala and that it was taking action to
fulfill the health rights of the petitioning parties. They urged
the petitioners to continue with their case before the Commis31 8
sion, as a matter of right.

It is noteworthy as well that Latin American states have
not reacted negatively (even if they might have been expected
to) with respect to proliferating protective orders issued by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, requesting
them to provide antiretroviral drugs and other essential lifesaving medicines to persons with HIV/AIDS. Between 2000
and 2002, the Commission granted precautionary measuresurgent interim measures of protection-on behalf of over four
hundred persons carrying HIV/AIDS in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-

316. Such has been the case in Brazil and Colombia, for example. See Lei
No. 9.313, supra note 306 (establishing that right-to-health guarantee for
persons with HIV/AIDS includes free integral health care and access to
treatment); Decree No. 1543 (Colom. 1997).
317. This, for example, was true in Argentina (ICESCR), Costa Rica
(ICESCR), and Ecuador (American Declaration and San Salvador Protocol).
See Hans V. Hogerzeil et. al., Is access to essential medicines as part of the fulfilment of the right to health enforceable through the courts?, 368 THE LANCET 305,
306, available at http://www.who.int/entity/medicines/news/Lancet-Ess
MedHumanRight.pdf.
318. The author was present in the hearing. An audio transcript is available through the parties.
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In almost all of

these cases it requested the state to provide the beneficiaries
with the "medical examination and treatment indispensable
for their survival." In some cases it specified that this should
include comprehensive treatment and the antiretroviral medications necessary to prevent death, as well as the necessary hospital, pharmacological, and nutritional care needed to
strengthen their immunological systems and prevent the development of infections.3

20

States have, for the most part, com-

plied with these measures, at least with respect to the named
parties. At the very least, no American state has formally objected to the Commission's intervention in ordering such
health-based remedies to individuals within the state's jurisdiction.
American states have also responded positively (i.e., without protest or "extreme reactions") to the issuance of healthrelated precautionary measures by the Commission involving
the inadequate provision of health care in custodial settings.
Such measures are most frequently granted in prison contexts,
but have also been granted in other custodial settings such as
state-run psychiatric hospitals, often with important physical
and mental health consequences for the beneficiaries. In December 2003, for example, the Commission ordered precautionary measures on behalf of 460 patients at a Neuropsychiatric Hospital in Paraguay who were living in grossly inhuman,
degrading, and unhygienic conditions, without access to adequate physical or mental health care. 32' The Commission requested that, given the grave health risks presented, the state
urgently adopt the sanitary and medical measures necessary to
avoid harm to the personal integrity of the patients of the hospital. It also ordered the state to elaborate a medical diagnostic for each patient to assure that medical interventions were
319. See OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev., ch. Ill.C.1 (2001); OEA/
Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., ch. IIl.C.1 (2002); OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1
rev. 1, ch. Ill.C.1 (2003) ("Precautionary measures granted or extended by
the Commission").
320. See, e.g., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc.6 rev., at 1283 (2000), ch. III.C.1,
32 (El Salvador).
321. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003), ch. IIl.C.1,
60 (Paraguay). For a fuller description of these measures, see Alison A. Hillman,
ProtectingMental Disability Rights: A Success Story in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, 12 No. 3 HuM. RTS. BIEF 25 (2005).
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individualized. Consequently-triggered by the personal intervention of the President of Paraguay himself after visiting
the hospital to observe the denounced conditions (as well as
the credible threat of litigation if the precautionary measures
were ignored)-the state took immediate responsive action,
firing the hospital's director, reconstructing and modernizing
patient facilities, reassessing intake procedures, and beginning
a reform process aimed at providing community-based, rather
than institution-based, care to persons with psychosocial and
intellectual disabilities. A process of mediated supervision of
the reform process has continued with the participation of the
3 22
state, the Commission, and the petitioning parties.
Moreover, by 2003 the Commission had granted nine sets
of precautionary measures on behalf of prison inmates in need
of specialized medical treatment in Cuba, Jamaica, Peru, and
Guatemala. Faced with credible information that sick patients
were being refused treatment, the Commission asked the
states to transfer each respective inmate to a hospital specializing in the kind of physical ailments suffered and to grant specialized medical attention, to be administered in collaboration
with a physician selected by the beneficiary's family. 323 In an-

other case, upon learning that the inmate's health treatment
had been terminated upon his transfer to another prison,
where his health status worsened, the Commission requested
that the state provide the inmate with a medical exam, including a diagnosis, prognosis, and recommended treatment for
his illness, as well as the treatment prescribed as a result of that
exam.3 24 As a result of the intervention, the state transferred
the prisoner to a facility that both provided medical care and
accommodated family visits. In a series of similar cases, the
Commission requested the state to immediately provide the
medical examinations necessary to protect the inmates'
322. The petitioners included Mental Disability Rights International
(MDRI) and the Center forJustice and International Law (CEJIL). This author represented CEJIL in the proceedings.
21 (2002)
323. See, e.g., OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., ch. III.C.1,
(Cuba) (inmate suffering from lung cancer and refused medical attention);
50 (2003) (Cuba) (inmate
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, ch. III.C.1,
suffering from back tumors, respiratory difficulties, a chronic ear infection,
and a peptic ulcer).
73 (2003) (Peru)
324. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1, ch. III.C.1,
(detainee suffering prostate condition).
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health, which the state reportedly did in some cases. 325 In
other cases, the Commission has requested not only that individual detainees be provided treatment and medical exams,
but also that unhealthy detention conditions and facilities that
326
cause or exacerbate ill-health be remedied.
The Court, too, has intervened in extreme situations to
protect the right to health of detainee populations. It has ordered a state to urgently provide "proper medical treatment"
to a detainee with heart disease, 327 and to ensure that such
treatment be received "from a doctor of [the beneficiary's]
choosing." 328

The Court has also ordered provisional mea-

sures to urgently protect the life and personal integrity of detainees and employees in an Argentine penitentiary that, in
terms of sanitation, overcrowding, and poor nutrition, lacked
"the minimum conditions compatible with their dignity."3

29

That Latin American governments do not automatically
reject claims involving economic, social, and cultural rights is
further evident in the many friendly settlement agreementsakin to consent decrees-they enter, through which they voluntarily accept their international responsibility for violations
of social rights and agree voluntarily to take comprehensive
steps to repair the resulting abuse. Such amicable settlements
have, following approval by the Inter-American Commission,
been entered and enforced in such areas as the right to education,3 30 the right to health, 33 1 the right to work, 33 2 the right to
325. OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114, doc. 5 rev., ch. III.C.1,
50 (2002) (Peru)
(inmate suffering mobile breast lumps); see also OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 106, doc. 6
rev., ch. III.C.1,
48 (2000) (Peru); OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev., ch.
III.C.1,
49 (1999) (Peru); OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev., ch. III.C.1
(1998) (Peru) (inmate dying of cancer); OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1,
ch. III.C.1, 1 66 (2003) (Jamaica).
326. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 6 rev.
24 (1999) (Guatemala) (poor
health conditions in preventive detention).
327. Cesti Hurtado Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (Sept. 11, 1997) (Provisional Measures, considering 6 (ratifying President's July order requiring
provision of adequate medical treatment in reference to the detainee's state
of health, and maintaining measures)).
328. Cesti Hurtado Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (Jan. 21, 1998) (Provisional Measures, Resolution 2).
329. Mendoza Prison Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. E) (Nov. 22, 2004)
(Provisional Measures).
330. M6nica Carabantes Galleguillos v. Chile, Case 12.046, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 33/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2003)
(school dismissal for pregnancy).
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housing and land, 33 and freedom from slave labor,3

34

among

others.
Similar positive examples, while beyond the scope of this
Article, can be given with respect to other orders involving the
right to education, labor rights, indigenous rights, and the
right to housing. 33 5 The point is that American states regularly comply with Commission recommendations in the area of
economic, social, and cultural rights-at least to the same degree they comply with recommendations in classic civil and political rights cases. There is no evidence that American states
find litigation of such rights, as a category, "illegitimate" or
that they will have "extreme reactions" to judicial orders concerning them. If intransigence arises with respect to a particular case, it tends to result from standard legitimacy concerns
regarding the scope of the remedial order issued in the case or
the degree of deference believed better left to local authorities
in striking a proper balance between the rights of alleged victims and the rights of others, regardless of the formal set of
norms used in the litigation.

331. Marfa Mam~rita Mestansa Chaves v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 71/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118 Doc. 70 rev. 2, at 668
(2003) (forced sterilization in public hospital).
332. Pablo Ignacio Livia Robles v. Peru, Case 12.035, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2003); Ricardo Manuel Semosa Di Carlo v. Peru, Petition 12.078, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
31/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2005); Radil Savala Mdlaga y
Jorge Pacheco Rond6n v. Bolivia, Petition 241/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 98/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2005).
333. Community of San Vicente los Cimientos v. Guatemala, Case 11.197,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 68/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.118 Doc. 70 rev. 2, at
642 (2003); Enxet-Lamenxay et al Indigenous Communities ('Riachito') v.
Paraguay, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 90/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3
rev. at 350 (1999); Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroisa et al. v. Chile, Petition
4617/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 30/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5
rev. 1 (2005).
334. Jos6 Pereira v. Brazil, Case 11.289, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 95/
03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.I18, doc. 5 rev. 2 (2003) (slave labor).
335. For a fuller account of these measures, see sources cited supra note
128.
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ENSURING THE LEGITIMACY OF SUPRANATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

The chief difficulty with Cavallaro and Schaffer's unexamined affirmation that judicial enforcement of economic, social,
and cultural rights is illegitimate in the eyes of American states
goes beyond the fact that it is factually unsustainable and conceptually inconsistent with the suggested elements approach.3 3 6 More consequentially, it leads them to overlook
the actualjudicial-overreach factors that cause legitimacy criticisms in the first place. Doing so, the authors offer a litigation
strategy and set of proposed "clear cut cases" that in fact amplify, rather than avoid, classic legitimacy concerns arising
where judicial organs intervene inappropriately or prematurely in the setting of public policies. Instead of trying to

build a litigation strategy around a predetermined view of social rights litigation as illegitimate, Cavallaro and Schaffer
would have done better to ask what it is that makes a judicial
decision illegitimate in the eyes of states, and then build a
strategy from there. 337 Had they done so, they likely would
have offered a very different strategy and set of recommended
"test cases."
"Legitimacy," as a term applied to the judicial function,
generally refers to the political-institutional role of an adjudicatory body in a system of law based on democratic accountability, separation of powers, and evolving norms of decency.
At the national level, a court weakens its legitimacy by exceeding its proper adjudicatory role and arrogating to itself the
functions of the "representative branches." At the supranational level, these horizontal separation-of-powers and countermajoritarian difficulties are compounded by the vertical
336. In its two broadest variants, II and III. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-51.
337. That the authors misconstrue the legitimacy issues at stake is most
clearly demonstrated by the fact that they declare litigation of economic,
social, and cultural rights illegitimate in the eyes of OAS member states
while simultaneously urging that those very rights be litigated under expansive interpretations of civil and political rights. If OAS member states truly
believed it illegitimate for a court to intervene in the health, education, social security, and housing policies and programs they create to protect the
social rights of individuals (which they clearly do not, provided jurisdictional
rules are respected), then there is little reason to believe the legitimacy
problems would go away by litigating under a different set of norms.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2006]

RETHINKING THE "IESS AS MORE" THESIS

suones of subsidiarity-i.e., the supplementary role played33by
8
Su-

pranational organs vis-A-vis their domestic counterparts.

pranational adjudicatory bodies tend to preserve their legitimacy by, first, respecting the lawmaking function of national
legislatures in the first instance and, second, by respecting
their secondary role in the protection of human rights, deferring where possible to the greater appreciation domestic authorities (pressed by civil society groups) tend to have over local conditions and concrete solutions. At the same time, they
must respect the jurisdictional limitations inherent in the adjudicatory function, declining to exercise competence over cases
that fail to present justiciable controversies, as defined in the
applicable system. In exercising their competence over discrete disputes, adjudicatory bodies must keep these factors
constantly in mind. This is true irrespective of whether an invoked norm facially looks more civil, cultural, economic, social, or political.
"Legitimacy" has little to do, therefore, with enforcement
of any particular abstract right or set of rights. Rather, it has
to do with how tribunals, in resolving the discrete controversies presented to them, respect their role in a democratic political system, one in which their functions are limited.3

39

An

adjudicatory body or system jeopardizes its democratic legitimacy when it appears to exceed its proper competence and
take on functions committed to other departments or repositories of power. This can occur in varied ways, each compounded at the supranational level. Three are particularly rel338. The subsidiary role of the inter-American human rights system in the
protection of human rights is referenced expressly in the American Convention, which refers to international efforts as necessarily "reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American
2. It is ensured
states." American Convention, supra note 23, pmbl.,
through the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, allowing states to
resolve problems under their internal law before being confronted with an
international proceeding, and the "fourth instance formula," which prevents
an international body from examining internal issues unless a violation of a
provision of international law is alleged. See, e.g., Veldsquez Rodrigtez Case,

60-61;Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Intersupra note 249,
Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. (1998), 1
141-42.
339. Litigants should take this expressly into account, framing their cases
in ways to which judges can legitimately respond, respecting basic autonomy,
democratic-accountability, separation-of-powers, and subsidiarity principles.
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evant to the present discussion: by exercising regular competence over non-justiciable claims; by appearing to engage in
judicial-lawmaking, such as by creating new rights without sufficient consensus formation through overbroad norm interpretation; and by crafting detailed remedial orders mandating
judicial rather than legislative, or international rather than national, prerogatives in the first instance. Cavallaro and Schaffer, treading carelessly, fall into each of these legitimacy pitfalls in presenting their thesis and test cases. The following
Section discusses the first. The latter two will be addressed
generally in Parts VI and VII, infra.
A.

ExceedingJudicial Competence: Adjudicating
"Non-JusticiableClaims"

Courts and tribunals play a decisive but circumscribed
role in the democratic political system. In contradistinction to
the representative branches, they serve the democratic process
by limiting their interventions as far as possible to those concrete "interpretive" disputes that arise under law when, in discrete factual settings, conflicting rights and duties are inter340
preted under differing suppositions by adverse parties.
While courts may surpass that traditional role when lapses in
representative democracy become acute, their sustained legitimacy tends to depend on their self-restraint in limiting the exercise of their competence to the principled and rule-based
resolution of discrete factual controversies. Abstract or generalized grievances over large sectors of the population that cannot be reduced for adjudicatory purposes to concrete factual
injury to specific persons are rarely conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action, and hence
are generally best reserved for the messier, more open political process. 3 4 1 In this equation, Cavallaro and Schaffer's urg340. Courts sometimes go beyond this, but in so doing generally are not
acting under their adjudicatory competence, but rather under something
more akin to an advisoryjurisdiction.
341. This is especially true for non-parties, whose interests and perspectives are not necessarily represented in the proceedings. In this regard, it is
important to mention that many Latin American countries recognize collective amparo actions and other "diffuse" causes of action. These actionswhen not predicated on concrete demonstrable injury to a named partyare often more akin to promotional or advisory mechanisms of protection.
Given inter-American justiciability doctrine, they often present serious ad-
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ing of advocates not to look at the inter-American system as an
"arbiter of disputes" between specific individuals and the state,
but rather as a mechanism for evaluating broad state policies
and for "producing jurisprudence with potentially sweeping
policy implications" and "revolutionary" impacts,

3 42

appears

largely misdirected as a strategic device, especially if its aim is
to increase judicial legitimacy and on-the-ground implementa343
tion rates.
The circumscribed role adjudicatory bodies play in most
democracies is reflected in justiciability doctrine. It is encapsulated in the notion of a 'justiciable controversy" or "concrete
case," the threshold requirement for an adjudicatory body taking legitimate cognizance of a legal claim of right. As previously discussed, the precise contours of a justiciable controversy vary across jurisdictions, often reflecting distinct levels of
political accountability or accepted balances of power. In the
inter-American system-as under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights and U.N. Human Rights Committee-a justiciable controversy is one characterized by the
core elements of injury-in-fact to a specific person or persons
and a causal nexus between that injury and the conduct of the
defendant state. Where these elements are not met, the Commission or Court exceeds its limited jurisdictional competence
and, from a legitimacy standpoint, enters impermissibly into
an area of struggle properly reserved for the political process.
Ironically, while Cavallaro and Schaffer reproach human
rights lawyers in the Americas for "cast[ing] particular instances of social injustice in the language of state obligations
missibility problems when used as a basis for exhausting domestic remedies
in the inter-American human rights system. To avoid these problems, this
author generally advises potential litigants who have favorably relied on diffuse causes of action at the domestic level, to limit their regional-level complaints to alleged violations of the right to judicial protection, for failure to
enforce the diffuse remedy domestically. Only in that way may concrete injury, suffered by individual beneficiaries of the domestic action and attributable to state conduct, potentially be demonstrated and hence standing rules
respected.
342. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 274, 277. They instruct petitioners to "focus on the potential impact that the litigation of cases may have
beyond the parties involved." Id. at 274.
343. Id. at 222 (characterizing their test cases as those manifesting "the
greatest potential to establish precedents likely to be implemented by states
in the Americas").
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and enforceable, individual rights" 344 on the ground that
these instances fall outside the legitimate sphere of judicial
competence, 3 45 the "test cases" they commend in Part IV of

their article themselves fall outside this permissible area. Specifically, by undervaluing the legal significance of a justiciable
controversy in the inter-American system and, relatedly, the legal obligations that attach to human rights claims in adjudicatory contexts-for economic-social-cultural and civil-political
rights alike-Cavallaro and Schaffer offer test cases and a line
of argument that recreate the legitimacy concerns they caution against.
1. Failingto Establish Concrete Injury to Individualized Persons
The first major legitimacy-related difficulty evident in the
Cavallaro-Schaffer approach to supranational social rights litigation lies in the authors' general inattention to personalized
injury-in-fact as a core requirement for the exercise of the regional system's adjudicatory function. They characterize this
jurisdictional element in mere prudential terms, 3 4 6 seemingly
on the belief that general "distributive justice" claims with effects over broad collectivities are both justiciable and politically legitimate so long as litigants invoke immediately-enforceable civil-political rights in adjudicating them.
The right-to-education cases commended to litigants reflect this jurisdictional error most directly. They are framed
not in terms of concrete, personal harm to any specific individual, but exclusively by reference to general budgetary inequalities between bureaucraticsubdivisions-horizontally,in terms of
school districts, and vertically, in terms of primary, secondary,
and tertiary levels of education. Neither provides a proper basis for the exercise of the inter-American organs' adjudicatory
competence.
Cavallaro and Schaffer first hypothesize a situation in
which two schools or school districts-one poorer and more
344. Id. at 235-36.
345. Id. at 221 (warning of "limited role" of Commission and Court "in
promoting economic, social, and cultural fights").
346. Id. at 272-73 (describing "preference" for individualization in the inter-American system as a means of increasing the likelihood of implementation of international decisions, rather than as ajurisdictional prerequisite to
the exercise of adjudicatory competence).
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"ethnic"-receive unequal per-student resource allocations. 3 47
They contend that, on these facts, the Commission and Court
"would be on firm ground were they to find a violation in the
' 348
unequal distribution of resources in the two communities."
The authors, however, fail to identify any method of demonstrating concrete personal injury to particular children in the
poorer school district owing to the differential school budgets.
The fact of unequal resource allocation to the district or school
tells the adjudicator little to nothing about the relative adequacy of the education received by individual students in that
district or school. We are told nothing about the quality of
teachers, the quality of the facilities, the respective need levels
of the students in each school, or the precise reasons why one
school is receiving greater funding than the other.3 49 Without
framing the legal question of inequality in a concrete factual
context of a specific child or specific children's actual access to
education or educational opportunity-one conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences ofjudicial action-an
adjudicatory body, particularly a supranational one, should
hesitate to enter into the rocky terrain of appropriate school
budgeting. More to the point, it would exceed its contentious
competence in doing so.
Incidentally, it was this practical litigation problem that in
many ways helped lead the early architects of the legal strategy
to end racial segregation in the United States to focus their
court arguments not on unequal per-student expenditures in
white and black primary and secondary schools, which were
grotesquely unequal and unjust, but rather on a distinct set of
cases through which concrete personalized injury resulting
from segregated education policies could most clearly be
347. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 276.
348. Id. They further contend that "as a remedy, the [inter-American] system could order that the state afford roughly equal resources to the communities." Id.
349. Indeed, educational needs vary widely according to diverse factors.
The right to education and to educational equality turns not on the bare
quantity of resources assigned to schools, but rather on the "quality" or "adequacy" of education, as measured by educational needs fulfillment. As one
U.S. state supreme court has stated in an important case on equal educational opportunity: "The very uncertainty of the extent of the nexus between dollar input and quality of educational opportunity requires allowance for variances as to individual and group disadvantages and local conditions." Horton v. Meskill, 652 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
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demonstrated to a court of law.3 5 0 These included suits seek-

ing to equalize the salaries of black and white teachers in the
same school system, 35 1 suits seeking access by qualified blacks
to graduate and professional schools for which no in-state alternatives were available,3 52 and, ultimately, a direct attack on
segregated primary and secondary schooling based on its effects on students' "hearts and minds." 353

This approach al-

lowed U.S. civil rights advocates to turn discrete, strategicallychosen aspects of the larger political struggle against segregation into 'justiciable cases" cognizable by the judicial department. In a similar manner, human rights advocates who wish
to bring their struggles to adjudicatory tribunals, whether domestic or international, need to recognize that the types of
claims such bodies are competent to hear are limited, and
frame their cases accordingly.
Cavallaro and Schaffer next propose an even more starkly
inappropriate "test case." They posit suing a state for spending more per-student on the maintenance of a free and open
public university system than it does on a free and open public
elementary-school system, on the assumption that a greater percentage of poor and minority students attend the latter than
the former. 3 54 Beyond the causation problems inherent in the

case as proposed, 3 55 its appropriateness for judicial resolution
is further placed into question by the difficulty, if not impossi350. For a description of the complex factors and motivations underlying
this strategy, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950 (1987); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQuALITY (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2004) (1974);Jack M. Balkin,
The History of the Brown Litigation, in WHAT "BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION"
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 29 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).

351. See sources cited supra note 350.
352. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
353. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
354. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 277.
355. On their hypothesized facts, no identified state conduct inhibits poor
and minority students, either directly or indirectly, from accessing higher
education (e.g., both systems are "open" and "free"). See id. at 277. Given
that no financial or other obstacle to attendance is specified at either elementary or university levels, the emphasis of Cavallaro and Schaffer on the
state's failure to "maintain effective affirmative action programs to guarantee
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bility, of proving injury-in-fact to any particular elementary student as a result of the policy. This follows not only from the
lack of direct correlation between educational budget allocations and the quality of education received by individual students, but-more fundamentally-from the lack of any cognizable standard of comparison between similarly-situated persons treated differently in the particular case, a necessary
element for proving unjustified unequal treatment under international human rights law. 356 Primary-school and university
students simply are insufficiently "similarly situated" to establish ajudicially-cognizable standard of comparison from which
concrete individualized injury could be assessed. 357 Without
such a standard, a legal finding of discrimination in a concrete
case-particularly if accompanied by a remedial order requiraccess to superior education to persons from historically disadvantaged
groups" is not entirely clear. See id.
356. See, e.g., Carlos Garcfa Saccone v. Argentina, Case 11.671, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Report No. 8/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev.
40-41 (1998)
(citing E.W. VIERDAG,

THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION

IN INTERNATIONAL

44 (1973) for purposes of case analysis under article 24 of American
Convention).
357. It may also be noted that factual situations such as the one hypothesized by Cavallaro and Schaffer-in which per-student expenditures in public university systems exceed those in public elementary schools by a factor of
ten to twenty, see Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 277-are not likely to
exist in Latin America. Id. at 277 ("These hypothetical facts-which no
doubt exist in Brazil and elsewhere in the Americas"). Indeed, as reported
in a 2003 World Bank report, the countries of the region tend to reflect
three patterns of spending across primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.
The first, exemplified by Chile, demonstrates a large, equalizing convergence across vertical education levels such that per-student expenditures at
each was roughly equalized by 2001. The second, exemplified by Mexico,
has experienced steady growth at all levels, thereby maintaining patterns of
inequality (by a factor of about eight). These statistics, however, reflect federal dollars and thus do not take into account the local and state dollars that
contribute to primary, but not tertiary education-thus decreasing the perstudent inequality across these levels. Finally, the third trend, exemplified
by Brazil, demonstrates a bias toward tertiary education, which receives
seven times more federal funding than does secondary education. Again,
however, this does not take into account the primary role in education finance of local and state dollars in the federalized state. See David de Ferranti
et al., Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean:Breaking with History?, at 711,
Fig. 7.4, available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/
lacinfoclient.nsf/d29684951174975c85256735007fef1 2/32d7cObacee5752a
85256dba00545d3f/$FILE/Inequality%20in%2OLatin%2OAmerica%20-%20
complete.pdf.
LAW
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ing vertical resource equalization-would exceed accepted
limits to the inter-American organs'
adjudicatory competence
358
and place their legitimacy at risk.

While Cavallaro and Schaffer assert that judicial entry into
this budgetary field would have "potentially revolutionary policy implications" and that their hypothesized facts "would provide the inter-American system an opportunity to evaluatethrough the individual case mechanism-the educational policies of a given state"3

59

they overlook the fact that basic jus-

ticiability and subsidiarity considerations prevent the interAmerican organs from legitimately stepping over that threshold, through the individual case mechanism, in the ways they
propose. Broad evaluation of state policies, in the absence of
case-defining harm suffered concretely by individuals as a result of their application, is better left to the promotional or
advisory functions of the inter-American human rights organs.
By elevating the importance of abstract norms over the
concrete claims that underlie them, the authors thus stumble
into the very trap they admonish social rights advocates for
falling into: They attempt to force a situation of generalized,
abstract social injustice into a legal case. They believe they are
"on firm ground" simply because they invoke a "civil and political" rather than an "economic, social and cultural" right. As
the Commission's jurisprudence makes clear, once justiciability and other jurisdictional criteria are taken into account, the precise selection between equally-appropriate
norms is all but irrelevant.3 60 A proper concern for the legiti358. For a general discussion of ways to litigate the non-discrimination
principle in the context of social, economic, and cultural rights cases in the
inter-American human rights system, see PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 194206.
359. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 277.
360. Indeed, the Commission has adjudicated several right-to-education
cases, finding violations of the right to education on an autonomous basis
even where state responsibility rested, in part, on breach of the state's duty
of non-discrimination with respect to the education norm. Seejehova's Witnesses v. Argentina, Case No. 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.47,
doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979) (finding state responsible for violating right to education, under article XII of American Declaration, of 300 primary-school children expelled from school, denied school enrollment or prevented from
taking final exams on basis of their religious beliefs); Yean and Bosico Girls
Case, supra note 109, 29 (noting Commission's finding that the state violated the girl's right to education under article XII of the American Declara-
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macy of supranational judicial action would take these core
claim-based jurisdictional issues into account.
2.

Failing to Establish Causal Conduct as a Requisite to State
Responsibility

The second way the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis overlooks
the actualjudicial overreach factors that often cause legitimacy
criticisms lies in their underestimation of the need to prove
defendant-specific causal conduct, in breach of a legally-defined duty, as a prerequisite to finding state responsibility
under adjudicatory procedures for human rights violations.
Except in jurisdictions that recognize strict liability, an adjudicatory body exceeds its limited mandate, weakening its legitimacy as neutral interpreter of the law, when it holds defendant parties accountable for injuries their conduct did not or
cannot be shown to have proximately caused. 36' The "test

cases" on the rights to food, to health, and to housing proposed by Cavallaro and Schaffer fail to take this critical justiciability dimension sufficiently into account.
With respect to the right to food, for example, the authors hypothesize a "firmly grounded" case in which a group
of individuals "receive less than an adequate share of calories,
protein, carbohydrates, or other essential nutrients on a regular basis.

'362

Having been informed of the situation, the state

fails to promptly ensure access to sufficient nutrition and
health care and, consequently, "one or more members of this
tion by dismissing her from school on basis of arbitrary requirement related
to nationality); see also Adolescents in the Custody of the Febem v. Brazil,
Case 12.328, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 39/02 OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc.
1 rev. 1 (2003) (finding admissible claims that Brazil violated right to education under article 13 of San Salvador Protocol, to detriment of adolescents
held in state prison).
361. Inter-American human rights law has not developed a strict liability
doctrine, whereby a state may be held internationally responsible through
contentious processes for violating an individual's rights in the absence of
proof that the state's conduct, whether by act or omission, was a proximate
cause of the injury suffered. Such a strict liability system would largely remove the incentives for states to make their best efforts to ensure all human
rights, as they could be held internationally responsible even where they
took every reasonable and appropriate measure to prevent the violation.
Without the link between state conduct and individual injury, judicial decisions would be little more than advisory opinions.
362. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 278.
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group fail to develop as they would have had they received the
adequate nutritional intake that fate, and official failure has
denied them.

'3

63

According to Cavallaro and Schaffer, such a

situation would give rise to clear state responsibility for violation of the "right to life" and "right to physical integrity" under
the Convention in relation to anyone who subsequently died,
suffered preventable or curable disease, or failed to develop as
they would have as a result of the state's failure to provide for
3 64
her or his nutritional needs.

Such a litigation theory fails, however, to take causation
and its role in establishing state responsibility in adjudicatory
contexts sufficiently into account. At core, it converts the law
of state responsibility into a strict-liability-plus-knowledgedoctrine
whenever civil-political rights are formally alleged in litigation.
This is evident from the authors' proposed test case: because
the rights to life and integrity were formally invoked-rather
than the right to food 365-state responsibility is claimed to rest
on the state's breach of its immediate duty to factually "ensure" the rights in question through the provision of all nutritional and health needs required to prevent illness or death.
In Cavallaro and Schaffer's view, that result-based duty began
as soon as the state had knowledge of the alleged situation of
nutritional vulnerability. That is, under their theory, the focus
is not on the conduct-based duty to take all appropriate or reasonable measures to ensure the right in the fact-specific circumstances of the case, but rather on the result-based duty to
ensure it as a factual matter in practice, irrespective of broader
circumstances, capacities, and constraints.
The implications of this position are truly remarkable. If
applied in the real world, states could effectively be held internationally responsible through individual complaints mechanisms for virtually every health-related death, illness, or epidemiological vulnerability that occurred within their borders.
That is, a petitioner's litigation burden would be satisfied by
demonstrating two circumstances: one, that a state had knowl363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. ("We may view this situation as a violation of the right to food.
However, given that the right to food does not provide the basisfor an individual
petition to the Inter-American system, regardless of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted, we would be unable to help these victims.") (emphasis added).
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edge of a situation of vulnerability and, two, that one or more
affected persons became sick, died, or "failed to develop as
they would have had they received" state assistance. Given extreme levels of poverty and low-level service capacity in the region, there is virtually no disadvantage that would escape a
state's international liability under this standard. By failing to
take states' reasonable capabilities into account and by holding states responsible for injuries their conduct cannot reasonably be said to have proximately caused, 36 6 there are few legal
doctrines that would create graver legitimacy problems in supranational adjudication. That Cavallaro and Schaffer characterize this approach to social rights litigation as "cautious" and
"responsible" demonstrates how far afield their stylized view of
civil-political rights as immediately enforceable has taken
them.
Conceptually, the problem lies, again, in the authors' application of the improper dimensions of human rights obligations to rights-based claims. While they render direct-approach
claims non-justiciable by associating them exclusively with
quadrant 4 obligations, they reproduce a situation of non-justiciability with respect to the civil-political claims they privilege
by applying to them quadrant 2 duties. Such duties are not
directly cognizable in individual petition processes because,
though directed to individual rights-holders, their assessment
is based on "results" not "conduct." That is, they are designed
to assess the extent to which rights are as a factual matter ensured in a given situation, rather than what the state reasonably
did under the circumstances to prevent or respond appropriately to that harm, taking competing commitments in a democratic society into account.
Thus, irrespective of how concrete and individualized a
given harm might be (e.g., physiological death), quadrant 2
duties are incapable of providing a standard upon which
366. To each of their hypotheticals, Cavallaro and Schaffer tag on the otherwise case-engulfing qualifier that the "authorities' failure is not the result of
lack of resources." Given the nature of their hypotheticals and the economic
reality of the region, they never explain why this would not swallow every
case they have imagined. Most importantly, they fail to explain how "lack of
resources" would be proved in discrete contexts (this is generally not an area
courts should tread) or how it would otherwise be judicially assessed given
their reliance on the result-based dimension of the "duty to respect and ensure," rather than on its conduct-based dimension. Id. at 274-80.
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causal responsibility may be imputed to the state. Only quadrant 1 duties are capable of doing that. By underappreciating
these important duty-based distinctions and, specifically, by
employing norm-based distinctions as a proxy for claim-based
justiciability doctrine, the Cavallaro-Schaffer thesis for social
rights litigation leads to a distinctly untoward result: It renders
all social rights claims, whether framed under "direct" or "indirect" approaches, inappropriate for judicial review. It is precisely when supranational instances exercise regular contentious competence over claims such as these (framed directly
under quadrant 2, 3, or 4 duties) that they risk backlash for
decisions that exceed proper adjudicatory limits, and hence
loss of legitimacy that will likewise affect on-the-ground implementation rates.
Cavallaro and Schaffer fall into the same causation-related
trap in framing their health and housing rights "test cases." In
the first, they posit that a state violates the right to life and
integrity of children for whom it has not provided vaccines if
one of those children contracts a preventable illness leading to
death.3 67 In the second, they conclude that a state violates the
same rights where it fails to respond to requests for adequate
shelter by poor urban dwellers in makeshift hillside housing
and, subsequently, those persons die or are seriously injured in
a torrential shower that washes their homes away. 36 8 In both

of these
precisely,
victims?
through

examples, the element of causation is missing: How,
is the state responsible for the deaths of the alleged
Could the state have reasonably prevented the deaths
the taking of specific measures for which it had a le-

367. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 279. In suggesting this case,
Cavallaro and Schaffer may have been thinking of an Argentine case in
which the federal government was required, by a domestic court, to comply
"strictly and without delay" with a legislatively-defined time-table for the
building of a facility for the production of a vaccine for a disease endemic to
the southern zone of Buenos Aires. See Viceconte, M. v. Estado Nacional,
C.Nac.Cont.Adm.Fed., Sala 4, 2/6/1998, JA 1999-1-485, Mariela v National
State-Ministry of Health and Social ac/ amparo, C.Nac.Cont.Adm.Fed., 2/6/
98, JA 1999-1-485. State responsibility in that case rested not, however, on
the bare fact that someone might die without the vaccine, but rather on the
state's arbitrary and unreasonable lack of compliance with commitments
and a timetable it had already made to build the facility. The case was based
on unreasonable conduct, not results. The two cases, in this sense, are not

meaningfully comparable.
368. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 279-80.
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gal obligation to take? Would such measures have prevented
the death in this case? Is there convincing evidence of that or is
it merely speculative?
In this regard, the Cavallaro-Schaffer approach to social
rights litigation succumbs to an additional causation-related
difficulty. The majority of their case hypotheticals focus on
physical loss of life-deaths-as a case-defining vehicle employed to facilitate invocation of "civil-political rights." This
makes evidentiary sense from the perspective of proving concrete individualized injury. It makes far less sense, however,
from the perspective of proving causation. This is true in all
cases in which state responsibility for individual deaths is predicated not on direct acts, whether by state agents or private
individuals, but rather on omissions in the provision of goods or

services. In such cases, proof of state responsibility for loss of
life would, in most cases, need to be predicated on reasonable
evidence that the specific death could have been avoided had the
government in fact fulfilled its conduct-based obligations to
the deceased in his or her individual capacity. This case-specific evidentiary burden, in both practical and legal terms, is
not easy to meet. This is particularly true in non-custodial contexts, where legal duties are not necessarily heightened 369 and
where the scope of the state's legal obligation to the alleged
victim must be determined in light of the state's concurrent
and competing obligations to other individuals subject to its
jurisdiction.
This was concretely demonstrated in a 2005 case decided
by the Inter-American Court, a case which itself involved exceptionally heightened case-specific duties to the individual victims at issue. Resolving a claim closely resembling the Cavallaro-Schaffer test case, the Court found against the plaintiffs
precisely on the legal ground of insufficient proof of causation

with respect to the deaths of the individualized victims. In
Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, an extremely impoverished indigenous
community was forced off its ancestral lands by private land369. State legal obligations to persons in state custody are heightened by
virtue of the fact that the individual in state custody has "no means to turn to
his relatives and friends, to an attorney or to a private physician; the State,
therefore, ha[s] complete control over his life and personal safety." Juan
Hernindez v. Guatemala, Case 11.297, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/96,
1 60 (Oct. 16, 1996).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 39:171

owners. The community responded by building makeshift
housing on the side of a highway adjacent to the territory from
which it had been displaced. The state responded to the resulting health and nutritional crisis by declaring a state of
emergency and promising assistance, only some of which was
provided. It failed to take other reasonable or appropriate actions that would have eased the food crisis while the territorial
dispute was pending.3 7 0 Because of the extremely miserable
human conditions in the highway settlement, sixteen community members died from tuberculosis, malnutrition, or meningitis. In proceedings before the Court, both the Commission
and the petitioning parties argued that the state had violated
the right to life of the sixteen who had died, on the ground
that the deaths could have been prevented with adequate food
and medical assistance, especially if the state had assured the
Community the free utilization of its territory. 3 71 The Court
responded that it "lacked sufficient probatory elements to establish the causes of the mentioned deaths" and, as such, could
not find a violation of the right to life to the detriment of the
sixteen decedent members of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Com72
3

munity.

Meanwhile, the Court had little trouble finding a violation
of the right to a dignified life, understood as a range of health,
housing, educational, labor, and cultural rights, with respect
to "all members of the Yakye Axa Community." It did so based
on the state's failure to adopt appropriate measures in response to the conditions that affected the individual Community members' possibility of having "dignified lives," particularly given the importance of ancestral land to the indigenous
community. This expansive interpretation of life, together
with the heightened duty held by the state to provide this particular community with food and health assistance, softened
the evidentiary burden held by the plaintiffs in establishing
causal responsibility for the concrete harm alleged to their detriment. The lesson to be taken is that, where omissions in the
370. See Yakye Axa Case, supra note 136,
50. The state did not act, for
example, to ensure that the community members could enter their ancestral
habitat, while the territorial dispute was ongoing, to engage in traditional
hunting and collection activities nor to access available water supplies
thereon. See id. 7 50.85 & 50.93.
371. Id. 177.
372. Id. 177-78 (author's translation) (emphasis added).
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provision of goods and services are being challenged, evidentiary requirements associated with causation in fact favor "integration" or "direct" approaches over the narrowest "elements"
one (focused on discrete physiological deaths) that Cavallaro
3 73
and Schaffer privilege in their case-based hypotheticals.
This issue, in its practical manifestations, will be returned
to in Part VI. The point to be underscored here is that causation must be proved in contentious proceedings with regard to
each identified victim. It is not enough to identify a condition of
poverty, deprivation, or inequality and claim that the state, if it
has not acted promptly to prevent all associated harms, is responsible for human rights violations. A supranational body
could potentially do so under its advisory or promotional jurisdiction; it cannot in its adjudicatory role.

373. This does not mean causation for deaths in such circumstances can
never be proved; just that the burden of proof is high. In the 2006
Sawhoyamaxa Case, supra note 259, the Court did in fact find individual violations of the right to life for nineteen of twenty-six deceased members of the
Community, eighteen of whom were children and all nineteen of whom
died of reasonably preventable diseases with available low cost treatments.
While the Court insisted, as a technical matter, on proof of individualized

harm, a causal nexus, and conduct-based omissions as the basis for state responsibility ("insufficient and inadequate measures"), its holding was based
principally on the state's exceptionally heightened duty to the
Sawhoyamaxa-undertaken expressly through presidential decree-in the
area of health care and nutrition. Thus, the Court underscored that "the
measures to which the State committed for the members of the
Sawhoyamaxa Community differed in their urgency from those the State
should have adopted to guarantee the rights of the population and of indigenous communities in general." Id. 173 (author's translation) (emphasis
added). This heightened duty lowered the threshold for proving proximate
cause (much like a custodial setting would). Nevertheless, the consequent
diminution in vigor of the causation test led the Court to several seemingly
careless conclusions that a more rigorous approach would hopefully have
avoided. See, e.g., id. 180 (finding no state responsibility for deaths of three
adults who died of tuberculosis and pneumonia, without individualized assessment of cause, solely on ground that their age approached or exceeded
the average life expectancy in Paraguay; meanwhile, state responsibility was
affirmed for all infant and child deaths, likewise without individualized assessment, yet without parallel attention given to national infant or child mortality rates nor to how the deaths could have practically and reasonably been
averted in the factual circumstances of the case).
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DISTINGUISHING THE ADJUDICATORY FROM PROMOTIONAL
FUNCTIONS OF SUPRANATIONAL ORGANS

Cavallaro and Schaffer assert that their goal "is not to discourage human rights practitioners from using the InterAmerican system as a means of promoting social justice, but
rather to encourage them to do so in a thoughtful and responsible fashion." 3 74 Nonetheless, in focusing their thesis and
case-studies on the inter-American organs' adjudicatory functions, they misidentify the proper forum for generally "promoting social justice" in the regional human rights system.
While the Commission and Court may not legitimately assume
that broad undertaking through their adjudicatory competence, they are specifically authorized and even required to do
so under their promotional and/or advisory competences.
Effective and efficient use of the regional human rights
system requires that advocates properly distinguish between
the adjudicatory and promotional functions of the inter-American organs. These functions are complementary, and should
be used together, but each serves a distinct human rights purpose and belongs to different jurisdictional mandates of the
Commission and Court. Cavallaro and Schaffer appear to conflate them and as a result offer test cases that are inappropriate
for adjudication in the inter-American system. Advocates
should be aware that issues and arguments that will be successful before one will not necessarily be successful before the
other.
A.

Adjudicatory Competence

As described throughout this Article, the adjudicatory
competence of the inter-American human rights organs is casebased in the classic sense, meaning that all judicially cognizable
cases must fulfill the requirements not only of proper subject
matter jurisdiction, but also of a "concrete case" or "justiciable
controversy." The narrowness of the inter-American organs'
contentious jurisdiction is further accentuated by a series of
additional admissibility requirements. Thus, in addition to assuring itself that it enjoys ratione materiae,rationetemporis, ratione
loci, and ratione personae competence over the alleged legal
norms, facts, and parties to a case before taking cognizance of
374. Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 281.
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it, the Commission or Court when exercising adjudicatory
functions must also assure itself that the petitioners have exhausted domestic remedies, submitted their claim within a reasonable time, identified themselves, and chosen a single inter3 75
national forum for pursuit of their contentious legal claim..
Where these requirements cannot be demonstrated, the petition will be dismissed as beyond the limited adjudicatory competence of the inter-American human rights organs.
The Commission and Court guard their contentious function closely. Rarely will they use it to intrude into areas better
attended by other actors in the democratic process, including
themselves under their promotional or advisory jurisdictions.
Accordingly, issues of a broader, more structural, or diffuse
non-"case" nature that are not appropriate for the inter-American organs' case-based jurisdiction are regularly culled from
contentious petitions by the Commission itself.376 These issues
are then reserved by the Commission for its promotional and
advisory functions under article 41 of the American Convention,377 including "the specific authority its Statute assigns to it
to formulate recommendations to State governments concerning the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human
rights. ' 378 Emphatically, the subject matter of the claims and
issues removed from such complaints do not correspond to
whether they look more civil-political or more economic-social-cultural. What matters, as always, is whether they correspond or fail to correspond to a justiciable case.
The right to health, for example-like the right to life,
integrity, discrimination, or association-can give rise to justi375. These jurisdictional requisites are laid out broadly in articles 44-51 of
the Convention, as well as in the Commission and Court's rules of procedure. For a full description of the procedure for submitting contentious
complaints, see PROTEGTING, supra note 7, at 75-110.
376. See cases cited supra note 185.
377. Article 41 lays out the functions and powers held by the Commission
in the exercise of its mandate to "promote respect for and defense of human
rights." These include, among its properly "promotional" functions, the
powers "to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of
America," "to make recommendations to the governments of the member
states when it considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights," "to prepare such studies or reports
as it considers advisable," and "to provide those states with the advisory services they request." American Convention, supra note 23, art. 41.
76.
378. Operation Gatekeeper, supra note 185,
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ciable controversies and non-justiciable controversies. Ajusticiable controversy might arise where a public hospital denied
admission to persons with HIV/AIDS as a matter of policy and,
based on that policy, a person with HIV/AIDS was denied
treatment upon seeking medical care to which he or she
would otherwise have been entitled. By contrast, a claim
brought by that individual challenging the percentage of the
national budget allocated to HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention would be found nonjusticiable. The former, fulfilling the
elements of a justiciable controversy, is fully appropriate for
judicial resolution. The latter, incapable of fulfilling those elements, falls outside judicial competence; it is the proper domain of the political branches, prodded and urged by civil-society protest, lobbying campaigns, political mobilizations, and
the oversight of international supervisory mechanisms and special mandates in the exercise of their promotional and advisory functions.
B.

Promotional Competence

The narrow rule-bound nature of the individual petitions
process contrasts with the broadness and flexibility of the promotionalfunctions of the inter-American human rights organs.
Indeed, the issues and complaints that cannot or should not be
adjudicated supranationally in the region can always be
brought instead to the attention of the inter-American organs
under their promotional or advisory mandates. This is particularly true in relation to the Commission, widely seen as the
"engine" of the system. That sobriquet is due not only to the
fact that it receives and reviews all individual complaints submitted to the system-sending only a small number on to the
Court-but, much more importantly, because its promotional
mandate is so exceptionally broad and useful to social movement advocacy and mobilization in the region. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to deal with its full breadth, mention must be made of several of the most useful tools it offers
to human rights advocates in the region as they advance, in
the political-promotional sphere, the protection of economic,
social, and cultural rights.
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Thematic Hearings

Human rights advocates in the Americas can bring key
concerns related to economic, social, and cultural rights, as
with all rights, to the attention of the inter-American system by
asking the Commission to grant a "general" or "thematic hearing" on a chosen subject.3 79 The Commission meets in Washington, D.C. for two regular three-week sessions per year, with
at least one week of each session reserved for public hearings.
While approximately half of the hearings granted each session
are "case-based" (referring to the various procedural stages of
litigation), the other half are "thematic" or "general in nature."380 That is, any human rights concern arising in the
Americas of a general or diffuse nature can be brought to the
Commission's attention. Where particular states are concerned, the Commission may invite state representatives to observe the hearing and to respond appropriately. The Commission itself may then opt to take certain "promotional" measures to highlight the abuses discussed, without exercising any
sort of formal adjudicatory role. These may include the preparation of a special study or report on the matter, the issuing of
a press release, a request for responsive information from the
state, or the preparation of general recommendations directed
to the OAS member state at issue or to member states more
38 1
generally.
Over the last two years social rights advocates have
presented general hearings before the Commission on a variety of important issues, including justiciability standards for social rights claims, the right to adequate housing in North
America, the right to food in distinct countries of the region,
labor rights in Mexico and the southern cone, the slave trade,
the condition of migrant laborers, the rights of indigenous
peoples, the effects of extractive industries on indigenous peoples, the situation of HIV/AIDS and budgets in the region,
379. For the rules on requesting a general hearing, see IACHR Rules of
Procedure, supra note 23, art. 64. Requests must generally be submitted no
latter than two months in advance of the session.
380. The rules for both types of hearings are set out in id. arts. 59-68.
381. These responses parallel those the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights is able to take in response to information
presented to it, either in "days of general discussion" or through the periodic reporting process.
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contamination of human settlements from regional garbage
dumps, and the human rights impacts of free trade agreements. 38 2 Each of these issues was approached from a framework perspective, often tied to exemplary case-studies, but not
to a particular victim or concrete controversy. Information
and general assessment was thus offered to the Commission
for use in its general promotional and adjudicatory work in
stimulating respect and observance of human rights in the region.
The "hearings" tool is extremely important for economic,
social, and cultural rights advocacy, especially when used in
conjunction with discrete litigation initiatives involving narrow, concretized examples of the larger abuses discussed in
hearings. It allows advocates to raise regional awareness about
issues of grave concern, stimulating media interest and organizing constituencies on the ground. It also serves as an opportunity to interact directly with the members and staff of the
system's organs in an effort to raise their awareness about, and
sensitivity to, concrete violations of economic, social, and cultural rights in the region. This, in turn, may help lay the
ground-work for litigation in the social rights field, highlighting to the Commissioners the importance and gravity of the
issues at stake. It may also be used to complement ongoing
litigation that tackles one discrete aspect of the broader, more
structural, or diffuse problem addressed in the thematic hearing. In this way, the promotional and adjudicatory functions
of the Commission, though jurisdictionally distinct, are dynamically linked and should be used in concurrent and complimentary fashion by advocates in supporting efforts to protect economic, social, and cultural rights on the ground.
2.

Onsite Visits, Reports, Press Releases, Special Rapporteurs

Also of extreme importance is the ability to request that
Commissioners and Commission staff undertake onsite visits to
areas where human rights abuse has occurred. In this way,
they may speak directly to victims, appreciate firsthand the ac382. Minutes or records of these hearings are not formally published, but
rather are considered "internal working documents of the Commission."
IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 23, art. 68. Audio transcripts are
made available to the parties upon request. Id. This author participated in
or observed each of the above hearings.
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tual conditions in which people live and interact, and thereby
be in a better position to decide concrete cases involving economic, social, and cultural rights. In a related manner, these
onsite visits often lead to the production of special country or
thematic reports that highlight the key findings of the Commission in relation to particular types of abuse, including
those within the field of economic, social, and cultural rights.
The Commission often follows up on these visits by issuing
press releases covering the nature and findings of their visits
or, sometimes, by issuing a special country or thematic report.
These are often critical tools in local efforts to organize and
mobilize around particular human rights abuses.
In a related manner, each of the seven members of the
Commission serves as Country and Thematic Rapporteurs.
Over the last several years the Commission has had thematic
rapporteurships in some or all of the following areas: women's rights, children, indigenous peoples, persons deprived
of liberty, refugees, migrant workers and their families, freedom of expression, and, most recently, racial discrimination
and the rights of persons of African descent. A new rapporteurship on economic, social, and cultural rights is under
consideration at this writing. Each of these rapporteurships
can be used strategically-through onsite visits, the preparation of special reports or studies, or the issuance of general
recommendations or observations-to focus national and international attention on distinct contours of human rights
abuse at the local level and, particularly, on the special measures required to address such abuses as they effect groups in
particularly vulnerable situations.
3.

Periodic State Reporting & Shadow Reports

Both the American Convention and the San Salvador Protocol, moreover, envision periodic state reporting mechanisms
on the progressive measures taken and setbacks encountered
3 83
in the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights.
These mechanisms, once effectively implemented, can play an
important role in further refining the system's understanding
of how and why economic, social, and cultural rights are violated. That is, periodic reporting processes serve critical roles
383. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 42; San Salvador Protocol, supra note 77, art. 19.1.
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in drawing the attention of governments, civil society, and international supervisory bodies to the ways in which rights are
in fact achieved or not achieved on the ground. By monitoring
indicatorsof rights achievement (e.g., infant mortality rates, access to potable water, ratios of HIV-AIDS treatment to need,
etc.), reporting processes can alert governments and civil society to problem areas-for example, where indicators are "regressing" or stagnant-as well as to areas where progress is being made, and hence where "best practices" may be identified.
Through consultation between government and civil society,
benchmarks can then be set for the achievement over the population, within distinct time-frames, of certain levels of rights
enjoyment. Although state failure to "progress" in indicators
or to achieve benchmarks at agreed intervals (as breaches of
quadrant 3 and 4 duties) cannot in themselves constitute ajusticiable basis for litigation, 38 4 such failure is often relevant in
establishing the context in which discrete violations of ajusticiable nature do take place. In this way, state periodic reporting
procedures promise useful synergistic effects in the individual
petitions process, even while serving far broader purposes of a
political-promotional nature.
Unfortunately, both mechanisms have laid effectively dormant since 1979 and 1999 when the two instruments entered
into effect. In 2005, the OAS General Assembly issued Resolution 2074 (XXXV-O/05) calling for the establishment of a
Working Group under the San Salvador Protocol to monitor
states progressive realization of the economic, social, and cultural rights enshrined therein. Although there are many
troublesome aspects to the envisioned Working Group-such
as its functioning within the Inter-American Commission on
Integral Development, rather than the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-advocates will have to work tirelessly to turn this procedure into one that is useful for both
monitoring and adjudicatory work in the field of economic,
social, and cultural rights.

384. Litigant attempts to advance such arguments-pressing for the adjudicability of social rights in their collective and result-oriented dimensions-currently constitutes, in this author's view, one of the most formidable obstacles to regular and effective judicial enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights.
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4. Advisory Opinions
Finally, advocates may seek advisory opinions from the
Commission or Court as to the compatibility with treaty-based
human rights commitments of broad policies, laws, or practices that affect the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights in OAS member states. 38 5 The Court, in particular, has broad powers under its advisory jurisdiction vis-a-vis social rights: It is empowered to interpret any treaty dealing with
the protection of human rights that is applicable to the American states, including assessing the compatibility of domestic
legislation or trade agreements therewith. 38

6

Authoritative

guidance may thus be requested from the Court on the regional impact of specific norms of the ICESCR, the San Salvador Protocol, the full spectrum of ILO Conventions, CEDAW,
and many others. Indeed, the Court has stated that it's advisory jurisdiction is "more extensive than that enjoyed by any
international tribunal in existence today" and that, given this,
the Court has "an important role to play in the promotion and
protection of economic, social and cultural rights. '38 7 The
Commission also has important advisory powers, 38 8 although it
385. Advocates may not request an advisory opinion directly. With respect
to the Court's advisory jurisdiction, only OAS member states, the Commission, or other organs of the OAS (within their spheres of competence) may
do so. Congruently, only OAS member states may request the advisory services of the Commission. Advocates may, however, actively lobby or petition
these states and OAS organs to submit advisory requests that seek to clarify
key human rights concerns in the region. See American Convention, supra
note 23, art. 62.2.
386. See id. art. 64.1. As the Court has recognized, the advisory jurisdiction
conferred upon the Court by Convention article 64 "can be exercised, in
general, with regard to any provision dealing with the protection of human
rights set forth in any international treaty applicable to the American States,
regardless of whether it be bilateral or multilateral, whatever by the principal
purpose of such a treaty, and whether or not non-Member States of the Inter-American system are or have the right to become parties thereto."
"Other Treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, OC-1/82,
52 (1982).
387. Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 1986, at 44-45, 14, OEA/Ser.L/III.15 Doc. 13 (Aug.
29, 1986).
388. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 41.e (empowering the
Commission "to respond . . . to inquiries made by the member states on
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has tended not to exercise them on a formal basis, preferring
to direct requests for advisory opinions to the Court.
While advisory opinions are not directly binding on any
particular state, they provide useful guidance on how human
rights principles must be incorporated into distinct state policies as a function of states' obligations under international
human rights law, quadrants 1-4 inclusive. This authoritative
guidance may be invoked, in turn, in both promotional and
adjudicatory work at the domestic and international levels in
support of economic, social, and cultural rights.
VI.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAVALLARO-SCHAFFER

LEss-As-MoRE THESIS
This Article has concentrated to this point on the conceptual and jurisdictional difficulties in the Cavallaro-Schaffer
less-as-more thesis. Nevertheless, it is the practical implications of the thesis for effective on-the-ground protection of economic, social, and cultural rights that should most concern
regional human rights advocates. Three important dangers
must be highlighted in this respect. 3 9 The first is the significant underbreadthof coverage in human rights protection that
the "elements" proposal entails, especially in its narrowest version. That is, exclusive reliance on the classically-understood
civil-political "elements" of social rights abuse means, in practice, that the focus of litigation initiatives-and, consequently,
of the remedial response-frequently targets areas tangential
to the core abuse. As a result, the social rights violation itself
often remains unvindicated. This has important consequences
not only for the individual victims of discrete social rights violations, who are denied a fully effective remedy in the context
of their case, but also for similarly-situated non-litigants who
are likewise denied the protective benefit of remedial measures tailored to guarantee against future repetition of casespecific but often more widely experienced abuses.
matters related to human rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to
provide those states with the advisory services they request").
389. Other dangers arise that will not specifically be covered here. For
more on the practical implications of associating the quadrant 4 duty of
.progressive realization" exclusively with economic, social and cultural
rights, see A Pyrrhic Victory, supra note 17.
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Second, given the unique specificity of rights in addressing from distinct dimensions all aspects of human dignity,
heavy reliance on expansive interpretations of civil-political
rights norms to redress violations of economic, social, and cultural rights risks real and meaningful norm dilutionwith respect
to the small category of rights invoked exclusively in litigation.
Thus, the "integration" or "elements II" approach, when used
exclusively, can lead not only to insufficient protections of the
contours of social rights abuse-which rarely can be interrogated fully through the broader generic "umbrella" protections-but also to a weakening of classic civil-political rights,
which can lose their specificity and grow at a rate that exceeds
local level expectations and commonly-held normative understandings. This, in turn, can lead to a loss of legitimacy in the
work of the supervisory body, whose decisions may be viewed
as "visionary" and not adhering to consensus-based understandings of the scope and content of rights, even as those un390
derstandings progressively evolve.
The third relates to litigant reliance on a stylized understanding of civil-political rights as immediately enforceable in
their result-based dimensions. Such a view reinforces claims of
absoluteness in human rights protection that ignore the legitimate rights of others, the reasonable limitations facing the
state, and the general welfare in a democratic society. It is this
absolutist approach to rights-not the nature of any particular
right-that leads to the much-maligned "queue-jumping" concerns that Cavallaro and Schaffer reference, as well as to other
counter-majoritarian critiques of judicial intervention in
human rights matters. Effective protection of economic, social
and cultural rights in the region requires that advocates avoid
all three of these litigation hazards.

390. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights currently walks this line
closely. The problem is accentuated by the regular use of "separate votes" by
several of the Court's judges, often employed as a vehicle to pontificate abstractly on personal views of international law and visionary paths for the
future. These personal reflections may at times be confused with interAmerican law or recited by advocates as semi-authority for increasingly
broad, often ungrounded interpretations. See, e.g., Separate Opinion, supra
note 172.
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Framing Violations Exclusively in their "Civil-Political
Elements": Obscuring Core Social Rights Abuse
and Diverting Remedial Attention

This Article firmly supports "mixed" approaches to social
rights litigation. 3 9 1 That is, within the constraints of a concrete case, advocates should not limit themselves artificially to
certain "dimensions" or "elements" of rights-a strategy that
in fact undermines, rather than respects, indivisibility doctrine. Rather, once a concrete situation of abuse is identified,
advocates should address frontally each of the human rights
factually implicated therein. Only in this way may proper attention be drawn to the complex and intersecting ways in
which abuse is generated in discrete factual contexts and circumstances. This, in turn, will allow authoritative judicial assessments to be made of the unlawfulness of the contours of
abuse, and hence the issuance of merits-based remedies that
address those contours directly, and around which broader advocacy initiatives may be organized.
The elements approach advocated by Cavallaro and Schaffer urges advocates to neglect these important contours, focusing instead on the civil-political "elements" of social rights
abuse: the death in a landslide, the killing of labor or peasant
leaders who struggle for land reform. While this approach is
characterized as being "cautious" and "responsible," it in fact
often distorts the primary issues at play in a given concrete
controversy, diverting critical organizing, media, and legal attention away from solutions for the social rights violations
themselves, toward remedies narrowly tailored to address the
classic civil-political issues. It also reinforces the view that the
killings or deaths are "human rights violations" while the land
abuses, housing evictions, school dismissals and lack of reasonable access to healthcare are mere "context" or "political issues." 39 2 To the victims of social rights abuse left out of corre391. See also PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 117-21, 193-357 (advocating
mixed approach to social rights litigation).
392. Indeed, Cavallaro-Schaffer elements approach I is predicated on the
notion that economic, social and cultural rights abuses should be viewed as
the "underlying factors giving rise to violations of civil or political rights,"
Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 272 (emphasis added), and otherwise
reserved to non-litigation political strategies.
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sponding remedial solutions, the strategy can be anything but
responsible.
This difficulty is demonstrated in the "test cases" Cavallaro
and Schaffer offer, most of which require a person to have died
before any redress may be pursued for violation of the rights
to housing, to health, or to food-rights which have far broader
and more nuanced contours and dimensions than "life" in its
narrowest physiological sense. Such a focus narrows the adjudicability of such rights exclusively to their "emergency"
right-to-life aspects, necessarily distorting the types of remedies
that follow and, in fact, making the cases harder to litigate
given the difficulties in proving causation for death on the ba39 3
sis of state omissions in the provision of goods and services.
Unfortunately, this underbreadth problem is manifest in
far too many cases adjudicated by the inter-American human
rights organs. The following two case examples illustrate the
practical underbreadth consequences of the elements I approach to social rights litigation. They involve, first, the right
to housing and associated land resources in Brazil and, second, the right to education in the Dominican Republic. In
each, a "direct" approach, combined with other approaches,
would in fact have been the more advisable strategy for keeping state, media, and civil society attention effectively focused
on the core underlying social rights abuses and, consequently,
for ensuring on-the-ground reform.
1.

Corumbiarav. Brazil

Corumbiara v. Brazil39 4 involved a state-sponsored forced
eviction of five hundred impoverished families of landless
workers from an unproductive, privately-owned farm in Northern Brazil. The families, without access to employment, credit,
or land, had illegally occupied the farm in response to the
massive land shortage in Brazil, a problem resulting from the
country's highly concentrated land ownership pattern-one of
393. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. The Commission, influenced by the
Court's "reflections" in the Five PensionersCase has, in one recent admissibility report, taken a halting step down this dangerous path. See Luis Rolando
Cuscul Pivaral and Others Affected by H1V/AIDS v. Guatemala, Petition
642/05, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 32/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5
42-44 (2006).
394. Corumbiara v. Brazil, Case 11.556, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 77/
98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev., at 62 (1998).
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the most unequal in the world-and extreme slowness and
constant delays in land reform. According to the evictees,
ownership of a small parcel of land represented one of their
few hopes for surviving in dignity, far from the poverty of urban areas and from the abusive exploitation of cheap labor by
39 5
the large landowners in rural areas.
Brazilian authorities responded by sending in heavilyarmed military police to assist private security guards paid for
by local landowners in forcefully ejecting the squatters, pursuant to a local judge-issued eviction order. In a surprise night
ambush, faces painted black, they violently evicted the families
using brutal and excessive force. At least nine squatters were
killed, most shot in the back or at close range, and over one
hundred were wounded as a result of the violent confrontation. The entire settlement, including all of the evictees' belongings, was then destroyed and set ablaze. Although they
had nowhere else to go, the five hundred impoverished families were forced to abandon the otherwise unused land on
which they had settled. No plan was in place to assist them in
finding temporary housing or land resources on which they
could meet their immediate subsistence needs. To the contrary, in the view of the Brazilian state, the private property
rights of the large landowners took complete precedence over
the rights to housing, to food, and to subsistence of the five
hundred landless families. No balancing of interests was undertaken or required.
The case was presented to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Nonetheless, in a litigation strategy
closely hewing to the Cavallaro-Schaffer elements I approach,
the petitioners chose to focus narrowly only on the excessive
force used by police and, within that narrow spotlight, only to
the extent it caused unjustified physical injury or death to a
small number of the evictees. That is, they did not challenge
the forced eviction itself, which, on multiple levels, violated
the rights of all of the evictees to adequate housing and related land resources under both Brazilian and international
law. 396 Neither did they challenge the victims' right to have
395. Id. 11.
396. See, e.g., General Comment No. 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, U.N.
Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 6th Sess., Annex III, at 114, U.N. Doc.
E/1992/23 (1991); General Comment No. 7, supra note 254 (forced evic-
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access to a dignified life through access to a small parcel of
land on which they could survive. Violation of these rights
stood, uncontestedly, at the core of the underlying controversy, a controversy reproduced on a daily basis in Northern
Brazil.

3 97

Rather, the petitioners focused, narrowly and exclusively,
on the excessive physical force used in the eviction-force that
had led to the death of ten, the torture of several, and the
physical wounding of roughly four percent of the evictees. In
the view of petitioners, these were the "victims" of the forced
eviction-their right to life and right to integrity, in the narrowest sense of being killed and tortured, becoming the focus
of international litigation. In this equation, the other ninetysix percent of the evictees-those who could not show physical
wounds, but whose internationally-protected right to housing
was violated through both the illegally-undertaken eviction itself and the arbitrary and illegal destruction and deprivation
of their belongings, their homes, their security, and their dignity-fell out of the picture. They were not "victims" in the
framework of the litigation.
As a result, their Convention-guaranteed right to adequate housing and right to live a dignified life, 398 protected
under articles 26, 11, and 4, were not addressed on the merits
of the case. Had authoritative case-specific findings of fact and
law been issued on those rights, the inter-American system
tions). Brazilian legislation specifically prohibits evictions from taking place
at night-a prohibition the Commission found irrelevant to its limited inquiry. See discussion infra note 402.
397. Indeed, the case was exemplary of a systematic pattern of abuse involving land conflicts in Northern Brazil. According to reports, in 1995 (the
year of the Corumbiara forced eviction) and 1996, 1.3 million people were
involved in 1,304 separate conflicts over land, mining rights and labor issues
in Brazil's vast and lawless interior. Of the 750 conflicts in the countryside in
1996, 653 involved disputes over land ownership. SeeAmnesty International,
Brazil: Corumbiara and Eldorado de Carajds: Rural Violence, Police Brutality and

Impunity (Jan. 19, 1998), availableat http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGAMR190011998?open&of=ENG-BRA.
398. The Court has recognized that article 4 of the Convention must be
interpreted expansively as including not only a right to not be arbitrarily
deprived of life, but also to the conditions necessary for a dignified life. See,
e.g., PanchitoL6pez Case, supra note 138; Yakye Axa Case, supra note 136. For a

discussion of the development of the concept of a "dignified life" or "life
project" under article 4, see Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
Beyond Progressivity, in SociAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1.
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could have been leveraged, through a case-based controversy,
to address a discrete aspect of state policy with respect to a
social rights problem of massive proportions in Brazil. That is,
the Commission could have directly addressed the substantive
and procedural limits that regional human rights law places on
the circumstances and conditions under which housing and
land evictions, particularly of landless families with no access
to alternative accommodation, may lawfully take place in the
Americas. While no judicial order can solve Brazil's complex
and imposing land problems, a supranational order finding
that Brazil had exceeded those limits in the context of this
case and recommending, as part of a targeted remedial order,
that Brazil amend its legislation to ensure that procedures
through which evictions are carried out respect not only the
rights of affected individuals to life and integrity in their narrowest of senses, but also their rights to adequate housing and
to a dignified life more generally, could have functioned to
galvanize the national debate in Brazil on "the land problem."
Specifically, it could have focused that debate on when, and
subject to what procedural safeguards, private property rights
must cede to the rights of others and to the larger social interest.399 While Brazil would necessarily have to determine the

details of that policy for itself, a supranational order crafted in
the above terms could have stimulated a mediated process of
dialogue-between local and federal authorities in Brazil, the
case-specific victims, civil society more generally, and the interAmerican human rights organs-on how to effectively and
concretely address these problems in accordance with internationally-accepted human rights principles. The direct participation of the Commission or Court in that dialogue, through
their powers in supervising compliance with their case-based
recommendations and orders, would function to ensure that
human rights principles regarding the right to adequate housing were placed at the center of the national debate and larger
political struggle.

399. See American Convention, supra note 23, art. 21.1 ("Everyone has the
right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinatesuch
use and enjoyment to the interest of society."), art. 32.2 ("The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.").

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2006]

PETHINKING THE "LESS AS MORE" THESIS

The lost opportunity of the Corumbiaralitigation for generating framework principles and a formalized process for
stimulating discrete but meaningful forward-looking reform in
Brazil's land and eviction policies is demonstrated both by the
narrowness of the Commission's final recommendations and
by looking at how other adjudicatory bodies, adopting a "direct" approach, have dealt with similar case-based controversies in congruent factual settings. 400 In these latter settings,
the right to adequate housing has been placed at the center of
litigation initiatives, rather than being subordinated to the
narrowly-construed civil-political "elements" of the abusive situation, as in Corumbiara.
Indeed, following the extreme restrictiveness of the
Corumbiarapetitioners' claims, the Commission's conclusions
of law and formal recommendations were congruently restricted. The petitioners, for instance, recognized as "victims"
only the decedent and physically wounded evictees, relegating
to "context" the thousands of others whose homes and possessions were destroyed by the state's arbitrary conduct in carrying out the unlawful eviction. Consequently, the Commission
ordered adequate reparation exclusively for them (or their
next of kin) and exclusively in terms of the breach of their
physiological lives and bodily integrity. 40 1 Moreover, constrained to determining state responsibility for the unjustified
killings and physical abuse, the Commission's attention was diverted away from the state's direct conduct in authorizing and
undertakingthe evictions toward the state's omission in failing to
properly investigate the individual killings. These post-abuse investigatory deficiencies became the principal basis on which
state responsibility came to be grounded given that, in the
Commission's view, the use of force by the state in carrying out
the eviction could not be deemed "unjustified" while the
evictees were actively resisting. The result was an excessively
narrow set of remedial recommendations, largely limited to
the transfer of formal competence over eviction-related investigations from the military to civilian police forces. While that
400. See South Africa v. Irene Grootboom, 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 11 (S.
Mr.).

401. Corumbiara v. Brazil, supra note 394, 307(2) ("Make adequate reparation to the victims specified in this report or to their next of kin, as appropriate, for the human rights violations determined in this report.").
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narrow issue was undoubtedly important, it was tangential to
the core housing and land rights issues suffered by the five
hundred evicted families: first, the lack of adequate legislative
and other procedural protections to ensure that evictions are
carried out only when strictly necessary and only in strict accordance with the procedures established under national law
and consistent with international human rights norms; 40 2 second, the lack of a reasonable plan and effective procedures for
accessing
short-term land and housing assistance for the land3
less.

40

That these core housing-rights issues could have been addressed through the Corumbiaralitigation is illustrated by com40 4
parison with similar cases, such as South Africa v. Grootboom.
That case, decided under the "direct" approach by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, was based on specific and contextual facts virtually identical to those in Corumbiara. As in
Corumbiara, it involved a land invasion of vacant, privatelyowned property by a large group of impoverished landless
families who, given the extent of the land and housing crisis in
South Africa, had no realistic prospect of moving out of their
intolerable living conditions in their lifetimes. 40 5 As in
Corumbiara, they too faced a forcible eviction "done prematurely and inhumanely: reminiscent of apartheid-style evictions," in which their "homes were bulldozed and burnt and
their possessions destroyed.

'40 6

402. Focused on the "massacre," the Commission declined to rule on the
illegality of the eviction procedure itself. Indeed, the Commission found
that the fact that the eviction was initiated at dawn, in violation of Brazilian
law, was not relevant to its determination of whether "the use of force to
enforce judicial order of eviction was unnecessary or disproportionate." Id.
179.
403. The Commission and Court have increasingly addressed through
their case-based competence the lack of effective procedures in the region
for the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the ancestral land of indigenous communities. See, e.g., Awas Tingni Case, supra note 51; Yakye Axa Case,
supra note 136; Maya Indigenous Communities, supra note 113. This jurisprudence could have been built upon to extend the Court's case-based precedents in this area to non-indigenous groups for whom access to land is a
predicate for meeting subsistence needs.
404. See South Africa v. Irene Grootboom, supra note 399.
405. Id.
3-10.
406. Id.
10. The Constitutional Court of South Africa described the
Grootboom case in terms that could equally have been used to describe
Corumbiara:
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Yet, unlike in Corumbiara, the Court did not focus narrowly and exclusively on the brutal and excessive force used in
the "apartheid-style eviction." Rather, it addressed directly the
core issue at stake in the case: the right to adequate housing of the
evictees. Doing so, it issued one of the most respected decisions
rendered internationally on the obligations states bear to the
poorest of the landless poor who have no access to adequate
housing, are living in intolerable conditions, and, because of
those intolerable living conditions, are impelled to resort to
land invasions.
Corumbiara and Grootboom thus stand in stark contrast.
The former, litigated under the limited elements I approach,
bypassed entirely the land and housing issues faced by the
squatters in its findings of fact and law and, hence, in its remedial order. The only specific policy change it recommended
was a transfer of competence over investigations from one police
force to another. By contrast, the latter, litigated under a "direct" approach, addressed the housing and land issues headon. The remedial order required the state to amend its national housing policy so that it catered not only to mediumand long-term land and housing needs, but also ensured shortterm "relief for people who have no access to land, no roof
over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions
or crisis situations. '40 7 Though the specific details of that policy would be left to the state to craft in the first instance,
prompted and prodded by organized civil society, the Grootboom court sought to ensure that the state addressed not only
the inhumane and excessive force used so frequently in evictions, but also, more fundamentally, the preconditions-the
intolerable living conditions and lack of available land-that
impel people to resort to land invasions in the first place.
Clearly, while people lack access to the means necessary
for their survival there will be no end to land invasions in BraThe group of people with whom we are concerned in these proceedings lived in appalling conditions, decided to move out and
illegally occupied someone else's land. They were evicted and left
homeless. The root cause of their problems is the intolerable conditions under which they were living while waiting in the queue for
their turn to be allocated low-cost housing. They are the people
whose constitutional rights have to be determined in this case.
Id. 3.
407. Id. 99(2).
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zil, South Africa, or anywhere else. Transferring competence
over investigations and taking measures to ensure that "excessive" physical force is not used (addressed exclusively in
Corumbiara) will not remedy the underlying human rights
problem: lack of effective procedures for accessing adequate housing and land, necessary for basic subsistence and human dignity. The South African Constitutional Court, recognizing this
reality, has since reaffirmed the principle that, subject to recognized exceptions, governments have the obligation to reasonably ensure that replacement housing or alternative land is
available for evictees to settle, whether temporarily or permanently, before eviction orders are carried out. 40 8 Meanwhile,

states cannot foist the burden of accommodating the landless
entirely on private property-holders. 40 9 Rather, if alternative
accommodation cannot reasonably be found for squatters unlawfully occupying private lands, the state must identify other
ways to satisfy its parallel duties to the landed and landless,
such as by compensating private landowners for the temporary
"taking" of their property while alternative accommodation is
being located, or by formally expropriating for public use the
private property at issue, respecting legal safeguards for the
property owner. 4 10 Based on these important rulings, local
courts have been declining in many instances to issue eviction
orders against homeless or landless persons on vacant lands
until the state complies with its obligations to take appropriate
measures to ensure the rights of potential evictees. 4 11
Faced with a discrete controversy between the competing
rights of the landed and the landless, the Grootboom court thus
engaged in a balancing test, establishing an equitable and
transparent legal principle that government officials must take
into account in setting land, housing, and zoning policiesand thus around which the landed and landless can gain legal
certainty, broader social movements may organize, and future
litigation may depart. By contrast, the Commission in
Corumbiara,given the narrowness of petitioners' elements I ar408. See President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors. v. Modderklip
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Mr.).
409. Id. 45 ("It is unreasonable for a private entity such as Modderklip to
be forced to bear the burden which should be borne by the state of providing the occupiers with accommodation.").
410. Id. 51; see also discussion of appropriate relief, id.
53-65.
411. See, e.g., City of Cape Town v. Rudolph, 2005 (5) SA 39 (C) (S. Mr.).
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guments, did not address the basic conflict between competing rights-holders. The implication drawn-and that will not
have been lost upon stakeholders-is that the private property
rights of large landowners prevail over the housing and subsistence rights of the landless.
2.

Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic

Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, decided by the
Inter-American Court in 2005,412 provides another example of
how the narrow elements approach can lead to lost opportunities for effective social rights protection. A right-to-education
case at heart, it involved the arbitrary dismissal from public
school of a young, disadvantaged Dominican girl for failure to
present a birth certificate, a document denied her on account
of her Haitian ancestry. Consequently, the thirteen-year old
girl, arbitrarily prevented from attending middle school, was
left with no educational recourse other than to attend night
literacy classes for adults. State responsibility for violation of
her right to education was incontrovertible on these facts and
constituted the core issue in the case, especially from the perspective of the keenly-motivated girl who viewed schooling as
the key to her future and the primary means of overcoming
her family's impoverishment.
Nonetheless, despite the plain protection of the right to
education under article 26 of the American Convention, 413 the
Court bypassed the extensive briefing and testimonial evidence presented to it regarding the state's direct breach,
through its arbitrary conduct, of that right. Rather, in line
with the elements I approach, it focused narrowly only on the
412. See Yean and Bosico Girls Case, supra note 109.
413. Article 26 protects the rights derived from the economic, social, and
cultural standards set forth in the OAS Charter, among which the "right to
education" is expressly included. See OAS Charter, supra note 124, art. 49
("The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance with their
constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education, on the following bases: a) Elementary education, compulsory for children of school age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it.
When provided by the State it shall be free of charge; b) Middle-level education ... c) Higher education ....

.") (emphasis added).

The right to educa-

tion is also guaranteed in express terms under the Constitution of the Dominican Republic for all persons within the state's jurisdiction, as it is in
virtually all political constitutions in the hemisphere.
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civil-political aspects of the case associated with the denial of
the birth certificate: the rights to nationality,
to equal protec4 14
tion, to a name, and to legal personality.
The tragedy of the case is that without a clear finding on
the merits of state responsibility for breach of the girl's right to
education, that critical violation remained unvindicated and
unremedied on a practical level. That is, while the Court's final and binding order required the state to adopt all necessary
measures to reform its procedures for the granting of birth certificates, it was silent on the necessary reforms to the regulatory
norms governing public school registration,i.e., the deficient regulatory framework that had initially authorized and permitted
the direct violation by state agents of the girl's protected right
to education. Thus, no reparation order was issued either to
repair the personal harm caused by the young girl's arbitrary
school dismissal or to ensure that similar violations do not recur in the future to other young people on the same grounds.
That is, there was no order for appropriate sanctions to be
taken against the school officials responsible for authorizing
the arbitrary dismissal, for state recognition through a public
act that the girl's right to education had been violated, or for
the modification of educational policy to prohibit the use of
arbitrary grounds-including possession of a birth certificate
where alternative forms of identification are available-to justify school dismissals. Again, exclusive reliance on a narrow elements approach neither aided the cause of social rights nor
led to "more" implementation on the ground for those rights.
To the contrary, it ignored the social rights aspect entirely,
providing no basis or point of leverage upon which local social
movements could continue to build and advocate domestically
to ensure against further arbitrary abuses of the right to educa41 5
tion for all persons within the Dominican Republic.

414. The Court considered her denial of education exclusively at the stage

of reparations for purposes of fixing appropriate pecuniary compensation.
See Yean and Bosico Girls Case, supra note 109,
244.
415, Given the acute political tension associated with Haitian immigration
in the Dominican Republic, a focus on the right to education may in fact
have assisted implementation of the Court's order by serving to diffuse local
volatility around "nationality" issues, acting as a focal point around which
broader constituencies could have organized from a less-politicized vantage.
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Expansive Interpretation of Classic Civil-PoliticalRights:
Norm-Dilution and Underbreadth

A second practical danger arising from the CavallaroSchaffer thesis relates to the second variant of their elements
approach. As discussed in Part II, Cavallaro and Schaffer bundle under their "elements" terminology several distinct strategies, each carrying significantly different implications for
human rights enforcement. While the first, exemplified by
Corumbiara and Yean, envisions culling from a complex situation of human rights abuse only those abuses of a classic civilpolitical nature and litigating them through narrow interpretations of civil-political rights norms, the second strategy envisions litigating the economic-social-cultural abuses directly,
but through expansive interpretations of civil-political rights.
Given limits to the elasticity of such norms, this latter strategy
carries its own underbreadth problems, while also raising distinct concerns about norm dilution with respect to civil and
political rights. These latter rights, under the elements model,
are compelled to absorb the full impact of economic, social,
and cultural rights litigation in the Americas.
In light of the indivisible and interdependent nature of
rights, this latter approach is unproblematic, and indeed entirely proper, in the ample spectrum of cases in which classic
social rights abuses correspond directly to breaches of rights
that have traditionally been interpreted as "civil and political"-like property (for land claims), association (for union
freedoms), involuntary servitude (for labor exploitation), inviolability of the home (for evictions or other housing infringements), and neutral "process" norms (like due process, judicial protection, and non-discrimination). 4 16 In all of these
cases, "expansive" interpretations are not necessary; a mere
textual approach is sufficient, linked with a consensus-based
4 17
evolutionary principle.
Problems arise, however, in the equally ample set of cases
in which classic civil-political rights cannot easily or naturally
be extended to embrace all aspects of core social rights abuse
as experienced by victims. In those circumstances, either the
416. Such an approach is particularly indispensable in those jurisdictions
that, unlike the inter-American system, do not autonomously protect economic, social and cultural rights.
417. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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relevant social rights abuse must be ignored (leading to underbreadth problems) or the civil-political rights privileged in litigation must be stretched beyond consensus-based understandings of their scope and content. This is particularly problematic in attempts to litigate concrete violations involving
adequacy, availability, accessibility, and quality as core components of the rights to health, education, and housing. These
contours, as experienced by victims in discrete contexts, often
cannot be captured by the broadness of "life," "integrity,"
"property," or "participation"-at least not without norm dilution or underbreadth of coverage. The right to health, for example, has distinct dimensions-including physical accessibility, cultural adequacy, and quality goods and services-that
often cannot sufficiently be targeted or addressed under a
broad undifferentiating "right to life" analysis. The same is
true of the right to culture for indigenous populations. That
right goes beyond ties to property; it must be dealt with on its
own terms, as both an autonomous and transversal right. The
integration or elements II approach is thus insufficient as an
exclusive strategy for addressing violations of social rights in
the Americas.
The problem of limited elasticity of civil-political-rights
norms also raises the distinct specter of norm dilution, as these
rights are interpreted in increasingly expansive ways to cover
core elements of social rights abuse. The consequences are
particularly dire for the right to life, a norm the Court already
interprets in its most expansive sense as a right to "a dignified
life' or to "a ife project," understood as "the measures required
for life to develop under decent conditions."418 These concepts are of potentially illimitable scope, capable of subsuming
into their protective embrace virtually all nationally and internationally recognized human rights. Article 4 of the Convention has already, in fact, been interpreted by the Court to encompass, in some way, virtually all economic, social, and cultural rights, including decent health care, education, access to

418. Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, OC-17/02, 80 (2002). For an analysis of the development and status up to early 2006 of this jurisprudence, see
Melish, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in SociAL RIGHTs JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1.
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potable water, and adequate food. 4 19 Caution must be exer-

cised in going too far with these expansive interpretations.
That is, care must be taken to ensure that rights and obligations in the system have predictable consequences for states
and that the right to life does not become a free-for-all provision, implicated by default in all human rights abuses that affect a person's "dignity" or "life prospects." The Court has to
date enunciated no limiting principle for article 4's normative
expanse. 420 Going too far will lead to decisions that appear
arbitrary, "visionary," and lacking a "basis in law," precisely the
sorts of cases that lead to classic legitimacy problems. 42'
By contrast, a properly implemented "direct" approach
would advance by hewing closely to the normative (contourspecific, contextually-based) development that has already
been achieved at the domestic and regional levels with respect
to the rights to adequate health, education, housing, and so419. See, e.g., Panchito L6pez Case, supra note 138,
173-74 (focusing on
state's obligations to guarantee health and education under article 4); Yakye
Axa Case, supra note 136, 78 (highlighting state's obligation under article 4
to ensure "right to adequatefood, to access to clean water and to health attention,"
particularly with regard to children and the elderly) (emphasis added).
420. The jurisprudential dangers attendant to the Court's "life project"
approach have not yet fully materialized in the Court's work. This is due to
the limited number and complex nature of the social rights cases the Court
has considered to date. Indeed, from Panchito Ldpez (children's detention
facility), to Plan de Sdnchez (annihilation of indigenous community), to Yakye
Axsa (intolerable living conditions of displaced indigenous community), the
violation of rights in these cases have been so sweeping, diffuse and all-encompassing as to, in many ways, transcend individual treatment of specific
rights. In these exceptional circumstances, in which the totality of conditions necessary for a dignified existence is lacking and unentangling specific
violations largely impossible, the Court's "life project" jurisprudence constitutes, in many ways, the most appropriate and effective jurisprudential response. In these cases the heft of the Court's response must be directed to
the remedial order. See, e.g., Panchito L6pez, supra note 138; Plan de Sdnchez,
supra note 173, Yakye Axsa, supra note 136. Most social rights cases, however,
do not fit into this exceptional rubric. As such, the Court's "life project"
jurisprudence, as a methodology, is inadequate for dealing with the vast bulk
of run-of-the-mill, but nuanced, economic, social, and cultural rights claims
that arise in the American continent on a daily basis. These claims need to
be addressed for what they are: claims for protection against arbitrary or
unreasonable conduct, imputable to the state, that concretely harms persons' enjoyment of their individually-held rights to health, education, housing, employment, or culture.
421. See supra notes 290, 390 & accompanying text.
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cial security. Such developments must be informed and supplemented by internationally-articulated normative developments,
while not being dominated or replaced by them. 422 In this way-

supranational litigation of economic, social, and cultural
rights may properly attend to basic separation-of-powers, subsidiarity, and other legitimacy considerations, while simultaneously ensuring its effectiveness by preserving the distinct identity and dimensionality of each internationally-recognized
human right. In this way, supranational litigation may effectively address the vital contours of human rights abuse as it is
personally experienced, in discrete and diverse factual contexts, by victims on the ground.
C. Absolute Claims: Queue-Jumping and the Rights of Others
A third practical danger in the Cavallaro-Schaffer approach to social rights litigation arises from the consequences
of putting into effect the understanding of civil and political
rights as "immediately enforceable" in adjudicatory contexts in
their result-based dimensions. That is, like many advocates of
422. Cavallaro and Schaffer make the mistake of ad,0cating the linking of
inter-American jurisprudence to "trends in international... law" rather than
to what is happening in terms of norm development at the domestic level.
See supra note 289. The European Court of Human Rights avoids this error
through use of its "margin of appreciation" doctrine, a doctrine through
which it mediates the scope of its supervisory powers vis-,A-vis the scope of
discretion vested in national authorities for the definition, interpretation,
and application of basic human rights. By effectively pinning itself to a European consensus principle that looks to legal developments at the national
and regional levels-rather than relying on its own autonomous interpretation of Convention provisions, divorced from on-the-ground realities-the
Court slowly legitimizes regional human rights consensus, absorbing and
emanating social change as it develops on the ground, among states that are
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. In this way, it consistently maintains its legitimacy as a supranational human ights court. For
an excellent discussion of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION, supra note 4, at 50-117. Given the weaker levels of
democracy in the American region, it is not self-evident that the inter-American human rights organs should follow this distinctly European path in all
circumstances. Nonetheless, the processes of legitimization and consensus
formation that underlie the European Court's approach to its supervisory
powers are equally important in the inter-American region. Indeed, they are
necessary to ensure real-world, on-the-ground change for victim communities; any rational approach to supranational litigation of social rights must
attend to them closely.
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the exclusive use of civil-political rights, Cavallaro and Schaffer
embrace the rhetorical view that these rights are non-contingent and absolute. They contrast this with economic, social,
and cultural rights, which, subject to progressivity and resource constraints, are better left to political processes of super-vision, mediation, and control. It is, in fact, precisely on
the basis of this rhetorical and stylized view of rights that they
advocate their "elements approach," reasoning that it is only
through civil-political rights that social rights can be made "immediately enforceable" and hence amenable to judicial process.

42 3

While the corresponding duties attendant to civil and political rights are undeniably immediate in their conduct-based
dimensions (as they are with respect to economic, social, and
cultural rights), the practical danger of the Cavallaro-Schaffer
thesis lies in its inappropriate application of the "immediacy"
tag to the result-based dimension of individually-held civil and
political rights (quadrant 2). Thus, states have an immediate
obligation to "ensure" individually-held civil and political
rights in an absolute,factual sense, this being true whether such
norms are interpreted narrowly (under elements I) or expansively (under elements II).424

The problem with this approach (beyond the causationrelated justiciability errors it implies) lies in its denial of the
legitimate restrictions and the necessary balancing between
competing rights that attend all rights enforcement. No right
is absolute, whether civil-political or social. As both the American Declaration and American Convention make clear, "[t]he
rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare,

423. Contending that advocates and policymakers have been "incapable of
imposing immediate obligationson states to protect and ensure economic, social, and cultural rights," Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 222 (emphasis added), and that the economic, social and cultural rights guaranteed in
Convention article 26 lack "concrete duties" and are "unenforceable," id. at
225 & 268, they commend a litigation strategy based on incorporating "economic, social, and cultural elements within the scope ofjusticiable civil and
political rights .

. " Id. at 263.

424. This is made clear in their proposed hypothetical "test cases." See id.
at 274-80.
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in a democratic society." 4 25 These legitimate restrictions, as
they apply to individually-held rights in discrete factual contexts, must be determined through balancing processes that
take the rights of others and the reasonable capacities of the
state directly into account. Indeed, the balancing between
competing rights and obligations in concrete factual contexts
is the core task of supranational adjudicatory bodies, as it is
with national ones.
In this sense, while civil-political rights advocates have
long insisted on the rhetorical notion that civil-political rights
are non-negotiable and absolute, rarely has that view been accepted by courts in practice. Where it has-where rights have
been judicially viewed as absolute entitlements irrespective of
context, resource constraints, and the competing rights of
others-the inevitable result has been countermajoritarian critique and unjustified queue-jumping. This latter concept refers to the strategy of using rights-based litigation as a tool to
jump to the head of the line of all those entitled to receive a
given entitlement, unfairly displacing those higher-ranked on
a waiting list. Cavallaro and Schaffer cite both grounds as general reasons to avoid social rights litigation and to prefer alternative, non-adjudicatory mechanisms for protecting economic,
social, and cultural rights. 42 6 What they fail to recognize is
that it is not the nature of any particular right that gives rise to
these concerns in the first place. It is advocates' absolutist understanding of rights as immediately-enforceable entitlements

that does. Indeed, queue-jumping succeeds only to the extent
adjudicatory bodies accept the notion that individual rights
are absolute entitlements, irrespective of the rights of others in
a democratic society.
Clearly, neither the removal of autonomous social rights

from the contentious competence of courts nor the reframing
of social-rights claims as "absolute" civil-political-rights claims
will have any effect on the queue-jumping potential of human
rights litigation. To the contrary, these "solutions" simply
reproduce the concerns they purport to avoid. The underly425. American Convention, supra note 23, art. 32.2; American Declaration, supra note 78, art. 28 ("The rights of man are limited by the rights of
others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare
and the advancement of democracy.").
426. See supra note 19.
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ing problem must be addressed. This can be achieved
through two interrelated mechanisms: a realistic recognition
of the judicially-enforceable content of rights and proper design
of remedial orders.
First, rights may only be enforced in distinct adjudicatory
settings to the extent they have judicially-enforceable counterpart obligations. A proper appreciation of the judicially-enforceable content of rights in the inter-American system
would, therefore, recognize the distinction between quadrant
1 and quadrant 2 duties, and apply only the former to rightsbased claims. This recognition is important for queue-jumping concerns in that quadrant 1 duties require that states do
only what is reasonable or appropriatein the circumstances to
respect and ensure individually-held rights. What is "reasonable" with respect to a given individual in a given context will
necessarily depend on what the state is doing to ensure respect
for the rights of others and what the legitimate constraints facing the state are. That is, it is this "reasonable conduct" inquiry that delimits the proper scope of enforceable rights in adjudicatory contexts, rather than the factual guarantee or failure to guarantee rights in their absolute sense.
The second mechanism for avoiding queue-jumping concerns in individual cases is through the proper crafting of the
remedial order. Indeed, queue-jumping cannot occur unless
courts give expression, through the remedies they order, to
rights as absolute entitlements irrespective of social and financial context. Avoiding the problem requires framing remedies
in ways that do not privilege litigants over similarly-situated
non-litigants in terms of who may access goods and services
provided by the state. This is generally achieved by requiring
that, where budgetary or other legitimate constraints prevent
full enjoyment of rights on an immediate basis, states have reasonable rights-based plans of action and waiting lists in place to

rationally establish the order of receipt of rationed goods and
services by similarly-situated individuals.
Those plans of action and waiting lists must be based on
reasonable grounds and must be implemented in a rational
non-arbitrary manner. Where this is done, however, the state
will generally have complied with its enforceable obligations
with respect to the individual. Where it is not done, a proper
remedial order would identify the deficiencies in the plan of
action or the waiting list criteria and order that the deficien-
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cies be remedied. Only where it is shown that the individual
should have received goods or services under the state's own
reasonable rationing plan would an individual order of entitlement to the good or service necessarily follow.
The important role of courts in facilitating or preventing
queue-jumping through their remedial responses can be seen
in the distinct approaches taken by various high courts around
the world. Perhaps most starkly, the general approach to individual rights enforcement of the Constitutional Court of Colombia may be contrasted with the general approach taken by
the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the United States
Supreme Court, among others. The former high court tends,
in many of its opinions, to actively facilitate queue-jumping in
rights-based litigation. It does so by consciously ignoring resource constraints in many cases where individual litigants
claim that fundamental rights are imperiled due to lack of access to needed goods and services. It regularly orders the state
to, for example, provide immediately the health treatments
necessary to save the life or preserve the health of a given litigant before it, irrespective of cost, proportionality, or broader
implications to the health system. 427

The latter two high

courts, by contrast, actively aim to prevent queue-jumping in
their case-based jurisprudence. They generally do so by viewing individual claims for discrete remedies in the larger context of what the state is reasonably doing to ensure access to a
reasonably-moving queue within a rational plan of action. 428
427. See, e.g., Judgment T-1207/01, 16.11.2001 (Colom.); Judgment T165/95, 18.9.1995 (Colom.);Judgment No. SU-225/98, 10.3.1998 (Colom.);
Judgment T-236/98, 16.3.1998 (Colom.). The most notable of these are
those referred to as the "overseas treatment cases," in which the Constitutional Court orders the Colombian state to pay for expensive medical treatments abroad for individual litigants when their life or health is affected,
they cannot pay for the treatment themselves, and the treatment is not available in Colombia but would be effective for their health ailment.
428. See, e.g., Thiagraj Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal)
1997 (1) SA 32 (CC) at 97 (S. Afr.) (Constitutional Court of South Africa)
(affirming that appellant had enforceable right to health, but that no remedy was proper in case given that rationale guidelines for access to desired
health treatment had been established by responsible health authorities and
those guidelines had been applied in the case); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S.
581 (1999) ("If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with
mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at
a reasonable pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institu-
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The Cavallaro-Schaffer approach fails to take these remedial possibilities into account, assuming that civil-political
rights, wherever invoked, give rise to immediately-enforceable
entitlements on the part of the state. Far from aiding implementation on the ground, this view merely reinforces
prejudices against social rights as countermajoritarian, undermining the legitimacy of social rights litigation as a whole.
This is true whether those rights are framed under classic civilpolitical or classic social rights norms.
VII.

A PROPERLY-CONCErVED LESS-AS-MORE STRATEGY

Common ground is shared on an important core point:
To achieve more success on the ground in our communities we
should be doing less of what we are currently doing. 429 In

framing their less-as-more thesis, Cavallaro and Schaffer nonetheless got their "less" wrong. We do not need less social
rights litigation. And we certainly do not need less direct approach claims. What we need "less" of are claims that fail to
attend to system-specific justiciability doctrine and to subjectmatter jurisdiction constraints, that attempt to hold states accountable for harms their conduct did not proximately cause,
that subordinate social rights abuse, and that fail to recognize
the competing demands made on states' resources. In many
ways, we need "less" claims like those framed in Less as More.
Instead, we need to make sure that when we frame claims
under human rights norms for adjudication in national and
supranational instances we keep justiciability issues front and
center.
This, of course, does not mean that we step back from our
full-time advocacy and promotional work, including networking with on-the-ground partners, working with the media, negotiating with and lobbying governments, proposing new
tions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met.
In such circumstances, a court would have no warrant effectively to order
displacement of persons at the top of the community-based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who commenced civil actions."). Many
more cases from both jurisdictions could be given, but exceed the scope of
this Article.

429. See Cavallaro & Schaffer, supra note 2, at 218 ("Human rights activists
routinely presume that more is more: that more treaties, more norms, more
litigation, more laws, more expansive judgments, etc., necessarily result in
greater rights protection.").
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rights-protective legislation, coordinating promotional and litigation efforts with NGO partners, supporting civil society initiatives, engaging in social movement mobilization, and generally calling attention to human suffering in every effective way
possible. It simply means that we must be acutely aware that
the claims properly made in the political-promotional sphere
do not necessarily translate into cognizable claims in the adjudicatory sphere. We err by trying to force standards,
frameworks, and duties applicable in one into the other.
A properly-conceived less-as-more strategy would focus on
what matters in litigation contexts: jurisdiction, justiciability,
remedies, separation-of-powers, and subsidiary concerns. It
would not seek to trick governments and the courts into thinking they are dealing with "immediately enforceable" civil and
political rights-a tactic that misunderstands the nature of
state human rights obligations in adjudicatory contexts, particularly in the regional system. Rather, it would strictly limit the
number of cases presented to supranational adjudicatory bodies to those that adhered to the fundamental elements of a
jurisdictionally-proper and justiciable case-those framed in
terms of concrete injury to individualized persons, causal conduct implicating breach of a state duty held to the victim, credible allegations, and strong evidence. Beyond that, strategic
decisions between jurisdictionally proper rights must be made,
but in no case should the decision turn on whether a norm is
more classically "civil and political" or more classically "economic, social, and cultural." In the inter-American system,
that question, as a jurisdictional matter, is irrelevant.
The following brief Sections detail the principal strategic
decisions that arise in crafting a properly justiciable and jurisdictionally-appropriate social-rights case for presentation to
the inter-American human rights system.
A.

Focusing on a Justiciable Controversy: Victim Identification
and Causal Responsibility

Once a decision is made to pursue supranational litigation, a very careful assessment must be made to ensure that
any claim presented in fact conforms to the jurisdictional requirements of the adjudicating body. In the inter-American
system, this requires the establishment of a 'justiciable controversy"-i.e., a dispute involving individual injury to a protected
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right on the part of the alleged victim and causal responsibility
for that harm on the part of the defendant state. The first
strategic decision to be made, therefore, involves identification
of the contours of the controversy to be litigated. That determina-

tion, in turn, requires identification of the conduct upon
which state responsibility is allegedly based and identification
of the alleged victim.
All of these decisions should be taken in close collaboration with the affected community or group, proceeding on the
basis of a common understanding that the "case-based" jurisdiction of the Commission and Court is limited and that the
envisioned litigation should be only one small piece of a much
larger advocacy and media effort aimed at pressing state authorities-through strategies of accompaniment, consultation,
incentives, and shaming-into taking specific actions. It is useful, in this regard, to constantly keep in mind that a big case
need not be a broad one. The best judicial cases are generally
the ones that address specifically identifiable conduct and discrete facts that raise clear, uncomplicated grounds for state responsibility. Rarely should breadth and coverage be privileged
over detail and specificity in a judicial case or controversy. In
this sense, direct challenges to broad state policies or programs, including funding decisions or budgetary allocations,
should generally be avoided, and instead, cases that focus judicial radar on particular discrete instances of abuse within that

larger policy and, in particular, the concrete harms they cause
to the rights of specific individuals, should be preferred.
Once a concrete instance of abuse is identified (e.g., a
forced sterilization, a forced housing or land eviction, an arbitrary job dismissal, a negligent failure to provide treatment, an
arbitrary school dismissal), it must be verified that it occurred
on a date after which the applicable regional instrument entered into force for the state-i.e., after the state contracted its
duties to the alleged victim as rights-holder. From there, the
basis for state responsibility must be established: How, precisely,
is the state responsiblefor the discrete harm caused? To do this, a

clear understanding of state conduct-based duties must be possessed, including the rules for imputing causal responsibility
for harm to the state through its agents' unreasonable or inappropriate acts and omissions. In this regard, the easiest cases
to litigate arise where state agents themselves, through their
affirmative acts, directly caused the alleged harm. Litigation
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becomes marginally more complex where harm must be imputed to the state through the omissions of its agents-either
through their failures to take appropriate measures to prevent
privately-caused harm from occurring or to respond reasonably and with due diligence to such harm after it has occurred.
State responsibility may also arise through failures to reasonably provide goods and services to persons in need. Establishing this basis for state responsibility is straightforward where
alleged victims are heid in state custody. It is more challenging where they are not. These causation considerations and
their corresponding evidentiary burdens should play a key role
in determining which concrete abuses will be pursued through
litigation, and which will be reserved for larger political struggles. Where the more difficult bases for state responsibility are
at issue, advocates must approach the litigation with a clear
appreciation of the complexity of their claim, a precise understanding of the state legal obligation held to the individual victim vis-A-vis others in a democratic society, and a well thought
out strategy for requesting a remedy that attends to the alleged
victim's rights on par with the rights of similarly-situated nonlitigants.
Once the factual contours of a discrete controversy are
established and litigants are confident that there is a strong
case for state responsibility, the alleged victim or victims must
be identified. Where the challenged conduct has harmed
more than one person this decision should be based on a
number of factors, including, most importantly, the availability
of evidence to prove concrete injury to a protected right of the
individual (e.g., medical reports, letters of dismissal, news accounts, eye-witnesses, police reports, etc.), but also his or her
"likeability" and figurative "clean-hands," and his or her availability and willingness to pursue the claim at both political and
judicial levels. The precise number of alleged victims is not
important as long as each is specifically identified or identifiable
and concrete individualized injury can be proved affirmatively
for each. Given this latter requirement, smaller numbers
clearly ease the litigation burden and simplify the assessment
task of the adjudicatory organ, although larger numbers are
sometimes inevitable. The focus of litigation can then turn to
the crafting of an appropriate remedial order to respond to
the precise injuries exemplified by the chosen victim or victims. Such remedial orders should address both victim-spe-
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cific restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation and broader
issues of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.

Whenever, at any point, it become evident that either of
the two core justiciability requirements-concrete individualized injury and causal responsibility of the state-cannot be
established with respect to the particular contours of the controversy identified, the claim should be either amended or
dropped for pursuit through politicalmechanisms of redress.
B.

Jurisdiction and Choosing Amongst JurisdictionallyAppropriate Norms: Indivisibility and the
Shoe-that-Fits-the-Circumstances

Once ajusticiable controversy is defined, the second stage
of framing a case involves the strategic determination of which
jurisdictionalnorms will form the basis of the legal claim. In the
inter-American system, this will involve a selection of norms
primarily from either the American Declaration or the American Convention, as appropriately supplemented by other instruments over which the Commission and Court exercise jurisdiction in the particular case. In this sense, close attention
needs to be paid to the ratification history of the defendant
state with respect to the region's instruments. A claim that invokes the norms of the American Declaration with respect to a
state party to the American Convention is as jurisdictionally
improper as a claim that invokes the ICESCR or the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Likewise, litigants wishing to invoke the Protocol of San Salvador must verify that the defendant state has in fact ratified the treaty, that their claims are
limited to articles 8.1.a and/or 13, and that the alleged injury
giving rise to the claim occurred after the Protocol entered
into force for the state at issue. All of these jurisdictional issues must be closely attended at the initial stages of framing a
case for submission to the inter-American system.
Once the full set of norms jurisdictionally appropriate to
the case are determined, a strategic decision must be taken
about the litigation "approach" that will be pursued under one
or several of those norms. This decision should not follow
preconceived notions about the nature of any particular right.
Rather, it should attend to the articulated desires of the affected client group in terms of what they wish the "outcome,"
"remedial focus," or "theme" of the litigation to be and how
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this fits into their larger political strategy of redress. Given the
indivisibility and diversity of rights, a wide spectrum of strategic options is open to litigants. At least four distinct approaches to social rights litigation have been written about
elsewhere: an indirect approach, an integration approach, a
direct approach, and a complex violations approach. 43 0

All

have their strengths and weaknesses in distinct factual contexts, and are generally most effective when used in conjunction. None should be privileged a priori over others.
While the integration and direct approaches have been
the subject of this Article, special mention should be made of
the indirect approach given its strategic significance for litigation
in the region, particularly in light of legitimacy concerns. This
approach refers to the use of neutral "process" guarantees in
the regional instruments to protect social rights from substantive infringement. Specifically, it refers to the use of guarantees regarding effective judicial protection, due process, and
non-discrimination. The strength of the approach lies in the
fact that these norms apply not only to all rights protected in
the Declaration and Convention, but also to all rights recognized in the internal domestic legal order of states-i.e., irrespective of whether they are congruently protected at the international level in similar terms.
This extension is particularly significant in light of principles of subsidiarity and evolutionary processes of norm development. That is, through use of these "process" norms, supranational procedures can be used to ensure effective domestic
application of rights that are protected in more expansive ways
through national legislation than they are at the supranational
level. The benefit is that-based on a state's failure to enforce
its own democratically-adopted law-the Commission and
Court can enforce social rights guarantees without incorporating those higher protections directly into the regional human
rights instruments faster than regional consensus-based understandings will allow. From a legitimacy perspective, this ap430. See PROTECTING, supra note 7, at 193-357. This author would not include an elements approach-in its primary, narrow sense-amongst recognized approaches to protecting economic, social, and cultural rights, on the
ground that it does not purport to address, but rather expressly aims to ignore, social rights abuses in situations where they occur alongside narrowlyconstrued civil-political rights abuses.
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proach allows regional guarantees to remain a minimum floor
at which regional consensus has largely been reached, but
which national-level guarantees are free to surpass. By frequent utilization of process norms in its jurisprudence, the
Commission and Court may thus absorb and emanate social
change as it develops on the ground, slowly legitimizing a regional human rights consensus in relation to those norms,
which, when matured, can then be legitimately incorporated-through "direct" or "integration" approaches-into
the substantive provisions of the regional human rights instruments.
In this way, the various approaches to social rights litigation can and must be used together to ensure effective, casespecific, but evolving protections of economic, social, and cultural rights in the Americas. Again, in no case should civil and
political rights be a priori preferred to economic, social, and
cultural rights in making these case-specific strategic decisions.
C.

Envisioning a Remedy: Interstices and Dialogues

Litigants must also pay close attention to the remedial
stage of adjudicatory procedures. Indeed, it is the envisioned
and actual remedy that will form the basis for social movement
advocacy aimed at ensuring domestic implementation of any
final order. Advocates should thus envision the remedy they
desire from the very start of litigation. In doing so, they
should keep two central factors in mind. First, litigants should
imagine the precise contours of the remedy they would like to
see the Commission or Court issue, ensuring that they have
sufficient evidence to prove causal responsibility for each of
the necessary harms that will justify a corresponding remedial
solution. Second, litigants should conceive of remedies in a
way that will ensure that they and civil society more generally
have a continuing active role in the implementation stage.
Indeed, in crafting the remedial order adjudicatory bodies should generally distinguish between victim-specific relief
(e.g., measures of restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation) and relief that has broader, more structural effects with
foreseeable impacts beyond the victim party (e.g., measures of
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition). The details of
the former fall clearly to the determination of the supervisory
organ, based on the concrete evidence produced by the par-
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ties in adjudicatory proceedings. By contrast, subject to the
general guidelines and legal principles enunciated by the adjudicatory organ, the precise details of the latter should generally be deferred in the first instance to the "representative
branches," in consultation with the victims and subject to both
a reasonable time-frame and the organ's continuing supervisory jurisdiction.
The challenge to litigants is to ensure that, particularly in
these latter aspects, the supranational remedial order creates
the interstices necessary for civil society to remain actively involved in continually pressing the government to comply with
its human rights obligations. In the 2004 Panchito Ldpez case,
for example, the Court took an important step in requiring
not only that the state "adopt its domestic legislation," but that
it do so by elaborating, within six months and in collaboration
with civil society, "a State policy of short, medium and long-term
related to children in conflict with the law that is fully consistent with Paraguay's international commitments. ' 43 1 Participation-facilitatingorders of this kind are crucial for ensuring onthe-ground implementation of supranational judgments, given
inevitable inertia, inefficiencies, lack of coordination, and
foot-dragging by responsible implementing authorities. Social
movement mobilization is most critical here: It builds momentum and social consensus around the small apertures created
by law. The Commission and Court, moreover, each insist on
their powers to monitor compliance with their case-based recommendations or orders, maintaining supervisory jurisdiction
over them and requiring states to submit periodic reports, usually every six months or year, on the compliance measures undertaken. This continued involvement-exercised through
the organs' insistence on the receipt of periodic compliance
reports from the parties, onsite visits to the affected areas, and
working group meetings at the Commission's headquarterscan often add the extra leverage necessary for social movements and victim groups to achieve their goals on the ground.
Indeed, it is here that supranational litigation plays its
most valued role. After issuing rulings recognizing state responsibility for arbitrary or unreasonable conduct and requiring remedial action to be taken, the Commission and Court
then step into their flexible role as international monitors and
431. See Panchito Ldpez Case, supra note 138, 11 316-17.
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mediators of those adjudicated legal commitments-requiring
states to constantly report on the measures they have taken to
comply with legal decisions, to create participatory spaces for
victims and other interested parties, and to sit down periodically to assess results. On-the-ground monitoring and continual use of the rapidly-evolving compliance and supervisory
mechanisms offered by the inter-American system itself is thus
essential for rights enforcement. The challenge facing advocates in the system is to work effectively and cooperatively with
the Commission, the Court, and other actors to improve constantly these supervisory mechanisms, ensuring effective, mutually-reinforcing interaction between domestic and international social movements, advocacy efforts, media campaigns,
and monitored supervision.
D.

Working within Broader Movements

Though unrelated to their norm-based preference for
civil-political rights, Cavallaro and Schaffer's parallel insistence
on the imperative of a more concerted focus on practical onthe-ground enforcement and implementation of supranational decisions is firmly supported. Indeed, that litigationwhatever its focus-should ideally always be accompanied by
social movements, local-level follow-up, vigorous media advocacy, and national and international pressure campaigns is unquestionable. Few if any human rights organizations in the
Americas do not subscribe to, and incorporate into every litigation strategy, these well-understood practical insights.

432

While implementation strategies will vary widely according to the particular national (cultural, political, social) context, the identity and preferences 43 3 of the victims, the sophistication of corresponding social movements, the substantive is432. This does not, however, mean that they necessarily do a good job.
More can always be done-new strategies devised, more opportunities
opened, better synergies established. In this sense, Cavallaro and Schaffer
would have done better to offer case-specific practical examples of where
they feel litigants have insufficiently focused on the implementation stage
and what, given their circumstances, such litigants could have done better.
433. It is important to note that human rights !awyers, like all lawyers,
have professional duties to defend zealously their particular clients' interests. This can, at times, conflict with more general strategies to create broad,
structural "real-world" change. Human rights lawyers must walk this line
very carefully.
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sues at stake, and the precise nature of the given remedial
order, the challenge of implementation is always the same: to
go beyond rhetorical or cosmetic changes in state policy to
change the political culture that allows human rights abuses to
recur. That requires coordinated, intersecting campaigns at
domestic, regional, and international levels.
VIII.

CONCLUSION:

TAKING RIGHTS INTER-DEPENDENCE SERIOUSLY

That all human rights are "indivisible, interdependent,
and interrelated" has become the lodestar of international
human rights discourse. 43 4 While such indivisibility is insisted
upon at the rhetorical level, however, it is repeatedly undermined in practice by the persistent view that different legal
obligations apply to civil-political rights and economic-socialcultural rights. Taking rights interdependence seriously requires overcoming this conceptual hang-up and treating rights
as equal in practice as well as in name. This requires applying,
in adjudicatory and promotional contexts alike, the same legal
obligations and standards to all rights, regardless of their subjective characterization.
This Article has attempted to take a step in this direction
by drawing two clear lines. First, it has attempted to show that
there are no objective differences between economic, social,
and cultural rights, on the one hand, and civil and political
rights, on the other-from ajusticiability perspective, an obligations standpoint, or at the stage of crafting remedies. Distinctions between "immediacy" and "progressivity," as conceptual descriptors of "sets" of rights have no place in human
rights law. Rather, the proper distinctions to be drawn correspond to the dimensions of obligations (characterized here as
quadrant 1, 2, 3, and 4 duties) that apply congruently to all
rights, yet differently for purposes of judicial verses promotional enforcement. Second, this Article has aimed to demonstrate that not all claimed violations of a right over which an
adjudicatory body exercises subject-matter jurisdiction are ap434. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. World
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24
5 (1993) ("All

human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.").

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2006]

RETHINKING THE "LESS AS MORE" THESIS

propriate for judicial resolution. Rather, the focus of litigants
must be on ensuring that the cases and claims they present to
adjudicatory bodies, especially at the supranational level,
gather the elements of a 'justiciable controversy" and attend to
other core jurisdictional requirements of case-based litigation.
Any cases that fail to do so must be reserved for the political
process, including international monitoring and periodic reporting procedures.
By turning us back in the direction of decontextualized
stereotypes of rights, away from the basic technical and jurisdictional issues that accompany case-based litigation in the
human rights field, the Cavallaro-Schaffer less-as-more thesis
takes a decisive step backward in the debate on the judicial
enforceability of economic, social, and cultural rights. It is
hoped that the present "rethinking" of the less in that thesis
brings us at least back to the initial point of departure, if not
several steps beyond. This is particularly important given
ongoing efforts to create new supervisory instances at the international level with adjudicatory competence over economic, social, and cultural rights. These include, most notably, initiatives in support of the drafting of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and finalization of the soon-to-be adopted
U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
which also includes an individual complaints procedure in a
corresponding Optional Protocol. 43 5 It is imperative that the

adjudicatory functions of the corresponding instances remain
well-defined and distinct from any broader functions they may
enjoy. Indeed, once jurisdictional issues are properly taken
into account, the horizon for social rights litigation, both at
national and supranational levels, is vast.
435. This treaty, which includes a wide spectrum of economic, social and
cultural rights, was adopted on August 25, 2006 by the United Nations Ad
Hoc Committee charged with its drafting by the Commission on Human
Rights (now Council) at the conclusion of the Committee's Eighth Session.
After review by a Technical Committee, both the treaty and its optional protocol will be sent to the U.N. General Assembly for adoption at its 61st session in December 2006. The two instruments will thereupon be opened for
signature/accession/ratification and are expected to draw a large number of
states parties. See generally Press Release, U.N. General Assembly, Ad Hoc
Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. AC.265/2006/L.6 (Aug. 25, 2006).
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